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1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the potential for conflict between news media’s idealised socio-
political role and its practical commercial role, a qualitative content analysis 
of the coverage of the 2012 Libor scandal in four newspapers, The Times 
(London), The Financial Times, The New York Times, and The Wall Street 
Journal, revealed that these aspects of news media are in fact 
complementary. Although it is often argued that the commercial function of 
news media is prioritised over its social and political roles, the commercial 
aspects of the coverage of the Libor scandal did not overwhelm or 
significantly compromise the political watchdog role of the media. In fact, 
the unexpectedly large divide in coverage between the UK newspapers and 
the US newspapers signifies that the divide between domestic and foreign 
news is significantly more important than the divide between news media’s 
idealised socio-political role and its commercial aspects. The unexpected 
similarities between specialist and mainstream publications significantly 
contributed to this divide between domestic and foreign news. This suggests 
that scandals represent a unique case in which dramatic mass interest 
imperatives combine with critical public interest imperatives. 
 
The results of the analysis suggest that an equal fulfilment of both watchdog 
and newsworthiness imperatives – demonstrated by the UK press – can 
offer a comprehensive investigation of, and increase public concern for, 
issues within an international scandal. A strong emphasis on news values 
and construction of a personalised narrative by these newspapers enabled 
the scandal to attract and maintain audience attention. Their coverage also 
featured a strong emphasis on the morality of the scandal and used official 
political sources in order to inform the public of something they needed to 
know.  
 
In contrast, a lack of fulfilment of both watchdog and newsworthiness 
imperatives – demonstrated by the US press – can result in a weakening of 
 
 
2 
public attention and debate about foreign issues that directly affect 
domestic political and economic policy. The US coverage failed to emphasise 
news values or construct a personalised narrative, which stripped the 
scandal of resonance. It failed to aggressively question the individuals 
involved and demand official investigations, failed to emphasise the 
substantive social impact, and used a limited range of sources. This resulted 
in the US press failing to construct a scandal frame. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The news media is the only democratic institution within society whose 
success is measured both in terms of an idealised socio-political role and as 
a commercial entity. This is a “formula for conflict” (Harrison and Stein 21) 
that leads to a press that is “caught between its desire to please and extend 
its audience and its desire to give a picture of events and people as they 
really are” (Hutchins 57). The coverage of scandal can serve both of these 
purposes simultaneously and, by examining the coverage of a scandal, some 
insight can be gained into the balance between the idealised socio-political 
role and the commercial aspects of the press. Despite the proclamations of 
idealists, the commercial aspects of the coverage of the Libor scandal (2012) 
did not overwhelm or significantly compromise the socio-political role of 
the media. These two potentially conflicting, and often mutually exclusive, 
aspects of the news media appear to be complementary rather than in 
conflict. Newsworthiness and the pursuit of audience attention enhanced 
the media’s ability to be an effective political watchdog. In fact, the 
unexpectedly large divide between domestic and foreign news signifies that 
this is perhaps significantly more important than the divide between news 
media’s idealised socio-political role and its commercial aspects. In addition, 
there were some intriguing and unexpected similarities between specialist 
and mainstream publications.  
 
News media’s challenge to balance idealistic public service aspects and 
practical economic aspects was articulated almost 70 years ago in the 
Hutchins Commission (1947), which defined news media as a “business 
affected by public purpose” (Hutchins 1947) and has been a consistently 
salient concern over the decades. Harrison and Stein (1973) explained that 
the objective to generate profits, maintain audiences, as well as advocate 
social change is indeed a formula for conflict (21). Hart (1981) observed 
that working within the framework of a commercial enterprise means a 
certain degree of conflict between the ideological and commercial interests 
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is unavoidable (268). Schultz (1998) furthers these arguments by explaining 
that the commercial nature of the press makes it “a curious, hybrid political 
institution” due to the fact that it is the only democratic function within 
society whose success is also measured commercially (3-4).  
 
It is often argued that the commercial function of news media is prioritised 
over its social and political roles. News media are increasingly being 
criticised for exercising “self-interested political and economic power rather 
than acting as a disinterested check on the abuse of such power by others” 
(Schultz 4). The increasing commercialisation of news media has 
encouraged political infotainment, where a focus on sensationalism has led 
to politics being represented to the public “as something akin to a soap 
opera” (McNair 242). This in turn has generated concern that the 
commercialisation of the news is ultimately ‘dumbing down’ audiences 
(McNair 242). As McNair argues, political journalism is expected to report 
on economic policy, foreign affairs, and other valuable matters, “rather than 
the love lives of politicians, or their ability to look good on TV” (242). 
However, the desire to maximise profits and pursue personal gain through 
these methods is motive to “dispose of expensive Fourth Estate 
responsibilities” (Schultz 4). Schultz explains that although some news 
organisations have recognised the commercial advantages of investigative 
journalism, corporate interest has been varied and remains limited (51).  
 
Schultz reflects that the ideal socio-political role of news media is to 
successfully fulfil a ‘watchdog’ role, exposing the transgressions of leaders 
and officials in the name of the public interest. It must accomplish this while 
transcending its practical commercial obligations. She argues that the need 
to scrutinise those in power remains essential, yet this watchdog duty is 
“beyond the scope of the media industry” as it is constrained by its 
competing commercial imperatives (4). John H. McManus (2009), in fact, 
defines the commercialisation of the news by articulating its inherent 
conflict with watchdog imperatives, stating that the commercialisation of 
the news reflects “any action intended to boost profits that interferes with a 
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journalist’s or news organisation’s best effort to maximise public 
understanding of those issues and events that shape the community they 
claim to serve” (219).  
 
Financial journalism presents challenges in measuring the balance between 
news media’s socio-political and commercial roles. Financial media often 
construe their audience differently from mainstream media, in the sense 
that they cater to a relatively economic-literate audience. This means that 
there is variation in commercial imperatives between specialist publications, 
such as The Financial Times, and mainstream publications, such as The Times. 
There is also uncertainty surrounding the wider watchdog role of financial 
journalists, with a lack of consensus regarding the extent to which they 
should seek to serve the wider public interest (Tambini 2010). 
 
McManus explores two theories of news selection based on the conflict 
between fulfilling a socio-political role and a commercial role. The first 
theory “follows the norms of socially responsible journalism”, while the 
second theory “maximises the return to shareholders/owners” (227). He 
argues that the probability of an event becoming news under the watchdog 
function model is “proportional to the expected consequence of the story in 
terms of helping people make sense of their environment, and proportional 
to the size of the audience for whom it is important” (227). However, the 
probability under a commercial model is “proportional to the harm the 
information might cause major advertisers or the parent corporation, and 
proportional to the cost of uncovering [and reporting] it,…. [and] 
proportional to the expected breadth of appeal of the story to audiences 
advertisers will pay to reach” (227). As McManus observes, these two 
selection logics clearly conflict more than coincide. In addition, the more 
commercial imperatives are prioritised over watchdog imperatives, “the less 
valuable the news becomes as a resource for citizens” (227). 
 
Schultz’s survey of Australian news and investigative journalists revealed 
the conflict between watchdog imperatives and commercial imperatives. 
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When asked the extent to which they personally favoured the ideal of news 
media as “an independent and critical watchdog of government” (50), 79% 
of the news journalists and 87.5% of the investigative journalists favoured 
this idea strongly; only 5% of the news journalists and 2.5% of the 
investigative journalists considered the media as “just another business”  
(50). However, both sets of journalists showed less confidence about the 
reality of the media as a watchdog when asked to assess the “actual situation 
in Australia today (1992)” (51). Aggregate totals revealed that 39% of the 
news journalists and 35% of the investigative journalists thought the actual 
situation was “tipped in favour of an emphasis on the commercial” (51); 
only 21% of the news journalists and 12% of the investigative journalists 
believed that the media was fulfilling its role as a watchdog. 
 
Scandals provide a useful opportunity to investigate the balance, or lack 
thereof, between the commercial and socio-political roles of the media. 
James Lull and Stephen Hinerman (1997) define ‘scandal’ as a breach in 
moral conduct and authority, whereby social norms reflecting the dominant 
morality are transgressed, often provoking disgrace or outrage (3). A variety 
of effects are possible, from ideological and cultural economising to 
disruption and change (3). Scandals embody newsworthiness imperatives, 
which attract audiences and satisfy business objectives of the media. They 
possess a ‘juicy’ quality by satisfying news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965; 
Harcup and O’Neill 2001), grabbing and maintaining audience attention, 
which is paramount to advertisers. Scandals also perform a watchdog 
function within society, inherently keeping checks on powerful individuals 
and groups within society by exposing their transgressions.  
 
The 2012 Libor scandal, in which Barclays bank admitted to manipulating 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), provides a useful case study to 
investigate whether newsworthiness imperatives are prioritised over 
watchdog imperatives. A qualitative content analysis of the coverage in four 
newspapers, The Times (London), The Financial Times, The New York Times, 
and The Wall Street Journal, revealed a complementary relationship between 
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these presumed-to-be conflicting functions. This scandal featured 
prominently in the UK press, with the two UK newspapers presenting an 
equal balance of newsworthiness imperatives and watchdog imperatives. A 
strong emphasis on news values and their use of personalisation enabled 
the scandal to attract and maintain audience attention. This in turn made it 
easier for the newspapers to emphasise watchdog imperatives, informing 
the public of something they needed to know through a strong emphasis on 
the morality of the scandal and use of official political sources. This suggests 
that scandals can help to make financial news interesting for the 
mainstream, which then helps to engender a well-informed public.  
 
Although the two US newspapers did pick up the story, and at times 
featured insightful reporting, their fulfilment of watchdog and 
newsworthiness imperatives did not match the UK coverage. Their coverage 
revealed a significant lack of emphasis on news values and failed to 
personalise the scandal. This resulted in a lack of fulfilment of 
newsworthiness imperatives, which in turn made it difficult to initiate a 
strong emphasis on watchdog imperatives. The coverage revealed a lack of 
emphasis on the morality of the scandal and official political sources, which 
meant that the US media fell short of fulfilling watchdog imperatives for its 
audience. Thus, an interesting next step would be to focus on differences in 
coverage of foreign versus domestic scandals.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1.  Representations of the Socio-Political and Commercial 
Roles of News Media 
 
The balance between the socio-political and commercial roles of news 
media can be measured through an analysis of news media’s fulfilment of 
watchdog imperatives and newsworthiness imperatives. The watchdog 
function is a representation of, and provides the best means of measuring, 
news media’s socio-political role. Newsworthiness imperatives are a 
representation of, and provide the best means of measuring, news media’s 
commercial role. 
 
 
1.1.  Watchdog Function  
 
The watchdog function represents the idealised socio-political role of news 
media by exposing wrongdoing in the public interest, informing the public of 
what they need to know (Coronel 2008). Thus, this function perceives the 
public as citizens rather than consumers. This function is embedded in news 
media’s self-definition as the Fourth Estate, reflecting expectations that 
news media maintain a sceptical eye on powerful individuals and groups 
within society. This is enacted through the watchdog function by exposing 
their transgressions in order to “[guard] the public’s interest and [protect] it 
from misinformation, incompetence and corruption” (Bennett et al 184). 
The watchdog function is an effective representation of the media’s socio-
political role through its ability to act as a catalyst for changes in laws and 
regulations. Traditionally, the watchdog function is regarded as the 
exposure of government wrongdoing, whereby well-informed citizens can 
assess the efficacy of the government’s performance and hold it accountable 
(Coronel 2008; Bennett et al 2007). However, exposure often occurs across 
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a variety of sectors, with the press also uncovering wrongdoing in the 
private sector (Coronel 2008). Indeed, the watchdog function covers a 
variety of exposure journalism, from celebrities to officials, from sex 
scandals to political and financial corruption.  
 
Investigative journalism is arguably the most distinguished form of 
watchdog journalism. Investigative journalists expose how and why 
individuals and institutions fail, reporting “when things go wrong, who is 
responsible, how the wrongdoing was done, and its consequences” (Coronel 
3). They draw attention to larger patterns of incompetence or corruption 
and the systemic failures that underpin these (Coronel 2008). Watergate is 
often regarded as the epitome of watchdog and investigative journalism. 
This exposé resulted in the resignation of US President Richard Nixon and 
was the product of investigative journalists, government investigators and 
Congress (Coronel 2008). Although some critics argue that Watergate was 
driven more by political insiders than the media, Watergate continues to be 
regarded as the leading example of the power of the press in a democracy.  
 
Protess et al (1991) found that investigative journalism could produce three 
types of policy effects: “deliberative”, in which reporting results in official 
commitments to address the problems exposed and the possible solutions, 
i.e. the commissioning of inquiries or hearings; “individualistic”, in which 
sanctions are applied against individuals or companies accused of 
wrongdoing; and “substantive”, in which investigations result in tangible 
changes in rules, laws, procedures or policies. These policy effects have been 
seen in a variety of cases globally as a result of the watchdog function. For 
example, The News of the World phone hacking scandal (2011) is a recent 
example of the press’ ability to enact the watchdog function and produce 
policy effects. 
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1.2.  Newsworthiness Imperatives  
 
Newsworthiness imperatives represent the pragmatic commercial role of 
news media by attracting and entertaining audiences in order to cater to 
advertisers. Newsworthiness imperatives often reflect the nature of news 
media as a commodity by perceiving the public as consumers rather than 
citizens. This in turn leads to an “economic rationalisation of journalism” 
(McManus 219). Newsworthiness imperatives encompass expectations of 
mass interest and entertainment in order to inform the public of what they 
want to know. Schultz articulates the inextricable link between 
entertainment and news, arguing that it is not just about finding a balance 
between the two, but “inserting the values of entertainment into the news” 
(4) in order to satisfy newsworthiness imperatives. Similarly, Murdock and 
Golding (1974) argue, “news must be entertainment; it is, like all media 
output, a commodity” and therefore must be “vociferously inoffensive” in 
the search for attractive audiences who cater to advertisers’ needs (230).  
 
This emphasis on entertainment has produced numerous examinations of 
the extent of the tabloidisation of the news and its consequences (See Bird 
1998 and Tomlinson 1997). In particular, debates often focus on whether 
newsworthiness imperatives generate audience preferences for 
entertainment, or whether they satisfy these preferences. Newsworthiness 
imperatives satisfy the core proposition of market-based news media, 
ultimately “[giving] the people what they want” (McManus 224). However, 
this proposition has been the subject of much debate (See Barker 2002; 
Bogart 2000; McChesney 2004). 
 
 
2.  Measuring Watchdog Imperatives: Official Sources 
 
The watchdog function can be measured by the media’s access to, and use of, 
official sources. The press rely on official sources due to their classification 
as a specialist class – a social and political elite – “through which news 
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values, newsworthiness and the very agenda of the news are defined” (Atton 
268). Allan Bell (1991) articulates that a source can be used as both a form 
of authority and as a newsmaker, “someone whose own words make news” 
(193-194). However, as Bennett et al (2007) observe, the use of official 
sources often compromises, and in some cases impedes, the fulfilment of 
watchdog imperatives. There is a clear conflict between journalists and 
sources in their battle for power over public opinion: the watchdog function 
tasks journalists with protecting society from corruption, however officials 
are tasked with protecting their own interests, often at all costs (Bennett et 
al 2007). The source-reporter relationship in financial journalism is 
particularly challenging, as financial reporters often need elite market 
sources for news leads when reporting events that are not publically 
accessible to outside observers. In addition, the press is developing an 
unhealthy relationship with sources of power and is increasingly neglecting 
to question or challenge official versions of events (Bennett et al 2007). As a 
result of official sources driving the news, accountability is compromised. 
Bennett et al explored these aspects in an investigation into the US news 
media’s coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal – the torture and abuse of 
political prisoners.  
 
The perceived dangers of powerful sources for the watchdog function were 
articulated in 1947 in the Hutchins Commission: a US private commission of 
inquiry, conducted by Robert Hutchins, Chancellor of Chicago University 
(McQuail 2005: 170). The findings were critical of the press for increasingly 
falling short of fulfilling watchdog imperatives by being – among other 
things – “so limited in the access it gave to voices outside the circle of a 
privileged and powerful minority” (McQuail 2005: 170). The report coined 
the term ‘social responsibility’, stipulating that the press not only just meet 
the immediate needs of its own readers but also “contribute to the cohesion 
of society and the representation and expression of its diversity” (McQuail 
2003: 54). Social responsibility theory became – among other things – one of 
the predominant ways of thinking about the desirable relationship between 
media and sources, and the options for policy to improve the watchdog 
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function of media (2003: 55). However, the theory of social responsibility is, 
of course, a contested ideal, and has proven to be a difficult standard for 
news media to meet when considering the forces of commercial imperatives, 
in “an era of increasingly controlled information by the government, 
tightening marketing imperatives, and shrinking news audiences” (Bennett 
et al 185-186).  
 
In their book, When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from 
Iraq to Katrina (2007), Bennett et al reveal that news media is increasingly 
neglecting to prioritise watchdog imperatives. They argue that the driving 
force behind a news story often derives from officials in powerful positions 
within institutional decision-making arenas (29). These arenas include 
executive policy circles, or legislative or judicial processes (29). Thus, truth 
or importance is not necessarily prioritised. Bennett et al therefore identify 
the main practices that may account for journalism’s “uneven performance” 
and the subsequent decline in the public’s faith in the press (1). Their view 
embodies the idealistic expectations of the watchdog function as they seek 
to uncover why information that may challenge or even undermine official 
accounts of events is so often “screened out” of mainstream news, unless 
there is an opposing official to lead the charge (6).  
 
Bennett et al caution that the press is developing an unhealthy relationship 
with sources of power, which has potentially negative consequences for the 
watchdog function. The use of official sources driving the news increases the 
potential for the press to become the communication mechanism of the 
government or the market, not the people (1). This then has the potential to 
undermine the watchdog function, as it becomes difficult for the press to 
maintain a sceptical eye on powerful individuals and groups within society if 
these are the people they are using as primary sources.  
 
Bennett et al repeatedly return to the idea that the buck stops with the 
media, claiming that the press is increasingly neglecting to question or 
challenge official versions of events (Bennett et al 6). A familiar justification 
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for this lies in the pragmatics of news media, specifically the ‘access 
journalism’ game, which corporations and officials play rather adeptly: 
journalists are afraid of being cut out of the favors that are granted to 
friendly reporters, including exclusive interviews and leaks. Ultimately, the 
danger of official sources driving the news is the potential for crucial 
information that citizens could use to understand and evaluate stories to be 
severely underreported or simply not reported at all because it is not 
endorsed by powerful sources (6). This has the potential to undermine 
public involvement and fails to set a higher standard of public discourse 
“that officials would be obliged to respect” (2). 
 
Bennett et al use the US news media’s coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal to 
illustrate the lack of fulfilment of watchdog imperatives, and the potential 
consequences of powerful sources driving the news. According to Bennett et 
al, the media constituted the Abu Ghraib scandal in a manner that reflected 
the Washington power balance (109). Because powerful sources were 
largely driving the story, a large proportion of US news media were 
unwilling to call the events at Abu Ghraib, and frame the story as, ‘torture’ 
(Bennett et al 109; Entman 10). This meant that the foundation of the 
scandal lacked a sense of intentionality and purpose, and therefore attention 
was more focused on the torturers as opposed to the policies of their 
superiors (110). This created large gaps between American and foreign 
viewers of the scandal; the American public’s view of US foreign policy was 
significantly different to how others around the world saw it (109). The 
American public were left largely uninformed about policies that had not 
only sanctioned the detention of large numbers of people “with dubious 
links to terrorism or insurgency”, but also policies that created “dismal 
conditions in those facilities” (110). In other words, the American public 
were not fully informed of what they arguably needed to know. Therefore, 
the US news media’s use of powerful official sources negatively impacted the 
imperatives of the watchdog function of news media.  
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2.1.  Accountability 
 
Bennett et al repeatedly return to the ideal of the watchdog function. This is 
often defined and demonstrated when “deception or incompetence compels 
journalists to find and bring credible challenges to public attention and hold 
rulers accountable” (8). The accountability function is often inextricably 
linked to the watchdog function, and can incorporate notions of both legal 
accountability and moral accountability: “Significantly, legal culpability is 
addressed in courts of law, whereas moral accountability is debated and 
framed in the court of public opinion” (Hallahan 221). The accountability 
function has arguably been destabilised in the contemporary news climate. 
This was exemplified through the Abu Ghraib scandal, in which the use of 
official sources was arguably an impediment to the watchdog function, and 
therefore contributed to the Washington power alignment avoiding serious 
official inquiries into high-level culpability (Bennett et al 110). 
Accountability can be significantly hindered by a lack of institutional cues 
that often support and fuel stories. In addition, there have been noticeable 
differences in accountability in the UK and the US, illustrating the need to 
investigate whether newsworthiness imperatives are prioritised over 
watchdog imperatives.  
 
Bennett et al propose that a lack of investigations, court proceedings and 
firings are a key reason for news medias’ deficiency in fulfilling watchdog 
imperatives. These institutional cues often provide the press with a 
“politically safe way to tell stronger stories” (126) in order to address issues 
such as accountability. Robert M. Entman (2012) poses a similar argument, 
observing that the media require official government actions responding to 
revelations (25). News events often fade into silence after a few news cycles 
before sufficiently satisfying watchdog imperatives because no government 
entity initiates newsworthy remedial action, and there is a lack of powerful 
sponsors (26). Entman’s investigation revealed that it is often difficult for 
the media themselves to initiate full-blown stories concerning serious 
misconduct, and virtually impossible for them to sustain on their own (7). 
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Entman’s investigation into the media coverage of the Iraq War revealed a 
somewhat stronger interest in accountability among elites and media in the 
UK than in the US (176). After UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s resignation, 
the new Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, set up the Iraq Inquiry to 
investigate the UK’s role in the war (176). Detailed and self-incriminating 
testimonies were taken from a variety of elites involved in the war decision, 
including the head of British Intelligence (176). Conversely, American 
leaders were held to no such account by elites or media (176). Thus, the US 
press fell short of fulfilling the ideals associated with the watchdog function. 
 
One potential reason for the watchdog and accountability differences 
between the UK and the US is America’s political duopoly. Yves Smith, a 
journalist for leading finance and economics blog Naked Capitalism, echoes 
Entman’s argument that the English Labour party is willing to go after the 
Conservatives in an arguably much more persistent manner than the 
American Democrats go after the Republicans (Smith n. pag.). This is due to 
the fact that the Democrats depend on the same funding sources as 
Republicans (Smith n. pag.). A perfect example of Britain’s persistence with 
accountability is demonstrated with the News of the World phone hacking 
scandal, which showed there is a real possibility of media revelations being 
fed into political investigations, which in turn leads to more media 
revelations (Smith n. pag). As Smith observes, the fact that someone who 
“seemed to have such a lock on power as Rupert Murdoch” could be 
aggressively exposed is a fortifying message to both the British and the US 
press of their potential influence as watchdogs. 
 
 
3. Measuring Newsworthiness Imperatives: News Values 
 
Newsworthiness imperatives can be measured by news values, which are 
the primary means of ascertaining how and why events become ‘news’. The 
foundation study of news values, and the go-to study by most news media 
scholars, is by Norwegians Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1965). Their study 
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of foreign news in the Scandinavian press attempted to understand the 
process of news selection by identifying and defining the news values that 
establish the ground rules that come into operation when journalists select 
stories. Tony Harcup and Deirdre O’Neill (2001) offered an alternative 
approach with an investigation into how useful Galtung and Ruge’s news 
factors were three decades after its first publication. They proposed a 
contemporary set of news values that paralleled Galtung and Ruge’s. Sigurd 
Allern (2002) later made the distinction between “traditional” news values 
and “commercial” news values to address the increasing importance of the 
commercial role of the news. 
 
Galtung and Ruge identified 12 news factors to explain how foreign events 
became ‘news’. Most of these factors embody the actual nature of events and 
actors in the news as opposed to news gathering and processing. These 12 
factors can be used to understand how and why news events inherently 
satisfy newsworthiness imperatives, as they often feature a number of the 
following: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, 
unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, 
reference to elite people, reference to persons, and reference to something 
negative (Galtung and Ruge 65-71). Galtung and Ruge then proposed three 
hypotheses: 
 
1. “The more events satisfy the criteria mentioned, the more likely that 
they will be registered as news (selection)” (71). 
a. In other words, the news values inherent in the event before it 
has been made public 
2. “Once a news item has been selected what makes it newsworthy 
according to the factors will be accentuated (distortion)” (71). 
a. In other words, the emphasis of the news values by the news 
media 
3. “Both the process of selection and the process of distortion will take 
place at all steps in the chain from event to reader (replication)” (71). 
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However, Galtung and Ruge’s study has drawn criticism from scholars, 
including Stuart Hall (1973) – from a largely Marxist perspective – and John 
Hartley (1982) – from a largely semiotic perspective. Both Hall and Hartley 
argue that while a set of news values is indeed useful for identifying the 
formal elements within the construction of news, they fall short of 
explaining the ideological meanings behind such ‘rules’: a sole focus on news 
values “may disguise the ideological determinants of stories that appear in 
the media” (Hartley 80). In addition, Hartley argues that even though a story 
may be reported by exploiting a number of news values, “the news values 
themselves give little clue as to why the story was deemed newsworthy in 
the first place” (Hartley 79). Harcup and O’Neill (2001) concur with Hartley 
when they state: 
 
… [I]n contrast to some of the more mechanic analyses of newspaper 
content, we should be constantly aware that identifying news factors or 
news values may tell us more about how stories are covered than why they 
were chosen in the first place. (277) 
 
Thus, Galtung and Ruge’s second hypothesis, in which news values are 
emphasised by the media, is of particular interest. 
 
Harcup and O’Neill offered a new approach to the study of news values, 
proposing a ‘contemporary’ set of news values that parallel Galtung and 
Ruge’s, including the power elite, celebrity, entertainment, surprise, bad 
news, good news, magnitude, relevance, follow-up, and/or newspaper 
agenda (279). These news values appear to more strongly reflect the 
commercial imperatives of news media. 
 
Sigurd Allern (2002) made the distinction between ‘traditional’ news values 
and ‘commercial’ news values. As Allern argues, discussions of 
newsworthiness imperatives and news values do not often make explicit the 
importance of the market to a news organisation. He argues that as a result 
of the commercialisation of news, in which “news is literally for sale” (142), 
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a set of “commercial news criteria” is required to supplement traditional 
news values (145). This criterion includes the cost to cover and report the 
event, the preparation of an event for publication by a news source, the 
selectivity of a story in its distribution, and the potential for a ‘media twist’ 
in which entertainment is prioritised over relevance, truth and accuracy 
(145). The commercialisation of news means that news must be selected 
and packaged in a format that reflects popular tastes, such as an emphasis 
on entertainment.  
 
 
4. Financial Journalism 
 
Financial journalism presents challenges in measuring news media’s socio-
political and commercial roles. Criticism of financial journalism is largely 
based on the assumption that financial journalists should play an 
independent, watchdog role (Tambini 2010). However, Damian Tambini 
(2010) argues that the role of financial journalism to serve a “wider 
watchdog role…in the system of corporate governance” (162) is impeded by 
the “very direct and powerful impact” that financial news can have on 
market behaviour (161). In addition, this watchdog role is not a consensus 
view, even amongst business and financial journalists (Tambini 2010). 
Problematic still is the source-reporter relationship in financial journalism, 
in particular the use of company sources and corporate and financial public 
relations (PR), as well as the use of analysts. In relation to news media’s 
commercial role, financial journalists often need to find ways of making 
highly complex financial information newsworthy in accordance with 
mainstream news values. These news values differ for financial journalists 
working for specialist publications, and financial journalists working in the 
business sections of mainstream newspapers.  
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4.1. Financial Journalism and Watchdog Imperatives 
 
Tambini explores the relationship between financial journalism and the 
watchdog function of news media, specifically asking how financial 
journalism “fits in to a general framework of checks and balances on 
business” (160). Tambini’s interviews with business and financial 
journalists revealed a significant lack of consensus regarding the extent to 
which they should seek to serve the wider public interest (160). These 
interviews, however, revealed a conflicting outlook compared to interviews 
conducted by Gillian Doyle in 2006. 
 
Tambini uses his interviews with business and financial journalists to make 
several comparisons between financial and political journalists, suggesting 
that financial journalists often “do not see themselves as engaged in ‘public 
interest’ reporting the same way that political journalists do” (160). While 
political journalists have a “strong professional commitment to exposing 
wrongdoing and corruption”, the notion of a watchdog role is much less 
evident among business and financial journalists, who largely see their role 
as “supplying investors with market relevant information” (160). His 
interviews revealed a rejection of “ethical” or “social” responsibilities among 
financial and business journalists, with some journalists arguing that their 
ultimate responsibility was not to “plug gaps in the system of corporate 
oversight”, but rather to “respect the law and serve the shareholders of their 
companies” (161).  
 
However, Gillian Doyle’s (2006) interviews with financial and business 
journalists revealed a conflicting outlook. She suggested that these 
journalists do, in fact, “see themselves as performing a watchdog role in 
relation to corporate performance and conduct” due to primary concerns of 
corporate spin and the “relentless drive towards positive self-portrayal by 
companies” (439). Doyle’s interviews revealed a large consensus among 
financial and business journalists that their ultimate responsibility was to 
remain sceptical, cutting through corporate spin and criticising where 
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criticism is due (439). Journalists are therefore “innately disposed towards 
identifying and bringing to light any problems and instances of poor 
management or failure within corporations” (439). Doyle does point out, 
however, that most interviewees “would not immediately recognise their 
role as embodying any broad public responsibilities” (450). This indicates a 
certain degree of agreement between Doyle and Tambini, in the sense that 
there is a much narrower conception of the audience in financial media 
reporting than in mainstream media reporting. In addition, Doyle argues 
that although news coverage should ideally facilitate informed public 
engagement with important issues, there is “relatively little evidence” to 
support this assertion in relation to financial news journalism (434). The 
ways in which economic and financial developments are reported often fall 
short of “engender[ing] widespread and in-depth comprehension, 
particularly for non-specialist audiences” (434).  
 
While Tambini and Doyle articulate this divide in the ideologies of financial 
and political journalists, recent literature on financial journalism largely 
focuses on the failure of financial journalists to alert society to the warning 
signs of the 2008 financial crisis. As Paul Manning (2012) observes, “the 
sharpest criticism and the one to prompt the most soul-searching on the 
part of journalists was that they missed the story in the first place, before 
the crisis was upon them” (175). Scholars often point to the lack of training 
and skills of financial journalists as a key factor in this failure (see Gillian 
Doyle 2006; Aeron Davis 2007). Gillian Doyle’s interviews with financial 
journalists revealed that it is becoming increasingly difficult to find 
journalists with the expertise to sufficiently understand the complex 
information they are reporting on (433). Similarly, Aeron Davis’ interviews 
with journalists also indicated a perception of a lack of expertise and critical 
evaluation by journalists (163-164). This ultimately undermines the 
arguable watchdog role of financial journalists as it impedes journalists’ 
ability to hold companies to account (Doyle 442).  
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4.1.1.  Sources 
 
Doyle observes that many of the pressures faced by financial and business 
journalists are similar to those affecting journalists who cover other beats. 
These pressures include “constraints over time and resources and the need 
to remain close, but not too close to relevant sources” (435). However, as 
Tambini observes, while the source-reporter relationship between political 
journalists and their sources is often well articulated, the similar 
relationship between financial journalists and their sources is much less 
discussed (159). Two potentially problematic areas become apparent in 
source-reporter relationships in financial journalism. The first relates to 
company sources, in particular the growth of corporate and financial public 
relations (PR) (Davis 2002; Doyle 2006; Tambini 2008; Manning 2012), and 
the second relates to the use of analysts who often have greater specialist 
knowledge in order to interpret complex information (Doyle 2006; Manning 
2012; Thompson 2013).  
 
Doyle’s interviews with financial and business journalists revealed that the 
source-reporter relationship is significantly underpinned by a “relentless 
drive towards positive self-portrayal by companies” (439). When combined 
with the growth of corporate and financial PR, the notion of a ‘spin culture’ 
is formed, of which financial journalists must be especially critical. Both 
Manning and Tambini argue that the increase of PR in the source-reporter 
relationship has enabled financial institutions to exert more effective 
control over information (Manning 180; Tambini 159). Manning’s 
interviews revealed that circumnavigating the layer of formal PR channels 
to establish informal contacts that are ‘reliable and informed’ remains a key 
objective for financial journalists (181). Doyle argues that in order to extract 
useful and ‘truthful’ information from corporate sources, journalists need to 
retain a critical distance, and must be well informed, build up positive yet 
reserved relationships and retain one’s cynicism (439).  
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Doyle explains that the use of analysts as sources often play a much greater 
role in specialist publications than in the business sections of mainstream 
newspapers. She argues that the detailed financial analysis provided by 
analysts is usually not of great interest for journalists “whose primary 
mission is to seek out exciting and entertaining stories…[with] a lively 
human interest angle” (440). However, journalists working for specialist 
publications “have much to gain” from making use of the specialist 
knowledge offered by analysts. According to Doyle, using analysts as sources 
offers a “convenient and rapid means” of interpreting information and 
understanding the significance of events for the companies involved (441).  
 
In addition, Manning’s interviews reveal that this particular source-reporter 
relationship is beneficial for analysts as well, with one interviewee stating, 
“there is an ‘I scratch your back and you scratch my back relationship’… 
journalists need content and stories and hedge funds need publicity but not 
hatchet jobs” (183). Indeed, scholars Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales 
(2003) describe the relationship between financial journalists and their 
sources as a ‘quid pro quo’ situation, in which access to information is 
granted but with the condition that stories are presented in the desired 
manner (1-6). Thus, there are beneficial reasons for both parties in 
cultivating a relationship. However, once again, a degree of scepticism and 
critical distance is vital as analysts often have vested interests (See 
Thompson 2013). Thus, this source-reporter relationship can become 
problematic.  
 
 
4.2. Financial Journalism and Newsworthiness Imperatives 
 
Manning articulates that the ideal of “holistic [and] critical” (178) financial 
journalism is often impeded by mainstream journalistic values. Both 
Manning and Doyle argue that many financial journalists approach financial 
stories with mainstream selection criteria (Manning 179; Doyle 436). This 
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encompasses the news values articulated by Galtung and Ruge, and Harcup 
and O’Neill: 
 
Mainstream news values which guide story selection make it difficult for 
financial journalists to persuade their news organisations…to select stories 
which involve high levels of complexity and appear to lack a ‘personality’ 
around which to hang information. (Manning 179) 
 
This means that financial journalists often need to find ways of making 
highly complex financial information newsworthy “in the immediate sense 
of mainstream news values” (Manning 179).  
 
In addition, Doyle makes an important distinction between financial 
journalists working for specialist publications, such as The Financial Times, 
and financial journalists working in the business sections of mainstream 
newspapers. She argues that a reporter working for a specialist publication 
“may well have quite a different sense of what is newsworthy” to that of a 
financial correspondent working for a mainstream newspaper (436). 
Underpinning these judgements of newsworthiness is the perceived 
readership of each publication: specialist financial publications cater to a 
more “educated, informed and relatively [economic] literate” audience 
including investors and city fund managers. Doyle’s interviews with 
financial journalists revealed that “good financial journalism” for those 
employed at specialist publications involves “in-depth analysis intended to 
inform and perhaps shape investor sentiment and behaviour” (437).  
 
On the other hand, business news within mainstream media caters to non-
specialist audiences, and is expected to “capture and sustain the attention of 
a broad, lay readership” (436). The need for an ‘accessible’ approach to 
financial news in this case results in news coverage often gravitating toward 
‘infotainment’ in which actors, events and intrigues within the realm of 
finance are emphasised (437). Indeed, Manning’s interviews with journalists 
revealed a “certain preoccupation with celebrity and personality, at the 
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expense of ‘hard news’, even within economic and financial reporting” (180). 
In addition, Doyle’s interview with one City editor revealed the particular 
importance of personalisation in financial journalism: “Focusing on people 
and personalities is a much easier way to bring readers in than focusing on, 
say, technological trends or industry structure” (438). Doyle argues that a 
key factor determining newsworthiness in the business sections in 
mainstream newspapers is “whether a lay audience (i.e. a mixed readership 
including many who are not investors) will recognise the players involved” 
(437). In addition, she argues that the scale of the financial events must be 
considered, and whether this is likely to captivate a non-specialist audience 
(437).  
 
Financial journalism therefore differs from mainstream journalism in the 
fulfilment of both watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives. This is a 
result of a lack of consensus regarding the wider watchdog role of financial 
journalists, the complex nature of source-reporter relationships in finance, 
and the variation in news values between specialist publications and 
mainstream publications in the reporting of financial events. 
 
 
5. Scandals 
 
Scandals simultaneously fulfil both newsworthiness and watchdog 
imperatives, and thus provide a useful opportunity to examine the balance 
between these two roles of news media. Scandals fulfil watchdog 
imperatives through their essential position within Johan Galtung’s (1999) 
normative model of media and society, effectively uniting his three spheres 
of state, capital and civil society. They also play a vital part in the public 
sphere (Habermas 1962), enabling citizens to participate in political 
processes. Scandals possess an inherent emphasis on morality that holds 
individuals to an idealised standard of social conduct, consolidating their 
fulfilment of watchdog imperatives. Robert M. Entman’s Scandal and Silence: 
Media Responses to Presidential Misconduct (2012) examines the 
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relationship between scandals and the watchdog function. His investigation 
revealed that news media are falling short of fulfilling watchdog imperatives, 
as the magnitude of scandal news often fails to align with the social costs of 
transgressions. Scandals fulfil newsworthiness imperatives by satisfying a 
number of Galtung and Ruge’s, and Harcup and O’Neill’s news values. In 
addition, the media’s use of a personalised narrative in scandal narration 
serves to fulfil newsworthiness imperatives.  
 
It is necessary to maintain a critical awareness of the way in which media 
mediate transgressions and their role in framing scandal. Scandals are not 
simply reported by the media and exist independently of them: the media in 
fact constitute an event and produce its meanings through processes of 
inclusion, exclusion, emphasis of a perceived reality, and through the use of 
certain types of discourses (Entman 28; Hall et al 249; Thompson 49). As 
John B. Thompson (1997) observes, the very nature of scandals are shaped 
by the media – “their emergence, their developmental logic, their 
prominence, the ways in which they are experienced by both participants 
and non-participants, [and] their consequences” (49). Johannes Ehrat 
(2011) articulates that media publication constructs an act in a particular 
way, which therefore effects the construction of public opinion, judgement, 
and the consequences for social institutions and social actors (5). Critical 
researchers, including Kirk Hallahan (1999) and John Tomlinson (1997), 
consider media framing to be an important tool of power in the struggle to 
define whose worldview predominates (Hallahan 223). The ability of the 
media to raise the importance of attributes and to frame values indicates 
comparatively strong effects that go further than agenda-setting (Hallahan 
222). Indeed, Silvio R. Waisbord (2004) boldly contends: 
 
No other institution can compete with the media as arbiters of publicity, 
deciding what acts of corruption and subsequent developments merit 
public attention. No public space can successfully compete with the media 
as the ringmaster of scandals. Societies come to know about the existence 
of scandals through the media. (1078) 
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As a result of the media’s clear and crucial narrational role in scandals 
(Tomlinson 82), they therefore play a key role in determining whether 
newsworthiness imperatives are prioritised over watchdog imperatives.  
 
 
5.1.  Scandals and Watchdog Imperatives 
 
Scandals fulfil watchdog imperatives by holding an important position 
within Johan Galtung’s (1999) normative model of media and society. 
Galtung’s model acknowledges a reflexive relationship between media 
systems and other spheres of society (10). Different social systems are 
characterised according to the relative priority given to three sub-systems: 
state, capital and civil society. Galtung argues that these three spheres 
operate according to different and sometimes conflicting normative logics 
(7). He places the media system in the centre of these three subsystems, 
arguing that the media is the best means of reconciling the communication 
gap between the three spheres (10). Scandals, in particular, often satisfy this 
need, being a major contribution to the mediated public sphere in modern 
society by “[keeping] a close eye on those in society who wield tremendous 
political, economic, and cultural power” (Lull and Hinerman 28). Scandals 
direct attention to the “problematic ethicality of human decisions made 
within the confines of a ruling value structure” (Lull and Hinerman 3). Thus, 
by fulfilling watchdog imperatives, scandals effectively unite Galtung’s three 
spheres of state, capital and civil society.  
 
Similarly, scandals fulfil watchdog imperatives by playing a vital part in the 
public sphere. Scandals embody a particular form of transmission and 
distribution that enables citizens to participate in the political process that 
affects their lives. Therefore, the public sphere is a valuable concept in 
understanding how scandals perform a watchdog function, and in 
understanding the relationships between scandal and the media, the state, 
the people, and the economy. German scholar Jürgen Habermas (1962) has 
strongly influenced academic debates about the public sphere. The public 
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sphere is first and foremost a space in which public opinion can be formed 
and expressed, and where citizens can behave as a public body (Habermas 
1962). By facilitating the communication of information and viewpoints, the 
public sphere enables the democratic control of state activities, ultimately 
mediating between society and the state (Habermas 1962). Habermas’s 
concept is frequently cited in discussions of the relationship between media 
industries and political processes, with his model defining a standard for a 
democratic media infrastructure; the media, and scandals in particular, play 
a crucial role in criticising the state and its ruling structure. As Habermas 
himself argues:  
 
Only when the exercise of political control is effectively subordinated to the 
democratic demand that information be accessible to the public, does the 
political public sphere win an institutionalised influence over the 
government through the instrument of law-making bodies. (102) 
 
 
5.1.1.   Morality 
 
Scandals inherently fulfil the watchdog function by overtly emphasising 
morality. As Lull and Hinerman explain, scandals act as a “moral anchor in a 
sea of conventionality” (2); they enable the social community to understand 
not just an individual’s behaviour, but human behaviour in general by using 
a moral code with which to evaluate their actions. As a result, scandals are 
arguably the most extreme example of the ‘watchdog function’, 
demonstrating how individuals are held to an “imagined, idealised standard 
of social conduct” (5).  
 
It is important not to dismiss the scandal as nothing more than trivia or 
sensationalism (Lull and Hinerman 28; Tomlinson 68) as its watchdog 
qualities are used to highlight the struggle for meaning and power. As 
Thompson observes, scandals are, in fact, “struggles over symbolic power in 
which reputation and trust are at stake” (245). Scandals’ inherent emphasis 
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on morality produces disgust, offense and popular pleasures, enabling the 
dominant hegemony to be continually reaffirmed, and thus enabling society 
to witness hegemony and counter-hegemony in operation. Scandals 
therefore use their inherent morality in order to function as a “vigorous 
challenge” (Lull and Hinerman 2) to meanings and values that are 
conditioned by considerable forces of ideological and cultural hegemony 
(Lull and Hinerman 2). Kevin Glynn (2000) argues that this is of primary 
significance for cultural theory because it is “central to the general process 
whereby the meanings we make of ourselves and of the social world are 
organised and reorganised” (9).  
 
A moral code is often applied when exposing transgressions involving 
political and economic corruption. Howard Tumber and Silvio R. Waisbord 
(2004) draw a connection between the watchdog function and corruption, 
claiming that examinations of the reasons for scandal usually overlap with 
examinations of corruption (1032). They argue that scandals result not just 
from the publication of negative information, but information about 
corruption in particular (1032): “making corruption public is the defining 
element of scandal” (1077). However, this is a contested notion, as what is 
deemed ‘corrupt’ behaviour can depend on the placement and shifting of 
moral goalposts. The watchdog function’s inherent emphasis on morality 
serves to answer Tumber’s (2004) question, “Why is corruption apparently 
exploding all over the media?” (1122). By overtly drawing attention to the 
morality and ethicality of transgressions, scandals create a “condition for 
publicity” – something that society needs to know – which has meant that 
corruption has “become a public issue globally” (Tumber and Waisbord 
1034).  
 
The effectiveness of using a moral code with which to evaluate actions can 
be seen in the power struggle in the relationship between news media and 
business. In order to combat the largely negative perception of their 
morality and ethicality due to the watchdog function of scandal, big 
businesses, namely oil and energy companies, are increasingly using public 
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relations tactics in an attempt to influence public opinion, adopting what has 
been termed an “ideological offensive” (Dreier 427). Kenneth Henry (1972) 
has addressed the issues surrounding the use of these tactics in the struggle 
for power, questioning whether ‘managed news’ is in fact effective in the 
formation of public opinion (21).  
 
 
5.2.  Scandals and Newsworthiness Imperatives 
 
Scandals fulfil newsworthiness imperatives by satisfying a number of news 
values proposed by Galtung and Ruge, and Harcup and O’Neill. Bell argues 
that ‘scandal’, in particular, is ultimately created by the combination of the 
negative and the personal, which therefore “has obvious news value” (160). 
The sets of news values proposed by these scholars can, in fact, be applied to 
Lull and Hinerman’s scandal typology. This consists of three scandal 
categories that overtly satisfy a number of news values: institutional 
scandals, star scandals, and psychodrama scandals. In an institutional 
scandal, employees are motivated by both professional objectives and 
private desires that can sometimes conflict with prevailing moral standards 
(20). The transgressions of the individuals are deemed scandalous because 
these persons represent both themselves and the institution in which they 
are professionally situated. A star scandal erupts when the mass media 
expose an act or behaviour in which the desires of a famous person overrule 
social expectations, norms, and practices (21). Lastly, the psychodrama 
scandal “turns ordinary persons who do extraordinary things into public 
figures” (22). 
 
The consistent thread in each of these typologies focuses on the individual’s 
behaviour being widely circulated via the mass media through a process of 
“making public” (Thompson 43). The individual’s behaviour is then 
evaluated according to the “dominant moral code” (Lull and Hinerman 21), 
ultimately generating a high degree of shock and public disapproval from 
non-participants. 
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5.2.1.  Personalisation 
 
A vital part of the scandal-making process involves the media’s use of a 
personalised narrative to establish newsworthiness. A scandal becomes 
sufficiently newsworthy when events are shaped into narrative form by the 
media, who create a “media narrative” that frames and structures the 
scandal, populates it with characters, and gives it longevity (Lull and 
Hinerman 3). Both Entman and Lull and Hinerman argue that 
personalisation is essential in the fulfilment of newsworthiness imperatives, 
with Lull and Hinerman arguing that it is “precisely this personalisation 
process that turns a news story from a rumour into a scandal” (4). 
Personalisation can be measured by placing elements of news content on a 
scale from highly abstract to highly personal. Scandals must lean to the 
personal side in order to satisfy newsworthiness imperatives, focusing on 
“individuals who are responsible for or directly affected by an event” 
(Landert 13). Although personalisation as a requirement for 
newsworthiness can generate concerns regarding the potential for 
tabloidisation of news, scholars are optimistic about the potential for 
personalisation to bridge the gap between newsworthiness imperatives and 
watchdog imperatives. However, focusing on individual failures of moral 
obligation may end up occluding a more structural critique of scandalous 
behaviour.  
 
Daniela Landert (2014) defines personalisation as an emphasis on any 
persons who are involved in any of the three entities of mass media 
communication (9): the sender, i.e. journalists; the message, i.e. the news 
event which includes news actors; and the recipient, i.e. the audience (9). 
Landert explains that these three entities correspond with a particular form 
of personalisation: if journalists and news organizations are given high 
presence, this creates the personalisation of text producers; if news actors 
are given high presence, such as individuals appearing in the news, this 
personalises the news event; if readers are given a high presence, the 
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audience is personalised (9). These three forms of personalisation can often 
be observed in the same text.  
 
Personalisation of the news event is particularly important. This means a 
focus on people, rather than abstract or generalised processes (Landert 31). 
Indeed, Bell argues, “something which can be pictured in personal terms is 
more newsworthy than a concept, a process, the generalised or the mass” 
(158). This idea, however, becomes problematic with regards to financial 
journalism, which is often tasked with reporting structural tendencies 
towards bubbles and crises. Landert explains that personalisation can be 
measured by placing each entity anywhere on a scale from highly abstract to 
highly personal:  
 
At the most abstract end of the scandal, news events are represented as 
abstract processes (e.g. developments at the stock markets), readers as an 
anonymous mass audience, and text producers as abstract media 
organisations (e.g. The Times)…. more personalised are representations of 
individual named actors in professional roles, such as the judge of a 
newsworthy court case… At the most personalised end of the scale are 
representations of individuals in their private roles. Highly personalised 
news actors are often found in the role of victims who report how they 
personally experienced news events, focussing on their emotions and the 
effects on their private lives. (10) 
 
The media’s reporting of the collapse of British merchant bank Barings in 
1995 can be placed on the highly personal end of this scale. This scandal was 
narrated in terms of the transgressions and the life of a single individual, 
Nick Leeson (Tomlinson 76).  
 
Personalisation can also be placed on the larger scale of the separation 
between ‘quality news’ and ‘tabloid news’. It follows that personalisation 
does not necessarily equate to trivialization or sensationalism; as Tomlinson 
explains, “Personalisation can be read here not as trivialization but as 
achieving greater proximity to the lifeworld of the audience” (77) – in other 
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words, personalisation can bring the scandal closer to the real-life situations 
of the public. In order to achieve this, “a certain degree” of personalisation 
may be necessary to engender a moral discourse (82). In other words, it is 
the extent to which the media personalise a scandal that influences whether 
it crosses over into trivialisation or sensationalism, where the more 
challenging aspects of a scandal are framed in terms of “crude”, ideological 
moral stereotypes, or are obscured in a “blur of sentimentality” (82). 
Landert explains that while personalisation is more prevalent in tabloid 
newspapers than in quality newspapers, the trend towards personalisation 
is increasing overall (16).  
 
Of course, the danger of personalisation as a necessary requirement for 
newsworthiness is the potential for it to become the only way to tell a story, 
with the media offering stories “whose aim is simply to engage our emotions, 
with no other purpose in mind”, and where “the ‘personal’ obliterates the 
‘political’ as a factor for human behaviour” (Sparks 40). Elizabeth Bird 
(1998) cautions that personalisation, when taken to the extreme end of the 
scale, can create a disconnect between personal stories and larger issues, for 
example “corruption in an industry becomes one guy pitted against 
[another], the complexity of the Gulf War becomes Bush vs. Saddam, and 
good vs. evil” (46). Similarly, an intrinsic structural problem in the financial 
system could become a personal moral failure of individual bankers. 
 
A personalised narrative can manifest itself in a variety of ways in a news 
story. It can be found in the use of episodic framing, which involves 
storytelling from the perspective of people and individual events (episodes), 
to which audiences are arguably more interested and more responsive 
(Hallahan 221). For example, an article about the economic recession will 
feature homeless or unemployed individuals, as opposed to a narrative 
about the recession as a generalised concept. Personalisation can also be 
found in the use of chronological narratives as opposed to the traditional 
inverted pyramid structure of news stories. These narratives make it 
somewhat easier to portray the dramatic and the personal, as they often 
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contain “a clear structure, a moral point, and vivid imagery” (Bird 37). 
Finally, personalisation is most likely in the attribution of blame and 
assigning of responsibility to a villain (Entman 28; Hallahan 221). For 
example, blame was clearly attributed to Nick Leeson by the media after 
Barings collapse, and he was overtly branded as the villain of the scandal. 
 
Entman argues that simply publicising transgressions does not sufficiently 
satisfy newsworthiness imperatives: a scandal frame must be prominently 
and repeatedly applied in order to structure the media text and perform the 
four basic functions that define the scandal process: “promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation and analysis, moral evaluation and 
endorsement of a remedy” (Entman 28). As a result, scandal demands a 
narrative that identifies an individual villain who is the cause of a socially 
significant problem (28).  
 
Thus, personalisation of the causal agent is critical to establish 
newsworthiness (Entman 28). This creates a solid foundation on which to 
alter public attitudes toward powerful actors (36). A rather optimistic view 
of personalisation as a necessary requirement for newsworthiness sees an 
‘abstract’ scandal which is constructed into a highly personalised narrative 
providing an accessible context for the “moral-imaginative reflection” that 
characterises scandals (Tomlinson 77). Scandals use a personalisation 
process to expose the “shifting boundaries between the public and the 
private” (Lull and Hinerman 8) – in other words, personalisation through 
media scrutiny contributes to the public visibility of private acts. Indeed, 
media visibility and accountability preside over the implied expectation of a 
moral code of behaviour (11). As both Tomlinson and Entman claim, the 
‘success’ of a scandal – or its newsworthiness – is often more reliant upon 
how it is narrated by the media so as to personalise it, rather than the actual 
scale of misconduct or the scope of impact (Tomlinson 75; Entman 36). This 
is illustrated through Tomlinson’s comparison of the media’s reporting of 
the collapse of Barings in 1995, and their reporting of the massive fraud on 
the international copper market in 1996. Despite these scandals being 
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comparable in misconduct and impact, they had contrasting levels of 
newsworthiness due to the differences in the media’s use of personalisation 
(75-77). Ultimately, interpreting important national and global issues in 
personal terms is arguably more likely to engage audiences.  
 
Bird’s approach to the examination of the increasing trend towards 
personalisation of news media content comes from the tabloidization-end of 
the scale. Bird argues that audience definitions of news and their 
understanding of its purpose contribute to the newsworthiness of scandal, 
and ultimately facilitate the need for personal and dramatic scandal 
narration. Critics are often confused when presented with evidence that 
shows audiences’ preference for stories with a human-interest spin, as only 
small percentages of audiences claim to follow stories about scandal (37). 
However, data suggests that the public know more about these types of 
stories than other news categories (37). While audiences often “consume 
news in order to learn facts about the world around them and be informed” 
(37), news from an audience perspective consists of “stories that take on a 
life of their own outside the immediate context of the newspaper or 
television broadcast” (37). Lull and Hinerman agree, arguing that at some 
point “the story triumphs over the facts…and in doing so takes on a life of its 
own” (13). This illustrates that, from an audience perspective, scandals not 
only fulfil newsworthiness imperatives, but the personal and dramatic 
themes associated with scandal narration are perceived to be fundamental 
requirements of scandal, as audiences are more responsive to these stories.  
 
Entman argues that the metaphor of a “feeding frenzy” rarely applies to 
scandals (7). He asserts that it is “misleading” to claim that scandal is a 
“primordial instinctive motivation for journalists”, and public demand for 
scandal is exaggerated (8). He uses Watergate as an example, claiming that 
this scandal did not engage audiences or most of the media when it first 
made the news in 1972 (8): “it took almost two years for surveys to show 
unequivocal public support for removing Nixon from office” (8). However, 
while publics can often tire of scandal stories quickly, Waisbord contends 
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that even scandal-fatigued audiences can recover and scandals can be the 
subject of media frenzies when they cross media boundaries, “straddling 
‘quality’ and ‘tabloid’ news” (1096). Financial scandals have the potential to 
accomplish this, as although complex finance is esoteric, the notion of 
‘greedy bankers’ is rather familiar to the public. When the media construct a 
scandal in this manner, they are able to engage a diversity of publics 
potentially removed from and uninterested in high-level serious misdeeds 
(1096). 
 
Bird states that she sees audiences as active and selective readers, “who 
approach all kinds of news with the unstated question: ‘what can I get 
from…this story? How does it apply to my life, and why should we pay 
attention’” (35). Investigating whether newsworthiness imperatives are 
prioritised over watchdog imperatives is therefore useful in the 
consideration of audiences. In particular, it is important to consider whether 
the emphasis on personalisation as a requirement for newsworthiness 
actually prevents audiences from learning about important issues and in 
fact causes them to be ignorant, as the Pew Research Center suggests, or 
whether these stories are more effective in helping audiences understand 
the impact of events (44). 
 
Bird and Tomlinson are both rather optimistic about the power of 
personalised narrative as a necessary requirement for newsworthiness. 
They argue that although people may more readily involve themselves in 
the ‘personalised’ morality of scandals, they do not necessarily lack the 
ability or motivation to engage with more ‘serious’ moral issues: “it may be a 
question of how these issues are presented to them” (81). Audiences may 
pay more attention to stories about perceived important issues if they are 
presented to them using personalised and dramatic narration, enabling the 
issue to enter their own life situations (Bird 48; Tomlinson 77). This 
suggests that the issue is not so much about whether scandals are inherently 
newsworthy, but rather the way news media present a news story, and how 
they encourage an audience to make preferred moral judgments by 
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suggesting the “inflection, clarity and intensity of the transgressive events” 
(18). This idea also echoes Harcup and O’Neill’s emphasis on the importance 
of how stories are covered as opposed to why there were chosen in the first 
place.   
 
While the media are often criticised for making issues too personal, 
revealing the personal side of public events can often be the most effective 
way to actually bridge the gap between newsworthiness imperatives and 
watchdog imperatives: personalisation both engages people and “[offers] an 
entry point to everyday discussions of morality, boundaries and appropriate 
behaviour” (Bird 44). Bird explains that the personalised narration of 
scandal not only initially grabs people’s attention, but also enables them to 
understand the impact of such events. Bird uses the example of John 
Hersey’s human-interest story Hiroshima, which enabled “many Americans 
[to] understand the human devastation of the atomic bomb” (45). Indeed, a 
scandal can be “implicitly evaluated and granted its moral intensity” (Lull 
and Hinerman 16) through the use of personalisation. Personalisation as a 
requirement for newsworthiness can therefore facilitate the audience’s need 
for “a moral code they can use to understand and evaluate human conduct” 
(Lull and Hinerman 3).  
 
It seems to follow that scandalous misconduct may not attain sufficient 
newsworthiness if the news event is represented as a highly abstract 
process. This can occur when blame is attributed to “larger, anonymous 
institutional forces or… obscure underlings operating without their bosses 
knowledge”, rather than an accountable individual (Entman 28). Similarly, 
scandalous misconduct may not attain sufficient newsworthiness if 
responsibility is diffused over “too many bad guys” (Entman 28). These are, 
in fact, typical tactics of those attempting to deter scandal (Entman 28), and 
were seen in the coverage of the 2008 financial meltdown where corrupt 
behaviour and indefensible outcomes reached such complexity that 
responsibilities were largely diffused, making it hard to identify a single 
culpable villain; blame was often placed on an ambiguous and largely 
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anonymous set of targets like ‘Wall Street greed’ and ‘executive bonuses’ 
(Entman 9).  
 
 
5.3. Robert M. Entman’s Scandal and Silence (2012) 
 
Entman uses his book, Scandal and Silence: Media Responses to Presidential 
Misconduct (2012), to examine the watchdog function by investigating 
poorly calibrated scandal news within the field of politics. His investigation 
into the relationship between scandal and the watchdog function reveals 
that news media is increasingly falling short of fulfilling watchdog 
imperatives, as the magnitude of scandal news often fails to align with the 
social costs of offenses. Entman’s investigation fills a void in academia. He 
claims that the relationship between the social costs of offenses and the 
realm of misconduct in which they took place is often not examined or made 
explicit in a large proportion of scholarly works (20). Thus, his investigation 
includes a variety of presidential case studies, where theories are tested that 
might account for the media’s “varied framing of malfeasance – in some 
cases depicted as scandals, yet in others, equally harmful, virtually ignored” 
(12). Entman uses George W. Bush’s insider trading at Harken Energy as a 
case study in order to trace in detail a potential scandal that did not happen. 
He investigates a number of “blocked scandal traits” (138-147), which 
explain why Bush’s socially costly misdeeds never stimulated a damaging 
flood of negative publicity (128). 
 
Entman tests a few core themes in an attempt to explain the reasons why 
the watchdog function can sometimes fall short of its idealistic expectations. 
Some of these themes centre around the inherent nature of the scandal itself, 
including: 
 
1. It generally seems easiest for media to produce a scandal when the 
accusations do not pose much danger to existing structures of power 
and distributions of resources (8). 
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2. Scandalous misbehaviour, and sometimes scandal publicity, does not 
necessarily involve secrecy (9). 
3. The category scandal is not limited to illegality, dishonesty or 
immorality. It also includes violation of a society’s norms and ideals – 
e.g. incompetence, inattention and inaction can be framed as 
scandalous (12). 
o Once a threshold of managerial incompetence is crossed, it 
can raise issues of immorality or even legal transgression. 
4. In contrast to normative expectations, the intensity of scandal news 
is not always propelled by the substantive seriousness of the offense. 
 
Entman’s other themes centre around the media’s role in framing scandal, 
including: 
 
1. In practice, evidence suggests, the traditional media remain crucial 
gatekeepers (11). 
o By definition, an independent, functional fourth estate cannot 
be bound by the same considerations as the government it 
covers (11). 
2. It is necessary to rethink a common scholarly claim that as scandals 
play out, they yield larger lessons that clarify or complicate a 
society’s moral standards, patrol its moral boundaries and register 
changing mores (11).  
o If trivial misdeeds, i.e. newsworthiness imperatives, often get 
trumped up while deceitful behaviour, i.e. watchdog 
imperatives, even when publicised, escapes scandal framing, it 
would appear difficult for scandals to teach morality. 
o Scandals actually blur America’s rather permeable moral 
boundaries. 
 
 
Entman argues that a failure to contextualise, and connect the dots, has the 
potential to impede the watchdog function of news media (141). In failing to 
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draw explicit connections between facts, and between them and larger 
issues of corruption, morality, and legality, a potential scandal is made “less 
resonant, less memorable, less worthy of attention by audiences and 
journalists alike” (141). Constructing a scandal frame by contextualising is 
more likely to engage audiences’ moral compass in order to alter their 
evaluative criteria, and store it schematically in long-term memory (141). 
 
Entman creates a scandal taxonomy, placing scandals into a form of 
hierarchy that is inexplicitly based upon the divide between scandals 
fulfilling newsworthiness imperatives – such as Entman’s example of 
adultery1 – and scandals fulfilling watchdog imperatives – such as Entman’s 
example of the Iraq War and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)2. This 
taxonomy and hierarchy of scandal can be used to hypothesise a correlation 
between the social costs of offenses and the magnitude of scandal coverage.  
 
Entman’s case study on George W. Bush’s insider trading with regards to 
Harken Energy exemplifies the relationship between scandal and the 
watchdog function of news media. Entman uses this case study in order to 
examine a potential scandal that was virtually ignored. He investigates a 
number of theories that explain why Bush’s socially costly misdeeds never 
stimulated a damaging flood of negative publicity (128). Thus, this case 
study serves to illustrate what ‘not happening’ looks like (128). Entman 
details the qualities of the story itself, which involved “a series of ethically 
questionable, and in some respects probably illegal, activities by George W. 
Bush, and by Harken Energy Corporation” (128). Thus, this story inherently 
embodied the definition of both scandal and the watchdog function, with 
Bush failing to meet “important social (and legal) obligations…that imposed 
substantial costs on society” (128).  
 
Entman then details the way in which the media framed – or in this case, did 
not frame – the scandal, explaining a number of “blocked scandal traits” that 
                                                        
1 See Entman: Chapters 3-4 
2 See Entman: Chapter 8 
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contributed to the event becoming a non-scandal (138-147). These traits 
included: the media’s failure to follow up smoking-gun findings; vaguely 
describing the precise nature of the alleged wrongdoing and thus stripping 
it of resonance; failing to connect the dots and construct a scandal frame; 
failing to aggressively question the alleged wrongdoer or demand official 
investigations; failing to focus on the substantive societal impact; using a 
limited range of sources; and asserting that the allegations had surfaced in 
the past making them ‘old news’, and thus are not serious as no scandal 
emerged before. An investigation into how these traits affected the coverage 
of Bush’s insider trading exposed the workings of the scandal process, and 
the ways in which the watchdog function of news media can be impeded.  
 
 
6.  Financial Scandals  
 
Financial scandals offer a unique perspective in which to investigate the 
balance between news media’s socio-political and commercial roles. They 
provide an alternative focus to previous investigations that have primarily 
examined political scandals. Financial scandals have a distinct, and at times 
contentious, relationship with watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives. 
Although financial scandals have previously demonstrated their ability to 
fulfil watchdog imperatives, they appear to have a challenging relationship 
with newsworthiness imperatives.  
 
 
6.1.  Financial Scandals and Watchdog Imperatives 
 
Financial and business scandals were particularly successful in fulfilling 
watchdog imperatives in the 1980’s. In his article, “‘Selling Scandal’: 
business and the media”, Tumber (1993) argues that the economic climate 
of the 1980’s significantly influenced the nature of news media coverage, 
“[ensuring] that business and finance became front page news” (350). The 
increased attention being paid to this particular type of news satisfied 
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watchdog imperatives, as not only did the public become much more 
familiar with business and City culture by being alerted to what they needed 
to know, but an emphasis on morality enabled the press to attack business 
practice, which in turn “urged the government to enact regulation to control 
excesses” (352).  
 
However, it must be noted that while some scholars argue that the post-
Watergate era may have led to a rise in investigative journalism, there are 
also arguments that most extensive attacks on business and business 
practice have not come from news media, but rather from academia that 
“[puts] the Washington press corps to shame” (Tumber 348). Nevertheless, 
the use of a moral code to evaluate actions enabled the exposure of major 
fraud stories including the Guinness share-trading fraud, the County 
NatWest scandal, the BCCI scandal, and the Maxwell pensioners’ scandal 
(350). The Guinness affair involved an attempt to manipulate the stock 
market on a massive scale in order to inflate the price of Guinness shares 
and thereby assist a £2.7 billion takeover bid for the Scottish drinks 
company Distillers. This financial corruption scandal became big news as it 
represented a clear tale of morality: it was a story that inherently 
exemplified the mixing of the company’s activities and the ethics of business 
practice (350). In fact, it was a landmark in this respect as this emphasis on 
morality actually “soured the flavour of 1980’s people capitalism” (351).  
 
 
6.2.  Financial Scandals and Newsworthiness Imperatives  
 
It is particularly difficult for financial scandals to achieve a high degree of 
newsworthiness. Financial scandals are often inherently complicated 
technical matters concerning highly abstract financial concepts and 
instruments; they arguably do not connect with the lived experience of the 
general public (Tomlinson 75). Therefore, financial scandals are susceptible 
to being represented as highly abstract processes, whereby complexity 
impedes the use of a personalised narrative and diminishes newsworthiness, 
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or not represented at all. Entman challenges this complexity justification, 
however, through his case study on George W. Bush’s insider trading, as well 
as Martha Stewart’s insider trading in 2002. Tomlinson’s comparison of two 
international financial scandals of comparable misconduct and impact, but 
which had contrasting scandal magnitude, illustrates the importance of 
personalisation to a scandal’s newsworthiness. 
 
Simplicity over complexity is a critical decision-making element in scandal. 
For mainstream media in particular, the stronger the force of commercial 
imperatives, in which media are driven by intense economic competition for 
audience attention and advertisers’ dollars, the harder it is to justify 
reporting complicated scandal information (Entman 125). Entman explains, 
however, that the need to simplify can have serious consequences. At times, 
it can damage a genuinely innocent individual accused of malfeasance when 
their defence is multifaceted (125). Other times, it can undermine the 
credibility of scandal accusations by making it difficult, if not infeasible, to 
conduct thorough explanation and documentation within the confines of 
typical news formats (125).  
 
Entman uses his case study on George Bush’s insider trading at Harken 
Energy to argue that although the story was rather complicated and 
confusing, the basic facts were not in doubt: they were, in fact, rather 
unambiguous (139). Entman himself manages to explain the story in a 
rather simplistic manner: “as a company director, [Bush] obtained negative 
insider information, and that is precisely the circumstance covered by 
insider trading prohibitions” (139). In addition, Entman challenges the 
complexity justification by highlighting the sizable attention given to the 
story of Martha Stewart’s insider trading in 2002. Entman claims that many 
of the 600 stories that year that mentioned Stewart’s troubles featured 
“exclusively on the details of her transactions”, which included complicated 
financial manoeuvres, multiple players, and confusing timelines (151). Even 
mass-oriented general-interest publications like People magazine covered 
the story extensively and in some financial detail (151). Therefore, as 
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Entman argues, it is misguided to conclude that business investments are 
generally too complex to trigger a media frenzy (151). 
 
Tomlinson’s comparison of the media’s reporting of the collapse of British 
merchant bank Barings in 1995 and the massive fraud on the international 
copper market in 1996 illustrates the importance of personalisation to a 
scandal’s newsworthiness. The media’s reporting of the collapse of Barings 
is a clear example of how personalisation establishes newsworthiness. This 
scandal was narrated in terms of the transgressions of a single individual, 
Nick Leeson (Tomlinson 76). The ‘abstract’ concepts and themes that 
encompassed this scandal – namely the regulatory nature of international 
currency markets and monitoring of risk exposures – were transformed into 
a dramatic ‘human-interest’ story through a personalised narrative about 
Leeson and his life, to which the public could better relate (Tomlinson 75).  
 
In comparison, the media’s reporting of the fraud on the international 
copper market is a clear example of the effect a lack of personalisation can 
have on a scandal’s newsworthiness. This scandal was, in fact, labelled by 
The Guardian as the “world’s biggest financial scandal” (Donovan and 
Murphy 25) as it involved the most ambitious global financial fraud: it was a 
convoluted story of market rigging, spanning three continents, consisting of 
“a systematic attempt to siphon off untold profits by controlling the entire 
world market in copper” (Donovan and Murphy 25). This scandal oozed 
potential newsworthiness in accordance with the news values articulated by 
Galtung and Ruge, and Harcup and O’Neill, containing “all the ingredients of 
a prime-time television thriller” (Donovan and Murphy 25). However, it was 
unable to land itself on the front pages of the ‘quality’ press due to the fact 
that it arguably did not have enough to personalise it (Tomlinson 77). 
Although it had a lot in common with the Barings scandal, featuring a central 
villain, Yasuo Hamanaka, there simply was not enough detail available to 
sustain a personalised narrative (77). In addition, the central villain Yasuo 
Hamanaka had not even been arrested or criminally charged, but had 
merely been fired by his company (77). This ultimately meant that despite 
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the economic scale of the fraud, which was actually much larger than the 
Barings scandal, this story never became constituted as a scandal (77).   
 
The newsworthiness of the above two financial scandals and the theme of 
personalisation can be interpreted using Entman’s scandal taxonomy. 
Tomlinson’s comparison clearly demonstrates that personalisation plays a 
key role in the media’s “varied framing of malfeasance – in some cases 
depicted as scandals, yet in others, equally harmful, virtually ignored” (12). 
These examples support the claim that a lack of personalisation can mean 
that the “magnitude” of scandal news fails to align with the social costs of 
alleged offenses.  
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THE LIBOR SCANDAL 
 
The Libor scandal is an exemplary case in which to examine whether 
newsworthiness imperatives are prioritised over watchdog imperatives. 
This international scandal received high-magnitude attention in the UK, yet 
low-magnitude in the US, providing a perfect opportunity to investigate the 
extent to which watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives were fulfilled. 
 
The Libor scandal erupted in late June 2012 when British bank Barclays 
admitted to the United States Department of Justice to “misconduct” in 
rigging the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) between 2005-2009. 
Libor is a benchmark interest rate for trading between banks, used to 
determine the rate at which global banks lend money to each other. The rate, 
which is set by 16 international banks, is considered to be one of the most 
crucial interest rates in finance. Libor underpins trillions of dollars’ worth of 
consumer and corporate loans and financial contracts worldwide, including 
mortgages, credit cards, and business and student loans. Therefore, the 
manipulation of this rate has a significant flow-on effect on the global 
economy. 
 
The scandal involved Barclays, along with a number of the other 15 global 
banks who set the rate, manipulating Libor and trading against information 
in a massive insider trading operation in order to first inflate profits, and 
later create an appearance of soundness in the markets during a period of 
crisis. According to the US Department of Justice, traders at Barclays 
“encouraged” the manipulation of Libor, which resulted in Barclays’s rate 
submissions being “false and misleading” (justice.gov).  
 
The process by which Libor is set means that more than one bank had to be 
involved in an act of rate-rigging. Global banks submit their borrowing costs 
every morning to the Thomson Reuters data collection service (Grey n. pag.). 
The calculation agent discards the highest and lowest 25 percent of 
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submissions and then averages the remaining rates to determine the Libor 
rate; one stray outlier does not affect the rate (Grey n. pag.). Therefore, in 
order for the rate to be affected, more than one bank has to be involved in an 
act of rate rigging. Although British bank Barclays was the only financial 
institution officially held responsible and punished for the manipulation of 
Libor – agreeing to pay $453 million to US and UK regulators – 15 other 
global financial institutions were implicated in the scandal. These 15 
institutions remain under international investigation by a handful of 
regulatory authorities, including those of the US, the UK, Switzerland, 
Canada, and Japan, for allegedly manipulating Libor between 2005 and 2009. 
Included in this list are Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Citigroup Inc, Credit 
Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Rabobank.   
 
Award-winning journalist Matt Taibbi, writing for Rolling Stone magazine, 
described this story as a corruption scandal of epic proportions 
(Rollingstone.com). Taibbi’s article, titled “Why is Nobody Freaking Out 
About the Libor Banking scandal”, explicitly criticised and questioned, 
“Where’s the outrage here in America?” He observes that although there was 
some coverage, what was missing was the “Holy F***ing S***!” factor. 
Furthermore, media commentary in Britain drew many parallels to the News 
of the World phone hacking scandal, articulating the prospect of an eruption 
leading to lasting changes in both the financial and political landscape.  
 
The manipulation of Libor had both negative and positive effects for 
consumers and companies, demonstrating an interesting duality. The banks’ 
first fabrication of artificially high Libor submissions, in order to inflate 
profits, meant that some investors would have benefited while citizen 
borrowers would have suffered. This means that borrowers across a wide 
spectrum would have been making greater repayments. As the American 
Banker notes, while some plaintiffs claim investors were harmed because 
borrowers paid too little interest, others argue that borrowers were harmed 
because they paid too much (Grey n. pag.). The Wall Street Journal notes that 
an extra 30 base points would add approximately $100 to the monthly 
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payment on a $500,000 adjustable-rate mortgage (Grey n. pag.). On the 
other hand, the banks’ later fabrication of artificially low Libor submissions 
in order to appear financially stable was in fact potentially beneficial for 
citizen borrowers, who would have been making smaller repayments. In the 
corporate arena, this would amount to millions or billions in losses and 
gains. As a result, the expectation of public outrage of corruption at the 
highest level becomes complicated, as questions are raised regarding the 
morality of corruption when both negative and positive effects are evident.  
 
The Libor scandal represents an institutional scandal. As Lull and Hinerman 
assert, employees are motivated by both professional objectives and private 
desires that can sometimes conflict with prevailing moral standards (20). 
The transgressions of the individuals in the Libor scandal are deemed 
scandalous not only due to an overt “breach in moral conduct and authority” 
(Lull and Hinerman 3), but these persons represented both themselves and 
the institution in which they were professionally situated. Barclays, as well 
as the other 15 financial institutions implicated, were held publicly to a high 
moral standard that individual persons affiliated with it failed to meet (20). 
This ultimately put many large and powerful institutions under close 
scrutiny by financial regulators, the media and the public.  
 
The Libor scandal produced strong public policy and regulatory implications 
for the entire financial industry. As such, the idea of the “moral panic” (See 
Lull and Hinerman 1997) could emerge in the coverage of the scandal. The 
moral panic represents a reaction to an apparent social movement, where 
the number of people thought to be involved essentially threatens to 
destabilise the status quo (Lull and Hinerman 4). The behaviours of the 
individuals who define the Libor scandal could stimulate a moral panic if 
their actions are interpreted as “symptomatic of a larger social problem” (4), 
which is possible considering the extensive number of people and 
institutions thought to be involved in the rigging of Libor. This could lead to 
the coverage focusing on the manner of the moral breach instead of the 
actual persons involved (4).  
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The Libor scandal clearly raises questions about deregulation in the 
financial sector, exposing the flaws of regulatory legislation. In 2000, 
Congress passed The Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), 
leaving the off-exchange derivatives market, in which Libor is situated, 
unregulated (Bair n. pag.). Congress supported the argument that the 
Federal Reserve Board System provided sufficient oversight of the major 
derivatives dealers (Bair n. pag.). As a result of this new legislation, the 
nation’s existing derivatives market regulator, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), was taken out of the game. Although the CFTC 
did not have direct oversight of Libor, its removal created a larger gap in the 
monitoring of markets to ensure pricing was transparent and reflected 
market realities (Bair n. pag.). Ironically, despite having no apparent 
jurisdiction, it was actually the CFTC that led the investigation that exposed 
the Libor rate rigging. This was thanks to three CFTC enforcement attorneys, 
Vince McGonagle, Gretchen Lowe and Anne Termine, who found a loophole 
in the regulatory system, and launched an investigation, which they pursued 
for four years (Bair n. pag.). 
 
Indeed, the scandal clearly reveals the uncertainty surrounding who was 
responsible for Libor, as the Central Banks from both the US and the UK 
engaged in a blame-shifting game in the years before the scandal erupted. 
The New York Federal Reserve Bank was, in fact, alerted to potential 
corruption in the form of rate rigging by Barclays in 2007. However, the 
flaws of the CFMA were revealed, as the New York Fed did not launch a 
comprehensive investigation, stating that they had no responsibility for 
oversight of Libor. Instead, a memo was sent to the Bank of England 
recommending policy reforms (Bair n. pag.). However, the Bank of England 
also had no regulatory authority, as this power resided exclusively with the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Thus, the memo was forwarded to the 
BBA – ironically, the unregulated trade group that presides over the banks 
that set Libor.  
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An interesting outlook on accountability was initially demonstrated by the 
US authorities, whereby Barclays was held somewhat accountable for their 
misconduct by receiving a $453 million penalty but was awarded 
“meaningful credit [for providing] full and valuable cooperation” in the US 
investigations. In the initial press release by the US Department of Justice, 
who confirmed Barclays’ manipulation of Libor, they repeatedly credited 
Barclays for its “timely, voluntary and complete disclosure of its 
misconduct…its extraordinary cooperation, [and] its remediation efforts” 
(justice.gov). The release continued, “Barclays’s cooperation has been 
extensive, in terms of the quality and type of information and assistance 
provided” (justice.gov). This ultimately led the Department of Justice to 
agree not to prosecute Barclays for providing false Libor contributions 
(justice.gov), and suggests that leading an investigation is very difficult 
without the cooperation of the finance sector. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
A qualitative content analysis was conducted of the coverage of the Libor 
scandal by two major British newspapers, The Times and The Financial 
Times, and two major American newspapers, The New York Times and The 
Wall Street Journal. Qualitative content analysis can be defined as an 
“empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts” which follows 
“content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash 
quantification” (Mayring n. pag.). The aim of this approach is to maintain the 
systematic advantages of quantitative content analysis, transferring and 
developing them to qualitative, interpretative steps of analysis (Mayring n. 
pag.). While quantitative content analysis expresses findings as a quantity or 
amount – in numbers, graphs or formulas – and can be helpful in answering 
‘what’ questions, qualitative content analysis relies on nonnumeric data in 
the form of words and can be helpful in answering ‘why’ questions (Julien 
120). As Julien explains, qualitative content analysis is “interpretive, 
involving close reading of text”, with researchers recognising that “text is 
open to subjective interpretation, reflects multiple meanings, and is context 
dependent” (120). Qualitative content analysis can be useful in examining 
what is explicitly stated in texts, as well as what is implied or revealed by 
the manner in which the content is expressed (Julien 120). In addition, 
results can be discussed in terms of “discrete instances” (Julien 120), where 
an attribute is either present or absent, or in terms of “degrees of attributes”, 
where an attribute is evident to some degree, rather than simply present or 
absent. As an analytic method, qualitative content analysis is “flexible, 
providing a systematic way of synthesising a wide range of data” (Julien 
121). 
 
A qualitative content analysis of the Libor scandal involved categorising 
qualitative textual data, in the form of news articles, into conceptual 
categories to identify consistent patterns and relationships between 
variables and themes. This was achieved through the development of four 
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analytical categories that were used to construct a coding frame, which was 
then applied to the coverage of the Libor scandal and qualitatively 
interpreted using discourse analysis. These categories were: the emphasis 
on the morality of the scandal, the types of sources used and emphasised, 
the news values emphasised, and the personalisation of coverage. Discourse 
analysis was used in a close reading of news articles to examine patterns of 
language across the articles, and to examine the relationship between 
language and the socio-cultural contexts in which it was used. As Paltridge 
explains, discourse analysis can be used to examine how the use of language 
constructs, presents, and effects worldviews, identities, and different 
understandings (2).  
 
 The analysis remained systematic as these four analytical categories were 
clearly defined and included clear analytical rules, such as:  
 
 The use of the words ‘morality’, ‘morals’, ‘ethics’, ‘culture’, ‘corrupt’, 
‘corruption’ 
o Used to interpret two of the analytical categories: the emphasis on 
the morality of the scandal, and the news values emphasised 
 The degree to which a moral discourse was used in the 
reporting of the scandal equates to the degree to which the 
coverage fulfilled watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives 
o While the term ‘culture’ may not overtly align with morality, this 
word in fact encompasses the meanings and values that underpin 
morality. Thus, analysing the use of the term ‘culture’ serves as an 
effective means to interpret the media’s emphasis on the morality of 
the scandal. 
 
 Reference to law, criminality 
E.g. The use of the words ‘criminal’, ‘criminality’, ‘illegal’, ‘arrest’, ‘law’ 
o Used to interpret two of the analytical categories: the emphasis on 
the morality of the scandal, and the news values emphasised 
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 The degree to which a criminal discourse was used in the 
reporting of the scandal equates to the degree to which the 
coverage fulfilled watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives. 
 
 The naming of individuals: 
o In the attribution of blame: used to interpret two of the analytical 
categories: the personalisation of coverage, and the news values 
emphasised – Although Barclays as an institution was at the centre of 
the scandal, individuals from the company were implicated in the 
event, as well as individuals from the regulatory institutions  
 The degree to which an accountability discourse was used in 
the reporting of the scandal equates to the degree to which 
the coverage fulfilled watchdog and newsworthiness 
imperatives  
o As suppliers of information: used to interpret one analytical 
category: the use of official sources 
 The degree to which an official discourse was used in the 
reporting of the scandal equates to the degree to which the 
coverage fulfilled watchdog imperatives 
 
 The use of the words ‘anger’, ‘angry’, ‘disgrace’, ‘elites’, ‘furore’, ‘fury’, 
‘shock’, ‘outrage’, ‘uproar’, ‘victims’,  
o Used to interpret two of the analytical categories: the emphasis on 
the morality of the scandal, and news values emphasised 
 The degree to which an emotive discourse was used in the 
reporting of the scandal equates to the degree to which the 
coverage fulfilled watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives 
 
A qualitative-interpretive analysis of these rules was used, employing 
discourse analysis to examine the degree to which these attributes were 
evident. The examination of the manner in which these attributes were 
expressed not only revealed what was explicitly stated in the coverage, but 
also what was implied. This enabled a strong focus on the effect that these 
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rules had on the understanding of the scandal and its context. The use of a 
qualitative-interpretative analysis of these rules as opposed to quantitative-
statistical analysis enabled a rich, holistic investigation of the coverage and 
offered meaningful explanations by helping to identify patterns in the 
coverage, as well as an enhanced understanding of the Libor scandal and the 
context surrounding it.  
 
The comparison of four newspapers allowed for a thorough yet manageable 
analysis and mapped various lines of inquiry; two mainstream newspapers 
– one British and one American – could be compared and contrasted to two 
financial newspapers – one British and one American – in order to examine 
the extent to which each fulfilled watchdog imperatives versus 
newsworthiness imperatives. In addition, the two British newspapers could 
be compared and contrasted to the two American newspapers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Mapping the various lines of inquiry  
 
 
The analysis used a total sample size of 680 articles across the four 
newspapers between 28 June 2012 and 28 August 2012: 306 articles 
published by The Financial Times, 213 articles published by The Times, 86 
articles published by The Wall Street Journal, and 75 articles published by 
British 
Financial 
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American  
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The New York Times. These sample sizes reflect a true indication of the 
number of articles published during a two-month period through the height 
of the scandal, beginning with the initial revelation on 28 June 2012 when 
Barclays admitted to misconduct in manipulating Libor. They also give 
initial insight into the perceived newsworthiness of the Libor scandal, and 
highlight a fundamental difference between the UK and the US newspapers. 
The articles were found using the broad search term ‘Libor’, and were found 
within the ‘news’, ‘business’, and ‘editorial’ sections of the newspapers. 
While editorials, opinions, and columns differ visibly from articles in the 
news and business sections by not adhering to the same principles of 
objectivity, these sections remain highly relevant in the context of this 
analysis as they give insight into the editorial mindset and the scope of 
views deemed relevant.  
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
EMPHASIS ON THE MORALITY OF THE SCANDAL 
 
Ranking of newspapers’ fulfilment of watchdog imperatives – most (1) to 
least (4) 
1. The Times    (UK: Mainstream) 
2. The Financial Times   (UK: Financial) 
3. The New York Times   (US: Mainstream) 
4. The Wall Street Journal  (US: Financial) 
 
The above ranking illustrates that the coverage by the two British 
newspapers emphasised the morality of the scandal more than the two 
American newspapers, as the use of key words by these newspapers 
provided a thorough understanding of the moral context of the scandal. 
Thus, The Times and The Financial Times prioritised watchdog imperatives 
more than The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. In addition, a 
narrow divide was evident between the specialist publications and the 
mainstream publications, suggesting a possible consensus among financial 
journalists – in the UK at least – of a commitment to serve the wider public 
interest and an embracement of ethical and social responsibilities. Indeed, 
two editorials in The Times on 2 and 3 July 2012 explicitly articulated that 
this scandal reflects “a serious matter of legitimate public interest” 
(“Banking on the Law” 2), arguing that it is “hard to overstate the 
scandalousness of the bank’s behaviour or its significance for the wider 
economy” (“Libor Isn’t Working” 2). 
 
The coverage revealed two distinct ways of discussing the morality of the 
scandal: the first was explicitly using the terms “morality”, “morals” or 
“ethics”, while the second drew attention to the “culture” of Barclays and the 
financial industry as a whole.  
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Morality and Ethics 
 
The Times was a clear front-runner in a qualitative interpretation of the use 
of the terms “morality”, “morals” or “ethics”, as their relentless use of these 
terms provided a stronger moral context in which to interpret the scandal 
than the three other newspapers.  
 
On 30 June 2012, The Times created a foundation on which to emphasise the 
morality of the scandal by featuring an interview with British Labour leader 
Ed Miliband, who discussed his concerns about the morality and ethics 
underpinning the Libor scandal. The article, headlined “‘It’s deeper than 
bonuses. This is about people who have lost all their morality’” (Sylvester 
and Watson 28-29), clearly prioritised watchdog imperatives by repeatedly 
grounding the scandal in morality, using the scandal as a “moral anchor in a 
sea of conventionality” (Lull and Hinerman 2). When discussing the traders 
who colluded to manipulate the Libor rate in exchange for bottles of 
Bollinger, and the potentially “devastating effect” their decisions can have 
on the mortgage of “somebody living in the normal world”, Mr. Miliband 
stated, “[the trader] has no moral compunction about it because he feels no 
connection with that person. There’s an ‘anything goes’ culture” (Sylvester 
and Watson 28-29).   
 
Mr. Miliband alluded to a specific morality within the financial sector that 
does not align with the dominant morality of society. His assertion that “it 
wasn’t just a few rogue traders out of control and no one knew what they 
were doing” implies a specific set of meanings and values that underpin the 
financial sector as a whole. Mr. Miliband argued that these meanings and 
values, which underpin the Libor scandal, have created a “loss of ethical 
boundaries”. This, in turn, has fostered “institutional corruption” whereby 
people “have lost all sense of morality…thought they were above the rules, 
that they were too powerful to be challenged”. This scandal ultimately 
revealed “a corrupt elite that abuses their power”. This stands in great 
opposition to the dominant morality of society in which “probity, honesty, 
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integrity” are valued (Sylvester and Watson 28-29). This idea was echoed in 
further articles by The Times, which asserted that the Libor scandal 
epitomised concerns about a “moral corruption at the heart of modern 
investment banking” (“Responsible Banking” 2; Clark 8-9). This moral 
ambivalence stems from the overarching perception that the financial 
industry as a whole fosters “greed, incompetence, and a steadfast refusal to 
accept blame” (Clark 8-9).  
 
Mr. Miliband importantly emphasised that the Libor scandal was not merely 
a criminal matter, or a matter of policy – “it goes well beyond that. There is a 
problem with how people operate. This isn’t just about regulation, its also 
about culture and ethics” (Sylvester and Watson 28-29). Indeed, this scandal 
revealed a spectrum of consequences from normative issues such as 
morality, ethics, and corporate culture on the one hand, to political-
economic issues such as policy and regulation on the other. The Financial 
Times also addressed this issue in an editorial on 25 July 2012, advocating 
that Britain “needs a cultural as well as a policy revolution in banking”, and 
advocating for reforms “from prudential policy, industry structure and 
conduct supervision to the culture and values of the banks” (“Reforming 
British banking after Libor” 6). 
 
Articles in The Times (Ferguson et al 34) and The Financial Times (Binham 
23) articulated that while policy issues are often “relatively measureable 
and monitorable”, measuring corporate culture is “widely seen as a difficult 
and complex issue” (Ferguson et al 34). An article in The Financial Times on 
30 July 2012 referred to a survey undertaken by Corven that stated, “93 per 
cent of financial institutions have no way of measuring culture or behaviour” 
(Binham 23). The article explained that while many banking scandals can be 
attributed to cultural or behavioural problems, banks “overwhelmingly 
respond to these events by introducing ‘box-ticking’ processes rather than 
analysing root causes” (Binham 23). These box-ticking processes cannot 
ensure desirable ethical behaviour is actually enacted.  
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On 22 August 2012, The Times featured an article that attempted to remedy 
the difficult and complex nature of measuring culture and behaviour. The 
article, headlined “Banks must solve question of ethics” (Ferguson et al 34), 
articulated that “values and ethical standards” are the foundations of culture 
and are “keystones of governance in any corporate entity” (Ferguson et al 
34). The article articulated the need for a written “ethical code” for banks 
that “should serve as the core document for promulgation of these value to 
all of its employees… [who must] believe in and implement the ethical code” 
(Ferguson et al 34). The article explained that such a code results in 
“instinctive behaviours” of employees, becoming the “embedding process” of 
the desirable values and ethics that underpin corporate culture. As an 
editorial in The Financial Times echoed, culture cannot be “heavy-handedly 
‘managed’ by legislation or compliance rules alone. It must be more subtly 
cultivated and tended” (“Culture Shocks” 8).  
 
This emphasis on the need for a written ethical code reflects a 
transformation in the outlook of the financial sector from past decades to a 
much more pessimistic attitude of the sector and its morality. Another Times 
article quoted Lord Myners, the former City minister, who proclaimed, “This 
is the most corrosive failure of moral behaviour I have seen in a major UK 
financial institution in my career” (“Speaking with one voice”). In addition, 
an article in US newspaper The New York Times quoted Libor pioneer Minos 
A. Zombanakis, who claimed, “I was surprised to see a bank like Barclays do 
this. In my time there was an ethic and you assumed that everyone was a 
gentleman” (Thomas B1). Although this moral dimension from The New 
York Times was insightful, it was not a consistent trend throughout their 
coverage. 
 
Furthermore, The Times’ article emphasised the important relationship 
between banks and integrity, stating that the “ability [of banks] to continue 
to perform their vital economic function depends on public confidence in 
the integrity of their processes and, above all, of their people, upon which 
their reputation depends” (Ferguson et al 34). Interestingly, although the 
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term “integrity” was repeatedly used in all four newspapers, this is one of 
the few times that the term was used with reference to human behaviour; 
the term was more often used to describe the Libor rate itself, not the 
people who attempted to manipulate it. For example, statements that 
questioned “the honesty and integrity of a benchmark like Libor” (Protess 
and Scott B1; Schäfer 19) were typical in the coverage. While statements 
such as these are valid, in the sense that the scandal does raise questions 
about the Libor rate itself, the articles failed to also explicitly acknowledge 
the importance of the “honesty and integrity” in the bankers who set the 
rate. Although this was not a crucial detriment to the coverage, this 
ultimately created a clear separation between discussing the morality of 
those involved, and the institutional problems with Libor itself. 
 
The articulation that Libor itself was “structurally flawed” (Hosking 13) and 
needed reforming was the primary defence of both US and UK regulators, 
who came under intense scrutiny for their lack of action in preventing Libor 
manipulation. Thus, a trend became evident in all four newspapers in their 
repeated articulation of the regulators’ mantra that they saw Libor issues 
“as a sign of market problems, not wrongdoing by individual banks” (Paletta 
and Hilsenrath C3), and that Libor was “a malfunctioning market, not a 
dishonest one” (Nixon C10; Giles et al 1). An article in The Wall Street 
Journal articulated that the scandal represented the blurring of “where 
judgement ends and deliberate falsehood begins” (Nixon C10).  
 
The Times’ emphasis on the morality of the scandal was encapsulated in an 
editorial published on 7 July 2012. The editorial was headlined “It is the end 
of a dangerous moral experiment; We’ve discovered that we can’t live 
without a shared code of ethics. Regulation can never be a substitute” (Sacks 
22). The following section succinctly sums up the importance of examining 
the morality of the scandal: 
 
Morality matters. Not just laws, regulations, supervisory authorities, 
committees of inquiry, courts, fines, and punishments, but morality: the 
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inner voice of self-restraint that tells us not to do something even when it is 
to our advantage, even though it may be legal and even if there is a fair 
chance it won’t be found out. Because it’s wrong. Because it’s dishonourable. 
Because it is a breach of trust. 
 
 
Echoing Ed Miliband’s view that the financial sector has its own set of 
meanings and values separate from the rest of society, this editorial argued 
that we are reaching “the endgame of a failed experiment: society’s attempt 
to live without a shared moral code” (Sacks 22). It not only articulated that 
this scandal breached the dominant morality of society, but argued for a 
universal morality. At the heart of this morality should be the value of trust, 
with the editorial stating that trust depends on “virtues of self-restraint, 
embedded in a culture, embodied by its leaders, and embraced by 
individuals” (Sacks 22). Without trust, and therefore without morality, the 
market economy will fail: “Until morality returns to the market, we will 
continue to pay a heavy price” (Sacks 22). Many articles repeatedly 
articulated that the “fiercely competitive culture obsessed with short-term 
profits and bonuses” (Goff and Jenkins 15) created “a perverse incentive to 
act in ways that, if not illegal, are borderline immoral” (Davis 18). In 
addition, an article in The Financial Times quoted John Thurso, a liberal 
Democrat member of the Commons Treasury committee, who declared that 
the market had become a “sewer of systematically amoral dishonesty” 
(Parker 18).  
 
The Times’ editorial explained that aspects of the Libor scandal could be 
thought of as ‘altruistic’ cheating, where the individuals involved justified 
and persuaded themselves that an act of dishonesty was for the good of 
others (Sacks 22). This idea was echoed in an article published in The 
Financial Times on 3 July 2012 headlined “The case for and against Bob’s 
exit” (Jenkins 19). This article claimed that Barclays Chief Executive Bob 
Diamond believed there was “a moral defence” for the bank’s actions, 
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arguing that the Libor manipulation was “morally justifiable” by the fact 
that:  
 
[E]verybody knew the Libor rate was being manipulated…[and] condoned 
it because they realised that if banks admitted to the real, in many cases far 
higher, interbank borrowing costs, that could be counterproductive, 
potentially destabilising the system. 
 
It could be said that this defence stems from the deeper issue that Libor is a 
construct; it is a convention of the banks, not an objective reference point. 
However, as an article in The New York Times argued in relation to 
criminality, even if other banks were submitting falsely low Libor rates, 
“those may be mitigating factors, not defences to a crime” (Stewart a. B1).  
 
In fact, in the early stages of the scandal, The Times criticised Mr. Diamond 
for trying to downplay the scandal by arguing that the false figures were, as 
The Times writes, “only fractionally dishonest” (Hosking and Costello 6). 
This statement once again alludes to the fact that the moral code of the 
financial sector justifies what the dominant societal morality would deem 
‘immoral’ behaviour. The editorial by The Times (Sacks 22) and the article 
by The Financial Times (Jenkins 19) therefore endorsed the implementation 
of a written “ethical code” in order to re-establish and maintain a morality in 
the financial sector that aligns with the dominant societal morality. 
Ultimately, The Times editorial posited the choice: “either you have a trust 
economy or a risk economy” (Sacks 22): in other words, either an economy 
built on morality, or an economy built on regulation. However, as the 
editorial explained, even in an economy built on regulation, without trust, 
“self-interest defeats regulations”. By highlighting the importance of trust 
and the values of morality, these articles clearly demonstrated the 
prioritising of watchdog imperatives. 
 
Predictably, the Libor scandal triggered a growth in interest in Barclays’ 
competitors from potential customers. However, the coverage by the two UK 
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newspapers highlighted that customers were not only interested in moving 
to other banks, but were actively seeking out banks with the title ‘ethical 
banks’. On 7 July 2012, The Times published an article headlined, “Getting to 
the heart of ethical banking; The Libor scandal: Are banks with a conscience 
the way forward?” (Bridge 57). This article discussed a list of banks and 
building societies that had received a “sharp surge in interest” since the 
Libor scandal primarily because they carry the title “ethical banks”. This list 
included Co-operative Bank, Tridos, Charity Bank, and Ecology Building 
Society. The article claimed that these “ethical banks” return to the qualities 
of “old-fashioned banking” where customers and the public are deemed 
most important. This is in contrast to global banks who embody a corporate 
culture that puts the “pursuit of profits far ahead of ethics” (Gordon 16) and 
who need to “learn to reconnect money with morality” (Turner 22).  
 
This story was covered in more detail in an article published on the same 
day in The Financial Times headlined, “Rivals profit from crises at big banks” 
(Goff 15). This article added Nationwide, Metro Bank, Santander, and Halifax 
to the list, who along with their peers, “promise to treat customers more 
fairly and efficiently than the big banks” (Goff 15). Unlike big high-street 
banks, these “ethical banks” do not work with “companies engaged in 
ethically controversial practices” such as weapon production and those that 
cause large-scale environmental damage (Bridge 57).  
 
However, even these businesses are subject to scrutiny if they fail to live 
their values. As CBI chief John Cridland astutely put in an article published in 
The Financial Times, “There is no point in giving a lot of money to charity, or 
having excellent community environmental initiatives and good ethical 
standards in trading in third-world countries, if the very thing you do… is 
not up to scratch” (Groom 3). Nevertheless, these articles explicitly 
highlighted the morality and ethical issues underpinning the Libor scandal, 
which demonstrated a fulfilment of watchdog imperatives.  
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The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal only had six articles total 
that directly addressed the morality and ethicality of the Libor scandal. The 
New York Times published an article on 11 July 2012 headlined, “The 
Spreading Scourge of Corporate Corruption” (Porter B1). The article 
critically analysed the concept of corporate corruption, posing the question, 
“Have corporations lost whatever ethical compass they once had?” The 
article articulated the increasing disconnect between money and ethics by 
explaining that there is a perception that “company executives are paid to 
maximise profits, not to behave ethically” (Porter B1). This echoed the 
statement in The Times that the financial sector needs to “learn to reconnect 
money with morality” (Turner 22). The article stressed the importance of 
values of morality, asserting, “Capitalism cannot function without trust” 
(Porter B1).  
 
The only other mention of morality in The New York Times’ coverage was in 
brief passing in two editorials on 7 July 2012 (Nocera A17) and 13 July 2012 
(Brooks A23). In the first editorial, the article condemns Barclays’ 
justification for manipulating Libor, stating it was “a fundamental abuse of 
trust” to submit false data no matter what the reason (Nocera A17). This 
leads to the idea that “bankers feel neither the constraints of the law nor of 
morality” (Nocera A17). Unfortunately, the editorial did not develop this any 
further. The second editorial addresses the interesting issue of meritocracy, 
arguing, “the language of meritocracy (how to succeed) has eclipsed the 
language of morality (how to be virtuous)” (Brooks A23). The editorial used 
the email exchanges between the traders to illuminate that fact that “they 
have no sense that they are guardians for an institution the world depends 
on; they have no consciousness of their larger social role” (Brooks A23). 
Despite this strong use of language in these two editorials, this emphasis on 
the morality of the scandal was not a trend in the US coverage. 
 
The only direct mention of morality or ethics in The Wall Street Journal was 
in brief passing in two articles on 7 July 2012 (Jenkins A13) and 17 July 
2012 (Guerrera C1). In contrast to the UK coverage, the first article argued 
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that institutional problems were a greater concern than behavioural ones, 
conveying a sense of denial by claiming, “the larger lesson isn’t that bankers 
are moral scum, badder [sic] than the rest of us. The Libor scandal is another 
testimony (as if more were needed) of just how lacking in rational design 
most human institutions inevitably are” (Jenkins A13). The second article on 
17 July 2012 merely quoted “a top Wall Street banker” who said, “It will take 
a generation or two, but the industry has to regain its moral compass” 
(Guerrera C1). There were no other direct mentions of morality or ethics in 
the newspaper. In fact, one editorial attempted to downplay the scandal, 
again conveying a sense of denial by arguing, “we can almost guarantee that 
this case will prove less simple than the media consensus that a culture of 
corruption in banking has now been proven” (“Barclays Bank Bash” A12). 
 
 
 Culture 
 
There was minimal difference between the newspapers in their use of the 
term ‘culture’, with all four newspapers using the term frequently as an 
implicit way to address the morality of the scandal. As an editorial in The 
Financial Times explained, culture represents “the web of unspoken mutual 
understandings that frame what people expect from others and think is 
expected of them. This web shapes the fortunes of any organisation or social 
group” (“Culture Shocks” 8).  
 
Although the term ‘culture’ represents a largely abstract idea, and its use has 
the potential to depersonalise the scandal and exonerate individuals, an 
interesting link was revealed in the coverage between the discussion of 
‘culture’ and the personalisation of Bob Diamond. This indicates an 
intertwining of watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives. All four 
newspapers explained that regulators had expressed concerns about 
Barclays’ culture as far back as 2010 with the appointment of Bob Diamond 
as chief executive. The Financial Services Authority (FSA), sceptical of his 
appointment, sought reassurance from the Barclays board that Mr. Diamond 
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would establish “the right culture, risk appetite and control framework” 
(Jenkins and Goff 14; Watson et al 1,9). However, the coverage of the scandal 
indicated that Mr. Diamond fell well short of these requirements, as he was 
repeatedly blamed for the problematic culture at Barclays. All four 
newspapers featured statements such as; “he was responsible for the 
culture in which the dishonesty flourished” (Watson and Hosking 6; Lawson 
19); “the deeper problem of culture that Mr. Diamond embodied” 
(“Restoring Trust after Diamond” 8); “Mr. Diamond and his team presided 
over a culture of sloppiness, greed and a lack of concern for clients’ interests” 
(Nixon a. C12); and “Shareholders need to decide whether Bob is 
symptomatic of a sick banking culture that society will no longer tolerate” 
(Goff et al 19). A New York Times article quoted Andrew Tyrie, the head of 
the Treasury select committee, who asserted, “the culture at Barclays came 
from the top… It came from top executives” (Scott b. B1). This article, in fact, 
highlighted a couple of ironic statements made by Mr. Diamond, opening 
with the statement, “[Mr. Diamond] spoke passionately about creating a 
strong culture of integrity and trust” and quoting the Chief Executive: 
“culture is difficult to define… but for me the evidence of culture is how 
people behave when no one is watching” (“Culture Shocks” 8; Scott b. B1).  
 
The Times highlighted an important contradiction in Mr. Diamond’s own 
view of the culture at his bank. The newspaper explained that although Mr. 
Diamond told MPs that the FSA was happy with the “tone at the top” of 
Barclays, it emerged days later that there were, in fact, “serious concerns 
about an endemic cultural weakness at the bank” (Costello 3). Indeed, all 
four newspapers articulated that the “rotten” (Costello 3) culture at Barclays 
was to blame for the increasingly fraught and “dysfunctional” (Costello 3) 
relationship between Barclays and regulators: a relationship that 
importantly underscores the Libor manipulation. All four newspapers 
explained that “trust between [the FSA] and Barclays broke down this year 
because of concerns over the bank’s corporate culture” (Watson et al 1,9). 
These concerns primarily focused on the bank’s “tendency to push the 
envelope on governance and regulatory matters” (Enrich and Colchester B1; 
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Scott b. B1). The UK financial authorities believed the Libor investigation 
revealed “major cultural failings at Barclays that are part of a wider pattern 
of behaviour” (Nixon b. C12).  
 
Another Times article articulated that Mr. Diamond viewed the scandal as 
being isolated to a few rogue traders by proclaiming, “I do not accept the 
view that the behaviours revealed this week are representative of our 
culture. They are not” (Hosking and Costello 6). However, Sir Mervyn King, 
Governor of the Bank of England challenged this claim by asserting, “there’s 
no point in thinking if one or two disappear, you’ve solved the problem. If 
the structure remains the same, other people will come along and behave 
the same way” (Jenkins et al 7). Indeed, while the term ‘culture’ was often 
linked to the specific personalisation of Mr. Diamond, it was also often 
linked to the financial industry as a whole, with all four newspapers 
declaring that there was a need for a “changing culture – and not just at 
Barclays” (“Beyond Barclays” 2). This indicates a clear contrast between the 
personal morality of individuals and the wider institutional morality of the 
financial sector. 
 
In an attempt to help remedy the “rotten” culture of Barclays and the 
financial industry, the coverage highlighted the concept of criminality and 
enforcement. An editorial in The Financial Times articulated that “a more 
muscular approach” on enforcement could have a positive impact on 
cultural change, arguing, “policy makers must take a tougher line on 
enforcement…the penalties of wrongdoing need to be stiffened to the point 
where bankers conclude that it is no longer in their interest to break the 
rules” (“Reforming British banking after Libor” 6). In other words, tougher 
enforcement could bring about a change in the values held by bankers and 
therefore the culture of banking. Similarly, an editorial in The Times 
emphasised that enforcement can make a significant difference in “sending a 
message about what is unacceptable” (Cavendish 19), citing the US case of 
Bernie Madoff, who was the subject of a criminal investigation and 
subsequently sent to jail. However, as the editorial asserted, “In the UK, no 
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senior executive has been prosecuted in the course of the financial crisis”, 
and while the Serious Fraud Office was investigating whether it could 
prosecute Barclays’ traders for Libor manipulation, “under UK law their 
alleged actions may not have been a crime” (Cavendish 19).  
 
In the US coverage, The New York Times twice linked the term ‘culture’ to the 
concept of criminality. In one article, they argued that the US government 
guidelines state, “indicting a corporation for wrongdoing enables the 
government to be a force for positive change of corporate culture” (Stewart 
a. B1). In a second article, the newspaper argued that the Justice Department 
points out in its guidelines for charging a corporation with a crime, “a 
history of similar conduct may be probative of a corporate culture that 
encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds” (Stewart b. B1). 
 
This focus on criminality further demonstrated the apparent divide between 
the morality of the financial industry and the morality of the rest of society. 
The New York Times quoted Ed Miliband who stated, “When ordinary people 
break the law, they face charges, prosecution and punishment” (Scott and 
Protess B1), The Wall Street Journal quoted Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne who asserted, “Fraud is a crime in normal business -- why is 
it not so in banking?” (Colchester and Munoz C1), and The Times and The 
Financial Times quoted Business Secretary Vince Cable who asserted, 
“People cannot understand why people are thrown into jail for petty theft 
and these guys walk away having perpetrated what looks like a conspiracy” 
(Watson and Jagger 6-7; Pickard and Masters 2). 
 
The explicit emphasis on the morality of the scandal by the two UK 
newspapers enabled a firm sense of “moral accountability” (Hallahan 221), 
in which the scandal was overtly debated and framed in the court of public 
opinion. The Times and The Financial Times encouraged the public to use a 
moral code with which to evaluate the actions of the individuals involved, 
and thus these newspapers demonstrated a strong fulfilment of watchdog 
imperatives. Although the coverage by the two US newspapers used the 
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term ‘culture’ to indirectly address the morality of the scandal, The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal, indicated a weaker sense of moral 
accountability due to their lack of explicit emphasis on the morality and 
ethics underpinning the scandal.  
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OFFICIAL SOURCES 
 
Ranking of newspapers’ fulfilment of watchdog imperatives – most (1) to 
least (4) 
1. The Financial Times   (UK: Financial) 
2. The Times    (UK: Mainstream) 
3. The New York Times   (US: Mainstream) 
4. The Wall Street Journal  (US: Financial) 
 
The above ranking illustrates that the two UK newspapers emphasised 
watchdog imperatives more than the two US newspapers through their use 
of official sources. Although the coverage used a variety of sources, including 
shareholders, investors, analysts, lawyers, and brokers, most noteworthy 
was the UK coverage’s emphasis of official political sources, and the conflict 
with official company sources. While all four newspapers relied on official 
company sources, including individuals from Barclays, the FSA, the Bank of 
England, and the New York Fed, the two UK newspapers also relied on the 
strong critical reaction from official UK lawmakers. This significantly altered 
the nature of the scandal, as it was no longer purely seen as a complex 
financial scandal, but a scandal with a prominent political focus. This then 
raised questions as to whether the coverage was supporting the indexing 
hypothesis as articulated by Bennett (1990), in which the media coverage 
took their cues from political opinions, or whether the coverage was 
supporting the CNN effect, in which politicians took their cues from the 
media’s coverage, which elicited their moral and critical reactions (Bennett 
et al 219). Both of these concepts were, at various times, supported within 
the coverage as a whole, however the indexing hypothesis was more evident 
in relation to the use of official political sources who introduced key issues 
surrounding both moral and legal accountability. The UK coverage also used 
shareholders and investors as official sources in combination with political 
elites to further challenge the official company sources.  
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An inextricable link was revealed in the UK coverage between the official 
sources used and the news values emphasised. The two UK newspapers 
relied heavily on political elites and their strong critical reaction in both 
their use of official sources, and their emphasis of the ‘elite’ and 
‘bad/negative’ news values. Thus, many of the UK articles that overtly use 
political elites as official sources can be equally applied to the emphasis of 
these two news values. For example, the articles published in The Times that 
use the critical reaction of Labour leader Ed Miliband both challenge the 
official version of events from official company sources as well as emphasise 
both the ‘elite’ and ‘bad/negative’ news values. This suggests that the 
coverage was supporting the indexing hypothesis, as the crucial emphasis 
on these news values was a result of political sources introducing critical 
perspectives on the scandal. 
 
The US coverage, on the other hand, only seldom featured official political 
sources – from the UK or the US. Thus, not only did the coverage fall short of 
highlighting the strong critical reaction surfacing from UK political sources, 
but also illustrated a large divide in each country’s political elite reaction. 
The coverage did not reveal whether this was a result of a lack of outspoken 
US political elites, or whether reporters did not approach them – or a 
combination of both. Although the US coverage indicated the occasional sign 
of government actions responding to revelations, the lack of official sources 
suggests that the aggressiveness of these actions was significantly less in the 
US than in the UK. This ultimately meant that the US coverage primarily 
relied on official company sources, and therefore fell short of acknowledging 
the significance of the scandal and addressing notions of accountability.  
 
 
Official Political Sources 
 
The stronger use of official political sources in the UK newspapers was 
highlighted in an article in American newspaper The New York Times on 8 
July 2012 headlined, “The British, At Least, Are Getting Tough” (Morgenson 
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a. BU1). The article detailed the typical lack of action from US political elites 
in the scandal process, with most company chief executives riding out a 
scandal by blaming low-level employees and sacrificing a bonus or two. 
Regulators, if they choose to act, merely obtain fines from shareholders. The 
article expressed shock that in the wake of the Libor mess, “Wall Street and 
its supporters in Congress would continue to battle against price 
transparency in any market.” However, the article gave significant insight 
into the potential reason for this, observing, “Then again, that’s precisely 
what they did after the credit crisis.”  
 
The article explained that British officials, however, “are taking a different 
approach with this scandal”. Unlike many US regulators and prosecutors, 
who had apparently “bought into the argument that if everybody cheats 
nobody should be held accountable if caught”, British authorities had not. As 
Labour leader Ed Miliband asserted, “This cannot be about a slap on the 
wrist, a fine and the forgoing of bonuses. To believe this is the end of the 
matter would be totally wrong” (Scott and Protess B1). As The New York 
Times briefly mentioned in two other articles, British politicians had been 
“unflinching in their pursuit of Barclays” (Protess et al B1), and were 
“pushing for accountability” (Scott and Protess B1). This then raises 
questions as to whether this accountability was primarily as a result of the 
media’s highlighting of wrongdoing in the first instance, supporting the CNN 
effect, or primarily as a result of a political commitment to investigating 
wrongdoing, which was then reported by the media. 
 
The UK’s “unflinching” pursuit for accountability was clearly demonstrated 
in their coverage through their strong use of official political sources, 
including Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, who was repeatedly 
used due to his outspoken outrage. Indeed, Mr. Osborne often asserted that 
the financial sector had “elevated greed above all other concerns and 
brought our economy to its knees” (Parker 18). Prime Minister David 
Cameron was also used, asserting, “People have to take responsibility for 
their actions and show how they’re going to be accountable…It’s very 
 
 
75 
important that goes all the way to the top of the organisation" (Clark 8-9; 
Parker and Masters 1), and “[Mr. Diamond has to] make himself accountable 
to his shareholders and the Treasury select committee” (Goff et al 14). 
 
Furthermore, the UK’s fierce pursuit for accountability echoed Britain’s 
response to the News of the World phone hacking scandal, which was in fact 
repeatedly articulated in the UK coverage. The Financial Times used official 
political sources three times to make comparisons to the phone hacking 
scandal, in which official government actions successfully led to a high 
degree of accountability. This was exemplified through the Leveson inquiry, 
a judicial public inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British 
press, chaired by Lord Justice Leveson. The Financial Times published an 
article headlined, “The lie living at the heart of Libor” (Parker 18), which 
used a “Tory official” to address the notion of accountability, asserting, “An 
inquiry [into Libor manipulation] would force the bankers to account for 
themselves; so would the people who were supposed to be regulating them. 
Perhaps Lord Leveson would be free to do it”. Similarly, an article on 4 July 
2012 reflected, “Exactly a year ago, [Labour leader] Mr Miliband put himself 
at the forefront of a popular campaign for the sacking of Rebekah Brooks as 
News International’s chief executive after the phone-hacking scandal” (Goff 
et al 14). Furthermore, an article published the following day, which 
detailed Barclays chief executive Bob Diamond’s cross-examination by MPs, 
compared Mr. Diamond’s inconsistent and evasive testimony to that by 
James Murdoch, revealing an interesting synergy between scandal framing 
and moral benchmarks:  
 
Mr Diamond’s response would have seemed extraordinary had we not been 
conditioned by listening to James Murdoch at similar length in a similar 
accent. Different haircut, same approach. He did not know, he was not told; 
it was the fault of a few rogue reporters, sorry, traders. “Why were you 
unaware?” “I was not brought to that level.” (Engel 2) 
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The Times also used official political sources to make comparisons to the 
phone hacking scandal. In an article on 30 June 2012, the newspaper quoted 
Labour leader Ed Miliband, who drew parallels between the hacking of Milly 
Dowler’s phone and the rigging of the Libor rate: as both scandals revealed 
“a corrupt elite that abuses their power” (Watson et al 1, 10), Mr. Miliband 
demanded an inquiry similar to the Leveson inquiry in order to achieve a 
high degree of accountability. 
  
These comparisons with the phone-hacking scandal through the use of 
official political sources suggests that the Libor scandal was perhaps 
another example of Britain’s persistence with accountability; the analysis 
demonstrated a synergy between media coverage and policy, as media 
revelations were being fed into political investigations, which in turn led to 
more media revelations (Smith n. pag.). This idea, thus, supports the CNN 
effect. 
 
The Financial Times had a strong focus on reporting these political 
investigations. On 3 July 2012, the newspaper published an article headlined, 
“Chancellor opts for parliamentary inquiry” (Parker and Jenkins 18). The 
article detailed George Osborne’s announcement of a six-month 
parliamentary inquiry into the standards of the banking industry, sparked 
by the Libor scandal. The article used official political sources in order to 
address issues of accountability by reporting on official government actions 
responding to revelations. It sources a number of political elites, including 
Mr Osborne himself, former Labour chancellor Alistair Darling, chairman of 
the Treasury Select Committee Andrew Tyrie, and Labour leader Ed 
Miliband. It explained that the inquiry was immediately hailed as a “truth 
and reconciliation process” for the City of London and the British political 
elite, whereby politicians and bankers would be hauled before MPs “to 
account for what Mr Osborne described as an unchecked culture of 
‘systematic greed’”. The article quoted Mr. Tyrie, who asserted, “The 
perpetrators of wrongdoing should be held fully accountable for their 
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actions. It is the fact that so many appear to have got off scot-free that really 
stick to the gullet of the electorate”.  
 
The parliamentary inquiry was not the only political investigation reported 
using official political sources in order to address notions of accountability. 
On 18 August 2012, three of the four newspapers – The Wall Street Journal 
as the exception – published an article regarding a report into the Libor 
scandal published by MPs on the UK Treasury Select Committee. The Times’ 
emphasis on watchdog imperatives was the strongest out of the three 
newspapers with their article, headlined “Clean up your act, MPs order 
banks” (Costello 3). The article detailed how the “damning” and “hard-
hitting” report criticised Barclays, the Bank of England and the FSA, as well 
as certain individuals within each organisation. It explained how the report 
accused Bob Diamond of being “unforthcoming and highly selective” in his 
evidence to Parliament, which “fell well short of the standard that 
Parliament expects”. In addition, the report heavily criticised chairman of 
the FSA Lord Turner and Governor of the Bank of England Sir Mervyn King 
for “the way they forced Mr Diamond’s resignation over the Libor scandal”. 
Furthermore, the FSA was accused of “being two years behind other 
international regulators in addressing concerns about Libor”, and the Bank 
of England was “charged with poor-record keeping”. The article quoted 
Andrew Tyrie, the committee chairman, who asserted, “The manipulation 
was spotted neither by the FSA nor the Bank of England at the time. That 
doesn’t look good”.  
 
The Financial Times and The New York Times featured similar articles on the 
same day with headlines, “MPs call for urgent BoE reform” (Schäfer 2), and 
“In Report, British Officials Raise Questions on Testimony of Barclays’ Chief” 
(Scott B3) respectively. Noticeably absent, however, was any article from 
The Wall Street Journal detailing the report. This therefore illustrates that 
The Wall Street Journal did not fulfil watchdog imperatives as strongly as the 
other three newspapers.  
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Official Political Sources vs. Official Company Sources 
 
A clear difference between the UK and US’s use of official sources became 
apparent in the reporting of Bob Diamond’s cross-examination by MPs on 
the Treasury Select Committee. The Times had a particularly strong focus on 
this event, overtly using MPs as their primary official sources to present a 
comprehensive account of the questioning. On 30 June 2012, the newspaper 
published an article detailing the lead-up to Bob Diamond’s cross-
examination. The article, headlined “Barclays chief to be put on spot over 
rate-fixing scandal” (Hosking et al 8), clearly depicted the critical reaction 
from MPs in their unfavourable attitude towards Mr. Diamond. It explained 
that MPs felt that Mr Diamond had “so far ducked the central question of 
how much he knew and whether he encouraged, directly or indirectly, 
others to submit false information”. The article also explained how some 
MPs were “astonished” by a letter written to them by Mr Diamond in which 
he “came close to trying to defend the practice on the ground that he 
thought other banks were cheating too”.  
 
The Times published a follow-up article on 5 July 2012, headlined, “‘You 
seem to have seen nothing, heard nothing, known nothing’” (Hosking 8-9). 
The article was primarily concerned with detailing Bob Diamond’s cross-
questioning, in which he came away “bloodied, unbowed, but leaving many 
on the Treasury Select Committee incredulous that he could not have known 
of the wrongdoing under his nose”. It emphasised the conflict between 
official company source Bob Diamond and official political sources who 
challenged the chief executive by expressing “astonishment that a chief 
executive with so much trading experience could be left so ignorant of what 
was happening in his own organisation”. The article quoted MP John Mann, 
who asserted “You seem to have seen nothing, heard nothing, known 
nothing, in that three-year period… Either you were complicit, or grossly 
negligent, or grossly incompetent”. Also quoted was Labour MP Teresa 
Pearce who “attacked the 60-year-old American over his failure to spot any 
of the wrongdoing at the bank”. Furthermore, the article quoted a 
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“frustrated” MP John Thursoe, who asserted that Diamond’s blocking meant 
that the three-hour questioning led nowhere: “I’m not sure we’re much 
further forward”. Mr. Thursoe also suggested that the scandal was “a 
symptom of a much deeper malaise” at Barclays. 
 
On 11 July 2012, The Times published an article headlined, “Diamond 
accused of misleading MPs ‘calculatedly and deliberately’” (Hosking 6). The 
article described how MPs on the Treasury Select Committee made these 
allegations after receiving what they felt was a different version of events 
from another official company source Barclays chairman Marcus Agius. The 
article quoted Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the committee, who suggested 
that Mr. Diamond had been “a little misleading” in his testimony: “it will look 
to us… as another example of a complete lack of candour by the chief 
executive of Barclays”. The article went on to quote John Mann who went 
even further, accusing Mr. Diamond of “calculatedly and deliberately” 
misleading the parliamentary committee. 
 
The Financial Times was as equally comprehensive in their reporting of Bob 
Diamond’s questioning, although not as aggressive as The Times’ coverage. 
In fact, the day after the questioning, the newspaper published at least seven 
substantial articles detailing the unfolding scandal. This produced an equal 
balance of the two official sources, including Bob Diamond himself and the 
MPs. In one of these articles, The Financial Times articulated the importance 
of the conflict between political sources and company sources, explaining 
that it is “rare indeed for a chancellor [George Osborne] to publically 
question the integrity and professionalism of the leader of one of Britain’s 
biggest banks [Bob Diamond]” (Parker 19). Another article, headlined 
“Diamond leaves questions hanging” (Jenkins 2), echoed the strong 
response from MPs, claiming that Mr. Diamond was “inconsistent” and 
“evasive” during his interrogation. The article claimed that Mr. Diamond 
“avoided some of the toughest questions and denied knowledge of key 
issues”. It highlighted the inconsistencies in his testimony, explaining that 
Mr. Diamond’s account of his interaction with regulators conflicted with his 
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insistence that he first learned of the allegations only the previous month. 
Similarly, in another article the same day, the newspaper criticised Mr. 
Diamond for his lengthy responses and dismissive tendencies. 
 
In contrast to these comprehensive accounts by the UK newspapers, The 
New York Times used Bob Diamond as their primary – and only – source, 
focusing heavily on his point of view. Thus, their coverage failed to highlight 
the strong opposition from political elites, and ultimately fell short of 
fulfilling watchdog imperatives. The New York Times’ article, headlined 
“Barclays’ Ex-Chief Spreads the Blame in Rate-Rigging scandal” (Scott a. B1), 
explained that Mr. Diamond’s voice became “increasingly emotional” as he 
told the committee he was “sorry, angry and disappointed…This is wrong, 
and I’m not happy about it”. It explained that Mr. Diamond “reserved his 
most angry words for the Barclays’ traders” who manipulated the rate. In 
addition, it reported how Mr. Diamond placed some of the blame on 
regulators, stating that the bank had raised concerns with American and 
British authorities multiple times about Libor discrepancies. The article was 
filled with quotes from Mr. Diamond, which indicate the contrast between 
personal and institutional accountability: 
 
A number of banks were posting rates that were significantly below ours 
that we didn’t think were correct.... I can’t sit here and say no one in the 
industry didn’t know about the problems with Libor… I don’t feel personal 
culpability. What I do feel is a strong sense of responsibility. 
 
 
The Wall Street Journal’s article fulfilled watchdog imperatives on a lesser 
scale than the other three newspapers, as it made limited use of official 
sources – both from political elites and Mr. Diamond himself. Their 1,391-
word article, headlined “Rate Scandal Set to Spread – Former Barclays CEO 
Lambasted in Parliament as Other Banks Brace for Fallout” (Enrich and 
Munoz A1), made limited reference to the questioning itself, often veering 
off to discuss other aspects of the scandal. Compared with the UK 
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newspapers, The Wall Street Journal’s article made rather vague statements 
about the questioning, such as Mr. Diamond was “assailed by British 
lawmakers”, “Mr. Diamond faced hostile questions”, and “His explanations 
were rejected”. In the entire 1,391-word article, there was only one direct 
mention of the critical reaction from MPs, in which it stated that MPs 
expressed “skepticism about his claim that he wasn’t aware until recently of 
his subordinates’ improprieties”. While the article quoted Labour MP John 
Mann, who asserted “either you were complicit, grossly negligent or 
incompetent”, the article followed up with Mr. Diamonds’ response, “Is there 
a question?”, essentially giving Mr. Diamond the final word. Similarly, there 
was only one direct quote from Mr. Diamond himself, in which the article 
stated that Mr. Diamond “repeatedly condemned the “reprehensible” 
behaviour of a few employees, saying, “It puts a real stain on the 
organization””. 
 
The two US newspapers’ lack of official political sources in relation to Bob 
Diamond’s questioning indicates a failure to acknowledge the significance of 
Mr. Diamond’s testimony. The Times and The Financial Times used official 
political sources to explicitly tell the public what to think about his 
testimony, encouraging the public to question Mr. Diamond’s moral and 
ethical values and regard him with suspicion. In contrast, the two US 
newspapers did the complete opposite: their lack of political sources meant 
that the questioning was described in a rather vague manner with Mr. 
Diamond as the only source, essentially giving the public a one-sided 
perspective of the testimony. Thus, the two US newspapers did not 
emphasise watchdog imperatives as strongly as the two UK newspapers. 
 
 
Official Political Sources + Investors and Shareholders 
 
The Financial Times made strong use of sources by combining the use of 
political sources with the use of investors and shareholders, who often 
echoed the strong sentiments of political elites. On 29 June 2012, the 
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newspaper published an article headlined “Heat turned up on Diamond but 
replacement would be hard to find” (Schäfer et al 19). The article reported 
how Bob Diamond had “come under fire from investors for what one called 
a “culture of market manipulation” at the bank”. Interestingly, the article 
indicated that the only reason why most investors stopped short of calling 
for Mr. Diamond’s resignation was because “he would be difficult to replace”. 
However, one top 30 investor argued, “Bob Diamond has to go…I’d be 
surprised if he lasts the week”. 
 
On 2 July 2012, The Financial Times published an article headlined 
“Diamond’s future in the balance as hearing nears” (Jenkins et al 2). Echoing 
the strong demands from British politicians, the article reported, “investors 
also want answers over how much Mr. Diamond knew about the 
manipulation of Libor rates”. Although senior members of the British 
government, including Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor 
George Osborne, along with some shareholders, had “stopped short of 
calling explicitly for [Mr. Diamond’s] resignation”, a top-30 shareholder 
stated that Mr. Diamond’s position “could become untenable if the Prime 
Minister and other politicians demand a change at the top”. Similarly, 
another top investor asserted that the Libor manipulation “is one more big 
mistake. When you want to change the direction of a company, you change 
the boss”. This investor echoed statements by George Osborne about a 
culture of “systematic greed”, stating, “It is a culture geared to making 
money but with little concern for the shareholder or whether the business is 
run properly”. In addition, the article articulated that some investors were 
“critical of Barclays’ attitude to policymakers”. 
 
 
US official government actions 
 
The most interesting article regarding the use of official political sources 
and accountability in the US – or lack thereof – came from British 
newspaper The Financial Times. On 13 July 2012, the newspaper published 
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an article headlined, “US letter calls for action on Libor” (Nasiripour 23). The 
article detailed a letter written by a dozen senior US lawmakers urging the 
US’s top law enforcement officer, Eric Holder, to “hold regulators to account 
if they knew about manipulation of Libor but looked the other way”. 
Although the letter supposedly “represents an escalation of US interest” in 
the scandal, The Financial Times was the only newspaper to directly report 
this letter from US political elites, despite being a British publication. The 
newspaper even directly referenced the letter in two subsequent articles. 
The article transcribed sections of letter:  
 
We are… troubled by allegations that US and foreign bank regulators may 
have been aware of this wrongdoing for years… This scandal calls into 
further question the integrity of many Wall Street banks and whether our 
prosecutors and regulators are up to the task of regulating them.  
 
 
The article explained that the letter also increased pressure on then-
President of the New York Fed Timothy Geithner, who “thus far had faced 
only Republican calls for increased disclosure” into his involvement in the 
Libor scandal. This particular revelation gives credence to Entman and 
Smith’s argument that America’s political duopoly significantly lessens 
accountability in the US. While the UK coverage used official political 
sources to suggest a united political elite in the UK, with outrage from both 
the Conservatives and Liberals, this was not evident in the coverage from 
the US. This was clearly demonstrated in an article in The New York Times on 
26 July 2012, headlined “House Panel Questions Geithner on His Handling of 
Barclays’ Rate-Rigging” (Protess B5). While the article used official sources 
such as Jeb Hensarling, Republican of Texas, to detail “the ire of Republicans” 
during Timothy Geithner’s questioning at a House hearing, the article 
reported, “many Democrats rushed to his defense”. This included Barney 
Frank, a Massachusetts Democrat, who declared that it was the banks, not 
regulators, that “grievously misbehaved”. Compared with the “bruising” 
(Savage and Bremner 4) cross examinations of Bob Diamond, Marcus Agius, 
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Sir Mervyn King, and Paul Tucker by MPs in London, the article explained 
that Mr. Geithner “escaped relatively unscathed” from the more than two-
hour questioning. Democrats even echoed Mr. Geithner’s argument that he 
believed the responsibility rested with British regulators: Brad Sherman, 
Democrat of California asserted, “I for one am not part of the ‘blame America 
first’ crowd”. 
 
Two articles published in The Wall Street Journal further indicated that 
while there were signs of official government action in the US, these actions 
were significantly less aggressive than in the UK. The coverage did not 
reveal whether this was a result of a lack of outspoken US political elites or a 
result of reporters not approaching them – or a combination of both. 
However, the consequence of this was that US newspapers featured minimal 
use of official political sources, and thus failed to fulfill watchdog 
imperatives. On 11 July 2012, The Wall Street Journal published an article, 
headlined “Congress Joins Libor Probes” (Reddy C2). While the article used 
official government sources including Senate Banking Committee Chairman 
Tim Johnson and the House subcommittee chairman Rep. Randy 
Neugebauer, the short 577-word article was less aggressive than the UK 
newspapers. The article quoted Mr. Johnson who simply stated that his staff 
had started to schedule “bipartisan briefings with relevant parties” to learn 
more about the Libor manipulation: “It is important that we understand 
how any manipulation may impact American consumers and the US 
financial system”. Similarly, Mr. Neugebauer merely explained that 
transcripts of communications between the New York Fed and Barclays 
would be used “to get a preliminary understanding of the nature of the 
discussions” between the two institutions.  
 
A similar article was published the same day in British newspaper The 
Financial Times, headlined “Congress signals growing interest in the role of 
regulators” (Nasiripour 18). This article used the same official sources as 
The Wall Street Journal, asserting that the congressional inquiries were “at 
an early stage [and] signals growing US interest” in the scandal. However, 
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compared with the aggressive statements made by UK political sources, 
these US sources merely expressed their “interest in learning what role 
[certain individuals] played in these events”. 
 
The following day, The Wall Street Journal published another article that 
gives interesting insight into the response by both US official political 
sources and company sources. The article, headlined “Fed to Document 
Libor Action” (Paletta C2), used Senator Richard Shelby, the top Republican 
on the Senate Banking committee, as their official source. Mr. Shelby 
asserted that Congress must demand answers from the New York Fed and 
its former president Timothy Geithner about their knowledge of Libor 
manipulation. However, the article used Mr. Shelby to reveal that Congress 
had not, in fact, scheduled any hearings to directly address the Libor 
manipulation: Mr. Geithner, along with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, would appear before the House and Senate panels in the 
following two weeks “for previously scheduled hearings on other matters”. 
The article explained, “Mr. Shelby said Congress should consider holding 
additional hearings on the Libor issue in the near future”. Later, The New 
York Times highlighted that the outcome of these “previously scheduled 
hearings” yielded minimal revelations by the official company sources, 
announcing, “No great revelations were forthcoming” (Morgenson b. BU1). 
This illustrates that while there were indeed signs of government actions 
responding to revelations, the intensity of these actions was significantly 
less in the US than in the UK, and thus contributed to the US news media’s 
lack of fulfillment of watchdog imperatives.  
 
The analysis of official sources used in the coverage of the Libor scandal 
revealed a synergy between media coverage and policy. This was 
exemplified in the coverage by the two UK newspapers, which used official 
political sources and their strong critical reactions to address notions of 
accountability and thus demonstrated a firm fulfillment of watchdog 
imperatives. The use of official political sources in the UK coverage raised 
questions as to whether the coverage was supporting the indexing 
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hypothesis, in which the media’s coverage reflected the range of political 
opinions within government, or whether the coverage was supporting the 
CNN effect, in which the media’s coverage elicited the moral and critical 
reactions from politicians. The indexing hypothesis was more prominent in 
the use of official political sources who introduced key issues surrounding 
both moral and legal accountability. 
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NEWS VALUES  
 
Ranking of newspapers’ fulfilment of newsworthiness imperatives – most 
(1) to least (4) 
1. The Financial Times   (UK: Financial) 
2. The Times    (UK: Mainstream) 
3. The New York Times   (US: Mainstream) 
4. The Wall Street Journal  (US: Financial) 
 
A noticeable divide in the two countries’ coverage became apparent in their 
emphasis of news values, with the two UK newspapers emphasising a 
number of news values more strongly than the two US newspapers. Thus, 
the Libor scandal was deemed more newsworthy in the UK than in the US. In 
addition, specialist publication The Financial Times emphasised certain 
mainstream news values, such as the ‘elite’, ‘bad/negative’, 
‘relevance/meaningful’ and ‘threshold/magnitude’ news values, more 
strongly than a reader of literature might expect, indicating a narrow divide 
between specialist publications and mainstream publications. This suggests 
that both publications consider scandals newsworthy, which complicates 
Doyle’s assertion that there is often “a fairly sharp contrast” between 
specialist publications and mainstream publications in terms of 
newsworthiness (448). The coverage of the Libor scandal indicates a 
possibility that specialist publications can, at times, have a similar sense of 
what is newsworthy to that of mainstream newspapers. 
 
On 7 July 2012, The New York Times featured an editorial that directly 
addressed the newsworthiness of the Libor scandal by highlighting the 
particular news values that the scandal embodied. The editorial, headlined 
“Libor’s Dirty Laundry” (Nocera A17), articulated that one of the “biggest 
surprises” of the Libor scandal was the completely different reactions by 
Britain and America in terms of newsworthiness: “Britain is in an utter 
frenzy over it, with wall-to-wall coverage, and the most respectable, pro-
business publications expressing outrage… Yet, on these shores, the reaction 
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has been mainly a shrug”. This idea was echoed in an article in The Times 
that claimed, “…so far the scandal has gained little public traction in America” 
(Robertson and Hosking 41). The editorial quoted Karen Petrou, the 
managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, who exclaimed, “Why has 
the scandal created outrage in Britain? Because it truly is outrageous… They 
weren’t supposed to be fixing the rate – no matter what the reason”. An 
article in The Financial Times made clear that although the Libor scandal is 
not the first price-manipulation affair in banking, it is “one of the most 
serious”, in which it “adds a powerful dimension to the reputational disaster 
enveloping the banking sector” (Jenkins et al 7). 
 
In the limited space of 862 words, the editorial directly emphasised the 
‘unambiguity’, ‘meaningfulness/relevance’ and ‘unexpectedness/surprise’ 
news values. The news value of ‘unambiguity’ was highlighted with the 
consideration that perhaps “Libor is just hard to get one’s head around”. 
However, the editorial then combined this notion of Libor’s ambiguity with 
the ‘meaningfulness/relevance’ news value, asserting that while Britain 
“may not understand the intricacies of Libor any better than we do… they 
sense, powerfully, that banks have once again made a mockery of the role 
that society entrusts to them”. The editorial asserted that while Barclays is a 
British bank, and the first word of Libor is indeed “London”, the scandal was 
equally as culturally meaningful and relevant to US citizens, citing a headline 
in The Economist that read, in its entirety, “Banksters”. In addition, the 
editorial named a few American-based banks that were under investigation, 
including JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup.  
 
The third news value the editorial highlighted, ‘unexpectedness/surprise’, 
was made explicitly clear in the consideration that perhaps the scandal was 
not in fact all that surprising because “we’re suffering from bank-scandal 
fatigue”, with the editorial then briefly listing the various scandals of Bank of 
America, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase. The editorial claimed that 
with all the “seedy bank behaviour” that had been exposed in the wake of 
the financial crisis, “it’s stunning that there’s still dirty laundry left to be 
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aired”. Another article in The New York Times (Porter B1) acknowledged 
that the “most surprising” aspect of the scandal was in fact “how familiar it 
seems…we should be alarmed that corporate wrongdoing has become to be 
seen as such a routine occurrence”. The article sourced a Gallup poll to 
illustrate that widespread corruption across corporate America no longer 
surprises many individuals. In fact, the article used the email exchanges 
between traders to illustrate that even to its participants, wrongdoing 
appeared routine and standard behaviour (Porter B1).  
 
However, the editorial explicitly emphasised the unexpectedness of the 
scandal by asserting that even with the precedents set by the numerous 
banking scandals, “the Libor scandal still manages to shock”. This idea was 
paralleled in an article in the Wall Street Journal, which asserted, “Scandals 
emanating from the boom years should have lost their power to shock…[but 
evidence of Libor manipulation] is enough to stir even the most jaded cynic” 
(Nixon a. C12). The New York Times editorial argued that this shock is partly 
due to the nature of the scandal in which bankers, traders and executives 
“openly, and in some cases, gleefully colluded” to manipulate the rate, along 
with the fact that “so much [depends] on this one critical interest rate”. As 
the editorial argued, the scandal still generated shock as it demonstrated 
that “bankers feel neither the constraints of the law nor of morality”.  
 
These observations regarding the unexpectedness of the scandal were, 
however, contradicted in two articles in UK newspaper The Times. The first 
article attempted to argue that Libor was in fact “diddled for years” by many 
banks and was such “common knowledge” in the financial industry that “to 
suggest this came as a shock is laughable” (Parkinson 30). Similarly, another 
article, written by a former interest rate swaps trader, argued that the 
scandal “is not new… It’s easy to manipulate the rate” (“‘A concern but this 
scandal is hardly new’”). Furthermore, an article in The Wall Street Journal 
briefly mentioned, “some bankers argue that the scandal is overblown 
because the system for setting the [Libor] rate was always flawed” (Nixon 
C10). Nevertheless, the editorial concluded with an assurance that there 
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would be “a lot more opportunities for Americans to become outraged over 
this scandal”. 
 
 
‘Elite’ and ‘Bad/negative’ news values 
 
The only similarity between the UK and US coverage in relation to news 
values was in their comparably overt emphasis of the ‘elite people’ and ‘elite 
institutions’ directly involved in the scandal. However, the nature of the 
scandal made it largely inevitable that all four newspapers would primarily 
focus on the involvement of the “powerful individuals” (Harcup and O’Neill 
279) who defined the scandal, including; Barclays Chief Executive Bob 
Diamond, Barclays Chairman Marcus Agius, Governor of the Bank of England 
Sir Mervyn King, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England Paul Tucker, 
Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee Andrew Tyrie, and Chairman of 
the FSA Adair Turner. In addition, all four newspapers predictably 
emphasised the involvement of elite institutions in the form of global banks, 
primarily Barclays, as well as important financial regulators including the 
Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority, and the New York Federal 
Reserve.  
 
However, the UK press emphasised the involvement of a much wider range 
of elites, as their coverage also overtly emphasised the strong critical 
reaction by UK political elites. This suggested a more extensive inquiry into 
the elites involved, as opposed to focusing on just the primary definers of 
the scandal. Thus, the UK coverage’s emphasis on the strong critical 
reactions from political elites combined the ‘elite’ news value and the 
‘bad/negative’ news value by emphasising the “particularly negative 
overtones” (Harcup and O’Neill 279) that were surfacing from the story. The 
strong negative reaction from UK political elites was referred to as a 
“political firestorm” by both UK newspapers, with their coverage detailing 
the “political ire” and “mounting fury” which had resulted from the scandal  
(Goff et al 14). The political elites who “lined up to express their outrage” 
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(Goff et al 14) included Labour leader Ed Miliband, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer George Osborne, Business Secretary Vince Cable, and Shadow 
Chancellor Ed Balls.  
 
The US coverage, on the other hand, did not overtly emphasise UK or US 
political elites or their outrage. Thus, a clear divide between the two 
countries’ coverage became apparent in their difference in ‘elite’ emphasis, 
but also further illustrated the perceived divide in political elite reaction. In 
contrast to the many articles in the UK coverage detailing the mounting 
political pressure and the clashes between political parties in their strong 
reactions to the scandal, there were only three articles published – out of the 
four newspapers – revealing an equivalent US political reaction. This 
suggests a link between political elite sources and news values, indicating an 
intertwining of watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives. Due to a lack of 
official political elites as sources, the US coverage’s emphasis on the ‘elite’ 
news value was contained to a narrow focus on the primary definers of the 
scandal.  
 
Interestingly, an article in UK newspaper The Financial Times hinted that 
there was, in fact, some US political elite criticism of the scandal. Their 
article was published on 9 July 2012 headlined, “Frank calls Libor scandal 
‘outrageous’” (Scannell 17), and overtly combined the ‘elite’ news value with 
the ‘bad/negative’ news value. The article articulated the reaction from US 
Congressman Barney Frank, which was “the first strongly worded political 
response from Washington”. It claimed that while the allegations had set off 
a “political firestorm” in London, the reaction in the US “has been muted”. 
Crucially, the article explained that the Barclays settlement was announced 
one day before the US Supreme Court upheld the Obama administration’s 
healthcare law, and as lawmakers went on recess for the Independence Day 
holiday, thus impacting the newsworthiness of the Libor scandal. 
 
The Financial Times published two articles that demonstrated the 
combination of the ‘elite’ and ‘bad/negative’ news values. Although the 
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‘bad/negative’ news value is a typical defining element of scandal, it is 
important to analyse the degree to which this is overtly emphasised in the 
coverage in order to assess the fulfilment of newsworthiness imperatives. 
On 29 June 2012, the newspaper published an article headlined “The lie 
living at the heart of Libor” (Parker 18), which was primarily concerned 
with discussing the reaction of UK political elites, announcing, “MPs unite in 
fury to condemn the banks”. It depicted a dispute between the political and 
financial realms, as Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the Treasury committee, 
questioned, “What is there left of trust between parliament and the banks?” 
The article emphasised the ‘bad/negative’ news value by articulating that 
the manipulation of Libor had “fuelled the toxic mood in the Commons” and 
“tipped the political mood from resentment to outright contempt”. It 
explained that “the anger at Westminster is raw…Conservative MPs had 
been fuming all morning”. Furthermore, it made clear that the “political ire 
was not confined to London”, sourcing the EU’s top competition enforcer 
Joaquin Alumina who told the newspaper that he was “deeply worried” 
about the conduct in the financial sector. The next day, the newspaper 
published a follow-up article headlined, “Pressure to stiffen Vickers reforms” 
(Parker and Pickard 2). This article continued to document how “political 
anger…raged unabated” over the rate rigging, hypothesising a subsequent 
push by George Osborne for ring fencing of banking operations “once the 
anger has subsided”. Business Secretary Vince Cable was quoted, who spoke 
of a “massive cesspit in the banking system”.  
 
Although these articles clearly emphasised the strong critical reaction from 
the UK’s political elite, an editorial in The Financial Times published on 10 
July 2012 argued that the reaction of Britain’s political elite had, in fact, 
“fallen significantly short of what the public rightly expected”. The editorial, 
headlined “Labour’s plan for banking reform” (14), opined that the leading 
parties had been “too busy pointing fingers at each other to spell out what 
they thought policy makers should do to address the failures of the banking 
system”. Thus, while political elites and their outrage were emphasised in 
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the coverage, this editorial suggested that the nature of the elites’ outrage 
was misguided.  
 
The Times also published two articles that combined the ‘elite’ and 
‘bad/negative’ news values by focusing on the reactions of political elites. On 
29 June 2012, the newspaper published an article headlined “It’s payback 
time, banks are told, as calls grow for Barclays chief to go” (Watson and 
Hosking 6). The article depicted the outrage from George Osborne who 
“condemned the “shocking indictment” of the rate-rigging scandal”, along 
with outrage from other political elites who employed words such as 
“irresponsible”, “unacceptable”, and “incalculable damage”.  
 
The following day, The Times published another article detailing the 
apparent conflict between the political and financial elite. The article, 
headlined “Demand for inquiry into the City’s ‘corrupt elite’” (Watson et al 
1,10), used an emphasis on the ‘elite’ and ‘bad/negative’ news values to 
extend the moral frame being used to report the scandal. Thus, this indicates 
an intertwining of newsworthiness and watchdog imperatives. The article 
quoted Labour leader Ed Miliband, who asserted that the Libor scandal 
revealed “a corrupt elite that abuses their power”: in his view, the financial 
elite embody an “institutionally corrupt” sector. In another article by The 
Times, Ed Miliband also asserted that the Libor scandal was about “a certain 
section of the elite” who thought they “were too powerful to be 
challenged…[and who] have become so disconnected from other people that 
they are leading parallel lives” (Sylvester and Watson 28-29). As Lord 
Turner, chairman of the FSA, asserted, “There is a degree of cynicism and 
greed which is really quite shocking” (Jenkins et al 7). 
 
While the two UK newspapers featured entire articles emphasising the 
‘bad/negative’ news value, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal 
mainly featured sporadic statements that underscore this news value. These 
were often linked to the reaction of the public, with statements such as; “the 
resulting public uproar over the settlement…” (Scott a. B4); “…regulators 
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respond to public anger over the manipulation of [Libor]” (Scott B3); 
“…public revulsion over… the Libor scandal” (Norris B1); and “the public 
was justifiably angry over the Libor scandal” (Evans C3). With only a mere 
18 articles from each US newspaper – 36 total – that mentioned the key 
terms used to measure the emphasis on news values, there leaves only 
minimal room for discussion. 
 
 
‘Meaningfulness/relevance’ and ‘Threshold/magnitude’ news values 
 
Emphasis on the ‘meaningfulness/relevance’ and ‘threshold/magnitude’ 
news values was much stronger in the UK coverage than in the US coverage. 
The emphasis on these two news values was measured by the coverage 
dedicated to the potential victims of the Libor manipulation. Indeed, an 
article in The Times quoted Ed Miliband who asserted, “This is not a 
victimless crime. There are real people now paying the price” (Sylvester and 
Watson 28-29). The two UK newspapers emphasised the impacts and 
consequences of the scandal by drawing connections between the world of 
abstract finance and the real-world economy that affects the ordinary 
person. Thus, these newspapers emphasised Harcup and O’Neill’s news 
values by demonstrating that the Libor scandal was “perceived to be 
relevant to the audience” (Harcup and O’Neill 279) and was “sufficiently 
significant … in the numbers of people involved [and] in the potential impact” 
(Harcup and O’Neill 279).  
 
On 30 June 2012, The Times published an article headlined, “What the banks 
woe means for you” (Atherton and Whateley 67). The article was written in 
question and answer format, providing the public with information about 
who had been affected, how to prove if they had suffered a loss, how to 
claim compensation, and how to start a class action lawsuit. The article 
claimed that the “list of potential victims could extend pretty widely”, and 
quoted Sarah Brookes of Consumer Focus who argued, “it shouldn’t be up to 
consumers to have to prove that they have been disadvantaged”.  
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However, by 7 July, there was evident confusion regarding the potential 
victims of the rate rigging. The Times published an article on this date 
emphasising the ‘relevance’ and ‘threshold/magnitude’ news values 
headlined, “Confusion reigns over rate-rigging” (Milner 57). The article 
detailed the confusion among many homebuyers as to whether their rate 
payments were open to manipulation, and that “conflicting views” had been 
aired about how many “ordinary mortgage borrowers” were affected. The 
article quoted Grant Shapps, Housing Minister, who stated that the rate 
manipulation may have been a “contributing factor” in the number of homes 
repossessed, yet Mark Harris, a mortgage broker, argued that if sterling 
Libor was not affected, “the fixing scandal will have minimal effect on 
borrowers in the UK”. In addition, the article articulated that if the Libor rate 
were rigged artificially down, homeowners would have gained. Conversely, 
if the rate were pushed upwards, borrowers would have paid more. The 
article claimed that it would be difficult to quantify the potential number of 
customers affected “until the full extent of rate-fixing at other banks has 
emerged”.  
 
The conflict surrounding the potential victims was echoed in three articles 
in The Financial Times. On 29 June 2012, the newspaper published an article 
headlined, “Mortgage Borrowers may have enjoyed lower interest rates” 
(Moore 14). The article emphasised the ‘relevance’ and 
‘threshold/magnitude’ news values by articulating that an estimated 
250,000 mortgages are priced according to three-month Libor, and the rate 
can have a “dramatic effect on the interest that providers charge to 
mortgage borrowers”. It articulated that some borrowers may have, in fact, 
enjoyed lower interest rates as a result of the Libor manipulation. On the 
other hand, savers could have lost out on better deals, as banks are “less 
likely to pay out attractive rates on deposits if the cost of borrowing money 
is low”. The article further emphasised theses news value by articulating 
that US borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages, loans and credit cards 
may also have felt the impact of the Libor manipulation.  
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However, the following day, the newspaper published an article headlined, 
“‘No redress’ for Libor victims” (Powley 1), which emphasised the 
‘threshold/magnitude’ news value by asserting that the Libor manipulation 
“is not thought to have impacted the 250,000 UK borrowers whose loans are 
directly linked to Libor”. This was because the FSA only found evidence of 
manipulation of dollar Libor, not sterling Libor. The article quoted Ray 
Boulger of broker John Charcol, who argued, “The fact that it was not 
sterling Libor means it will have had a minimal effect”. The article then 
seemed to increase the confusion surrounding potential victims by quoting 
another broker, Sean Adams of broker SPF Private Clients, who argued, 
“Almost everyone who borrows money in Europe would have been 
affected… Whether it’s a positive or negative effect is difficult to say”. 
Similarly to The Times, this article claimed that borrowers “must wait for the 
extent of Libor rigging to be revealed”. The article went on to inform 
potential victims that they would not likely receive compensation, with a 
spokesman for the Financial Ombudsman Service saying that it would be 
difficult to show how customers had “directly lost out”. 
 
Another article in The Financial Times that emphasised the ‘relevance’ and 
‘magnitude’ news values was published on 12 July 2012 headlined, “Effect of 
Libor on US loans examined” (Nasiripour 19). This article detailed concerns 
that the rate manipulation may have harmed borrowers in the US, “raising 
the stakes on a scandal that thus far has been confined to Wall Street and the 
City of London”. It explained that there are at least 900,000 US home loans 
tied to Libor. The article quoted Senator Sherrod Brown, who opined: 
 
I think the US government should be just as aggressive in getting to the 
bottom of this scandal as the United Kingdom has been… This was not 
isolated to London, but affected tens of millions of investors, borrowers, 
and taxpayers in our country as well.  
 
Senator Mark Warner was also quoted, asserting that the rate rigging is “an 
enormous issue that not only represents a fraud on bank customers but has 
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an impact on smaller borrowers and lenders around the world”. This article 
repeated the mantra from previous articles, stating that US policy makers 
“do not know the extent of the possible harm on households”. 
 
Despite the considerable confusion articulated in the UK newspapers 
regarding the potential victims, they still managed to emphasise the 
‘relevance’ and ‘magnitude’ news values. The US newspapers’ emphasis on 
these news values, on the other hand, was minimal. The New York Times 
published an article on 28 June 2012 headlined, “A Rate-Setting Mechanism 
of Far-Reaching Effects” (Eavis B1). The article showed potential in 
addressing the impacts of the scandal by asserting that the accusations in 
the Libor case “have real-life consequences for consumers and businesses in 
the United States”. Although it explained that “Libor may sound like 
gobbledygook, but it’s the world benchmark for interest rates consumers 
pay”, the article did not develop or expand on these points to make clear the 
potential impact on victims. 
 
Similarly, on 11 July 2012, The Wall Street Journal published an article 
headlined, “Congress joins Libor probes” (Reddy C2). Again, this article 
showed potential in addressing the impacts and consequences of the 
scandal by quoting Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson who 
asserted, “It is important that we understand how any manipulation may 
impact American consumers and the US financial system”. However, the 
article did not develop this point any further. Furthermore, on 21 August 
2012, The Wall Street Journal published an article headlined, “Coming This 
Fall: A Libor Overhaul” (Guerrera C1). Although the article claimed, “if 
Libor…sounds foreign, think again. Anyone with a credit card, mortgage or 
car loan should care about their reference rate being manipulated by the 
very banks that set it”, the article did not explain the reasons why 
consumers “should care”. 
 
The Wall Street Journal published only one article about the potential effects 
on victims. On 4 August 2012, headlined, “The New Basics: What Libor 
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Means for You” (Grind B8), the article explained the two main ways 
borrowers may have been affected: through mutual funds and loans. Similar 
to the other articles, it explained that the extent of the problem “is still 
murky… The breadth of manipulation and the amount the rate was 
artificially kept low still isn’t clear”. Despite this article suggesting that the 
‘murkiness’ of the Libor scandal made it difficult to emphasise the ‘relevance’ 
and ‘magnitude’ news values, there was a noticeable difference in coverage 
between the US and UK newspapers in their emphasis on these news values. 
 
Interestingly, US newspaper The New York Times featured a quote from 
Martin Wheatley, managing director of British regulator the FSA who argued, 
“It’s clear from the reaction to the Libor scandal that consumers think it’s 
important”. This statement accurately reflects the coverage from the UK 
newspapers, which helped to elicit a critical response from the UK public. 
However, reference to Mr. Wheatley’s statement is ironic when considering 
it is featured in a US newspaper, whose coverage did not help to elicit these 
reactions from the US public to the same extent. 
 
 
‘Unambiguity’ news value 
 
Although each newspaper alluded to the complexity of the Libor rate, they 
simultaneously acknowledged its newsworthiness. This illustrates that any 
ambiguity was overcome by other criteria such as magnitude and impact. 
This was apparent in The Times’ statement, “For two days Libor, a 
previously alien term to most consumers, was trending on twitter” (Milner 
63); The Financial Times’ statements, “While Libor was hitherto a technical 
financial term, it has become ingrained in the popular consciousness” 
(Saigol et al 17), and “though it sounds more abstruse than other recent 
scandals, Libor has a very real-world impact” (Jenkins et al 7); The New York 
Times’ statement, “Before this scandal made headlines, few people outside of 
finance knew what Libor was” (Morgenson b. BU1); and The Wall Street 
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Journal’s statement, “Hardly a household name in the UK, it has become 
more familiar in the past week” (Bryan-low A5).  
 
 
Criminality 
 
Coverage of the Libor scandal by the four newspapers revealed a distinct 
divide between the two countries in the manner in which they discussed 
criminality. The initial coverage by the two UK newspapers revealed a 
discourse of confusion, as they grappled with whether criminal prosecution 
could, in fact, be enacted in the UK for Libor manipulation: under UK law 
“[Barclays traders] alleged actions may not have been a crime” (Cavendish 
19). This treatment of the scandal by the UK newspapers was highlighted in 
statements such as: “The commission wants to insert the threat of criminal 
penalties into legislation” (Dalton C2); “The government’s shift towards 
tougher regulation would include making it an offence to rig Libor” (Watson 
and Jagger 6-7); and “Individuals who rig key interest rates such as Libor 
could be hit with criminal charges as part of reforms” (Costello 35). 
Statements such as these clearly imply that rigging Libor was not, at that 
time, considered a criminal offence under the UK regulatory regime. In the 
US, however, the Commodity Exchange Act already made it illegal to put 
false prices into the markets (Masters and Binham 18). The UK’s treatment 
of the scandal in terms of criminality became less ambiguous only after the 
UK Serious Fraud Office “bowed to pressure” (Masters and Binham 18) to 
reconsider its decision from the previous year not to get involved in a Libor 
probe. They eventually announced a full criminal investigation on 7 July 
2012. 
 
However, even with full criminal investigations being launched by both the 
Justice Department in the US and the Serious Fraud Office in the UK, the 
divide in coverage was still prominent. The coordination of an international 
criminal investigation was made difficult by the differences in the legal 
systems of the two countries. This was reflected in the coverage, with the US 
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newspapers primarily focused on the investigations by the Justice 
Department and the CFTC, while the UK newspapers primarily focused on 
the investigations by the Serious Fraud Office and the FSA. An article in The 
Wall Street Journal explained the difficulty in the coordination of 
investigations, stating that the US Justice Department “risks jeopardising its 
investigation” if it examines interviews with traders conducted by British 
regulator, the FSA, “who were forced to undergo interrogation”. This is due 
to the fact that US criminal law generally bans the use of evidence obtained 
under compulsion (Eaglesham et al C1).  
 
In addition, criminality of the scandal was discussed in two different ways; 
the first was in reference to the actual actions of the banks and the 
individuals involved in the rate manipulation; the second was in reference 
to the subsequent legal actions that were being taken by various parties 
against Barclays and other banks as a result of the manipulation.  
 
 
Criminality of the actions 
 
The initial coverage of the scandal indicated a clear difference in the 
criminal urgency displayed by each country. This was underpinned by 
significant differences in each country’s criminal enforcement regime. The 
Financial Times made a point of comparing these differences in an article 
published on 29 June headlined “US in a different league in punishing 
financial crimes” (Masters and Binham 18). The article asserted that despite 
the uproar in Britain about the manipulation of Libor, UK enforcers wield 
significantly less power than those in the US, who operate under laws that 
“are more on point and [where] prison sentences tend to be longer”. While 
the US Department of Justice and the FBI were conducting criminal 
investigations, “various UK enforcers have essentially held fire”. The article 
explained that as a result of the unregulated nature of the Libor submission 
process, the FSA – who already had a relatively narrow criminal jurisdiction 
– concluded that it had no realistic prospect of winning a criminal case 
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(Masters and Binham 18). While general fraud laws in the UK could come 
into play, the article argued, “US prosecutors have a better record and the 
Commodity Exchange Act makes it a crime to transmit a false report that 
would affect the price of a commodity” (Masters and Binham 18). 
 
In addition to the struggle of keeping up with US criminal enforcement, UK 
enforcers had to grapple with the initial legal discrepancies of the rate-
manipulation within their own country. On 2 July 2012, The Times published 
an article, headlined “Rogue bankers face spell behind bars in a move to 
clean up the City” (Watson and Jagger 6-7). It depicted a conflict between 
the UK’s existing legislation for fraud, and the drafting of new market-abuse 
laws to make the rigging of interbank borrowing rates a criminal offence. 
The article explained that Chancellor George Osborne was in discussions to 
“write new rules into the Financial Services Bill” with the aim of “toughening 
criminal sanctions” in the financial industry. However, Lord Blair of 
Boughton, the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, argued that 
a criminal investigation into Libor-fixing should have been taking place 
under the current law against fraud: “Anybody, the youngest detective, 
would say this is a conspiracy to defraud” (Watson and Jagger 6-7). The 
article also quoted Business Secretary Vince Cable, who clearly articulated 
the key issue of this legal discrepancy: “[the public] cannot understand why 
people are thrown into jail for petty theft and these guys walk away having 
perpetrated what looks like a conspiracy” (Watson and Jagger 6-7). 
 
In an attempt to help remedy this discrepancy, The Times in fact suggested 
that Scotland, who was conducting their own investigation into the financial 
sector, could help out if English law proved too problematic. Prosecuting 
individuals in Scotland could prove easier, as fraud could come under 
common law rather than statute law, as is the case in England (Drainey 9). 
Thus, Scotland’s common law on fraud is “much more flexible and much 
more usable”. Although issues could be raised regarding where the crime 
was committed, the article claimed that jurisdiction issues would be 
minimal, as the Libor manipulation “affected people in Scotland just as much 
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as it affected people in America and England and Wales, and Germany for 
that matter” (Drainey 9).  
 
The revelation that the SFO would, finally, launch a full criminal 
investigation into Libor manipulation was featured in The Financial Times 
on 7 July 2012. Interestingly, their article, headlined “SFO bows to pressure 
for crime probe into Libor affair” (Binham 15), revealed that the SFO had the 
opportunity to become involved in a Libor probe the previous year but 
decided against it “because of its limited resources and concerns it might 
duplicate the work of others”. However, due to the “massive political 
pressure” for bankers to face legal action as a result of the Libor scandal, the 
SFO’s hand was now forced. The article explained that the investigation 
could be “the largest investigation in financial market history”, potentially 
leading to prosecutions for theft, false accounting and fraud. The article also 
detailed the paralleling criminal investigations by US authorities, who were 
examining “potential breaches of the Commodities Exchange Act… which 
have [previously] resulted in individuals being jailed for as long as 14 years”.  
 
While the UK coverage battled with the legal discrepancies, The New York 
Times published an article that detailed the criminal investigation by the 
Department of Justice (DoJ). The article, headlined “US Is Building Criminal 
Cases in Rate-Fixing” (Protess and Scott B1), explained that the DoJ had 
identified “potential criminal wrongdoing by big banks and individuals” and 
was subsequently building criminal cases against them, which was 
“expected to rattle the banking world”. The DoJ had jurisdiction over the 
London bank rate “because the benchmark affects markets in the United 
States”. The article detailed that the potential for criminal action had several 
firms “scrambling to arrange deals” in order to avoid the same “public 
outcry” that derived from the Barclays case. It revealed that UBS, like 
Barclays, had also reached an immunity deal with the DoJ, which could 
“protect the bank from criminal prosecution if certain conditions are met”. 
The article explained that the investigation added to a “sweeping regulatory 
inquiry” led by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and came on 
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top of private investor lawsuits. It explained while civil actions can result in 
fines and force banks to overhaul their internal controls, the DoJ “would 
wield an even more potent threat by bringing criminal fraud cases against 
traders and other employees. If found guilty, they could face jail time”.  
 
In addition, this article directly addressed the notion of accountability, 
responding to perceived public reactions by explaining that the criminal 
investigations come at a crucial time when “the public is still simmering 
over the dearth of prosecutions of prominent executives involved in the 
mortgage crisis” (Protess and Scott B1). The article stressed the importance 
of the Libor scandal in providing a potential opportunity for prosecutors: 
“Given the scope of the problems and the number of institutions involved, 
the rate-rigging investigation could provide a signature moment to hold big 
banks accountable for their activities during the financial crisis”. However, 
the article also explained that the investigation into global banks was 
“unusually complex and it could continue for years, and ultimately end in 
settlements rather than indictments”. 
 
Furthermore, the article gave interesting insights into the complex nature of 
coordinating an international criminal investigation, exposing the strained 
relationship between the US and UK regulators. The article explained a 
divide in criminal urgency between the American and British authorities, 
revealing an interesting paradox between the media’s coverage and the 
tangible consequences of the scandal. The article explained that American 
authorities were becoming increasingly frustrated with the seemingly 
unhurried reaction of British authorities in their request for information. 
For example, the article stated that approval was needed from British 
authorities before the DoJ and American regulators could gather email and 
bank records from overseas firms. It explained that British authorities “have 
been slow to act” and “at times have hesitated to investigate” (Protess and 
Scott B1). The frustration by American officials was echoed in an article in 
British newspaper The Times, reporting that there were suggestions that 
investigations were “being impeded by a slow response” by British officials 
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(Robertson 13). The New York Times article praised the American regulators 
for pushing the investigation, stating, “[in contrast to Britain’s hesitance], 
the Justice Department and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
have spent two years building cases together”. The article then 
comprehensively explained the process of the two American regulators in 
getting to the current point of inquiry. This divide in criminal urgency 
indicates that although the US coverage may not have demonstrated a 
strong degree of moral accountability, by emphasising the uproar resulting 
from the scandal and the need to hold individuals accountable, this did not 
categorically prevent a strong degree of legal accountability. 
 
Similarly, The Wall Street Journal published an article on 17 July 2012 that 
strongly criticised Britain’s handling of the investigation. The article, 
headlined “Charge the Criminals, Not the Companies” (Butler A15), claimed 
that in the UK, there had been “no sign” that bank executives would be 
criminally charged in relation to the Libor scandal. The article echoed the 
sentiments of The New York Times, labelling Barclays’ fine as “a flea bite” and 
asserting that fining companies for malpractice is not enough: “wrongdoing 
should be investigated: not by regulators, or panels of posturing politicians, 
or costly and long-winded public inquiries – but by the police and the 
Serious Fraud Office”. The article made clear that fraud “damages real 
people, like the pensioners robbed of interest by the low Libor number”. It 
noted the divide in criminal urgency between the American and British 
agencies, claiming that the American agencies seemed determined to go 
after individuals who they believed to be responsible for rigging Libor, 
however “there is no sign of that yet in London”. Again, this indicates that 
although the US coverage may not have emphasised watchdog and 
newsworthiness imperatives to the same extent as the UK coverage, legal 
accountability was still tangible. Interestingly, the article argued that there 
did not appear to be “much political appetite [in Britain] for holding those 
culpable to account”. However, an earlier article from the newspaper quoted 
Labour leader Ed Miliband, who strongly declared, “We need the full force of 
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the law brought against those who have done wrong, and if they are found 
guilty and if their offences warrant it, they should go to jail.” 
 
The notion of accountability in the UK was addressed in an interesting 
article in The Financial Times on 6 July 2012, headlined “Iceland inquiry 
model serves political warning” (Stothard 2). The article urged Britain to 
follow in the footsteps of Iceland’s “truth commission”, which was set up to 
investigate the 2008 financial crash. It was appointed by Parliament, but 
independent of it. The article detailed that the inquiry not only heavily 
criticised Iceland’s disgraced bankers, but also implicated government and 
regulators. In fact, it led to criminal charges against former Prime Minister 
Geir Haarde, “who became the world’s first leader to face trial for his role in 
the financial crisis”. The inquiry also “helped inform criminal cases against 
more than 100 people in the financial sector”. Professor Stefan Olafsson 
from the University of Iceland was quoted as saying that while most people 
“thought it was going to be a whitewash... in fact it was far reaching and 
comprehensive with major legal, political and legislative consequences”. The 
article explained that the document was so widely praised by the people of 
Iceland that “all nine volumes of the 2,000-page report were read out in full 
to audiences at The Reykjavik City Theatre nonstop over several days”.  
 
 
Lawsuits against Barclays and other rate-rigging banks 
 
On 30 July 2012, The Times published an article detailing the first movement 
of legal action against banks as a result of their manipulation of Libor. The 
article, headlined “British investors hit out at rate-rig banks with group 
action to demand money back” (Kennedy 13), detailed how lawyers were 
preparing to argue that “banks that colluded to drive down rates to the 
detriment of customers are in breach of competition law”. The article 
explained that deals signed with banks based on flawed rates could be 
treated as void because the banks were essentially “loading the dice”. Thus, 
lawyers were preparing advice notes to potential clients on “how to sue 
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banks for rigging Libor”, illustrating the far-reaching consequences of the 
bank’s criminal misconduct. 
 
The article made repeated reference to “collusion”, arguing that if banks 
were seen to have colluded to force Libor down, this could be treated “as if it 
were a cartel… [in which] they may have unlawfully abused a dominant 
position” (Kennedy 13). The article made clear that although Barclays was 
the only bank to admit to manipulating Libor, the US Department of Justice 
stated that Barclays had been doing so in order to stay “within the pack”, 
which as competition lawyer Susannah Sheppard argued, “could be seen as a 
group activity”. A similar article in The Wall Street Journal (Eaglesham et al 
C1) explained that in the US, an anti-trust law called the Donnelly Act would 
allow the attorney general to sue banks for collusion. Under this law, banks 
are vulnerable to triple the amount of total damages. However, The Wall 
Street Journal highlighted the difficulties of potential lawsuits involving 
collusion, explaining, “Plaintiffs will have to prove that the banks colluded to 
rig rates, show how that collusion affected Libor and connect changes in the 
interest rate to losses suffered by the plaintiffs”. 
 
The importance of the legal claims against banks that manipulated Libor 
was articulated in an article published in The Financial Times on 1 August 
2012. The article, headlined “Underwriters keep a wary watch for banks’ 
potential Libor exposure” (Saigol et al 17), asserted that according to one of 
the world’s biggest insurance brokers, Libor claims could be “a bigger game 
changer” for underwriters than the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis. In 
addition, there are fears that Libor could become a “litigation-fest for four 
years or more”. Barclays’ investors joined the long list of lawsuits being filed 
against the bank, arguing that they were “harmed” because Barclays “lied 
about being a ‘model corporate citizen’”. They blamed the bank for causing a 
drop in the share price. The article also highlighted the limitations of the UK 
justice system, explaining that in addition to the UK’s lack of a class-action 
system, awards tend to be far lower in the UK than in the US. Furthermore, 
the article argued that commercial-court judges in the UK may be wary of 
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handing down a decision that could set a possible precedent, “open[ing] the 
flood gates” and ultimately unravelling worldwide contracts based on Libor. 
 
The strong emphasis on news values by the two UK newspapers indicates a 
firm fulfilment of newsworthiness imperatives. Their extensive inquiry into 
the wide range of elites involved firmly emphasised the ‘elite’ news value. 
This was then combined with a strong emphasis on the ‘bad/negative’ news 
value by overtly highlighting the strong critical reaction by UK political 
elites. In contrast, the US coverage featured a narrow focus on the primary 
definers of the scandal, with a lack of US political elites potentially limiting 
the coverage’s emphasis on these two news values. Thus, this suggests a link 
between elite reaction and news values. However, the divide in criminal 
urgency between the UK and US authorities revealed a paradox between 
media coverage and the tangible consequences of the scandal. Although the 
UK coverage firmly emphasised the ‘elite’, ‘bad/negative’, 
‘meaningful/relevance’, and ‘threshold/magnitude’ news values, and thus 
revealed a strong degree of moral accountability, this did not guarantee a 
strong degree of legal accountability in courts of law. Although the US 
coverage’s emphasis on news values was not as strong as the UK coverage, 
this did not categorically prevent a strong degree of legal accountability. 
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PERSONALISATION 
 
Ranking of newspapers’ fulfilment of newsworthiness imperatives – most 
(1) to least (4) 
1. The Times    (UK: Mainstream) 
2. The Financial Times   (UK: Financial) 
3. The New York Times   (US: Mainstream) 
4. The Wall Street Journal  (US: Financial) 
 
There was a clear divide in the coverage between the countries in their use 
of personalisation. The two UK newspapers capitalised on the many 
opportunities to personalise the scandal through the inextricable 
relationship between individuals at Barclays, the Bank of England and the 
New York Fed. The UK newspapers transformed the abstract concepts of the 
scandal into a highly personalised narrative by attributing blame to, and 
featuring relentless coverage of, Barclays Chief Executive Bob Diamond and 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England Paul Tucker. The UK coverage 
prominently and repeatedly put a human face to the Bank of England, 
turning Mr. Tucker into a culpable villain. In contrast, the US coverage 
remained at the most abstract end of the personalisation scale, often 
referring to ‘The New York Fed’ as an abstract institution as opposed to 
singling out then-President of the New York Fed Timothy Geithner, or 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. Although personalisation is not 
the only way in which to report critically, this lack of personalisation 
diminished the newsworthiness of the scandal and complicated notions of 
both legal and moral accountability. Ironically, an article in The New York 
Times explained, the scandal clearly illustrates “the tangled web of 
relationships…where authorities and bankers maintain close ties” (Protess 
and Scott B1).  
 
The use of personalisation by the UK newspapers could be viewed as a 
frame that supports a ‘few bad apples’ interpretation of the scandal as 
opposed to a ‘rotten system’. At the centre of this frame were Bob Diamond 
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and Paul Tucker, who were overtly branded as the ‘villains’ of the scandal. 
Indeed, one article in The Times explicitly labelled Bob Diamond as “The 
former Barclays boss-turned-panto-villain” (Parkinson 30). In the case of Mr. 
Tucker, the newspapers exploited his vulnerable position as the front-
runner to take over the position as Governor of the Bank of England to 
further their personalised narrative. Revelations of his close association 
with central villain Bob Diamond produced a personalised narrative that 
enabled a potential alteration of public attitudes toward these two 
individuals. The UK press also repeatedly featured Governor of the Bank of 
England Sir Mervyn King in their coverage, creating a network of 
relationships that was manageable enough to enable a personalised 
narrative to emerge. The coverage used “a certain degree” of personalisation, 
in accordance with Tomlinson (82), in order to connect these individuals to 
the larger issue of corruption, and provide an accessible context to explain 
the complexities of the scandal.  
 
Most noteworthy in the personalisation of the coverage by all four 
newspapers was the minimal reference to Barclays Chief Operating Officer 
Jerry del Missier. Mr. del Missier was, in fact, the senior Barclays executive 
who ordered colleagues to lower the Libor rate after he “misunderstood” a 
telephone conversation between Bob Diamond and Paul Tucker. This could 
have been a potential opportunity to pin the blame on an indisputable 
culpable ‘villain’, who was once described by The Financial Times as “the 
linchpin” in the bank’s involvement in the scandal (Jenkins 23). However, all 
four newspapers personalised the scandal through the roles that Mr. 
Diamond and Mr. Tucker played in this infamous telephone conversation; 
Mr. del Missier was largely overlooked. The FSA’s official report into the 
scandal suggests as a potential reason for the media’s lack of personalisation 
with regard to Mr. del Missier. Their report asserted that the conversation 
between Mr. Diamond and Mr. Tucker was “misunderstood” by Mr. del 
Missier – a term that was repeatedly used in the coverage. Ultimately, the 
personalisation of the scandal through Mr. Diamond and Mr. Tucker 
strongly fulfilled watchdog imperatives. Personalising the scandal through 
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the culpability of these high-level individuals enabled a stronger degree of 
accountability. 
 
 
The Central Villain: Bob Diamond, Barclays Chief Executive 
 
On 30 June 2012, The Times published an article that used a personalised 
narrative to depict Bob Diamond as the central villain in the scandal. The 
article, headlined “Barclays chief to be put on spot over rate-fixing scandal” 
(Hosking et al 8), reported that Mr. Diamond would undergo a detailed 
cross-examination by MPs over whether “he personally put pressure on 
bank officials to manipulate Libor”. Personalisation of this scandal is 
particularly important when considering the rather abstract statements 
issued by US regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
For example, the article explained that the CFTC stated that problems with 
Libor were discussed among “high levels of management within Barclays 
Bank” in late 2007, with “certain senior managers” then giving the 
instruction to submit false rates.  
 
Some interesting insights into the relationship between personalisation and 
newsworthiness were evident within the article. The first phase of the 
scandal, in which Barclays was manipulating Libor to boost profits, lacked 
the potential for a personalised narrative, with Mr. Diamond explicitly 
asserting that “only a small number of people” were responsible. Thus, 
blame was essentially attributed to “obscure underlings operating without 
their bosses knowledge” (Entman 28). However, the potential for 
personalisation increased with the second phase of the scandal, in which the 
manipulation was an attempt to calm market jitters about the bank’s 
financial strength. The article explained that Mr. Diamond had been “much 
less candid” about the role of “senior Barclays’ staff” in this second phase, 
with MPs wanting to know whether Mr Diamond was one of the “senior 
figures” in the bank who put pressure on junior staff to act dishonestly. The 
article explained that Mr. Diamond was looking “particularly vulnerable”.  
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On 4 July 2012, The Times used personalisation in the reporting of Bob 
Diamond’s resignation. The report used a chronological narrative in a story-
like fashion as opposed to the traditional inverted pyramid structure. In 
addition, it used several metaphors to paint a strong visual image for the 
reader. The article, headlined “Sir Mervyn cut up rough – and decided 
Diamond Bob had to go” (Wighton 6,7), depicted Mr. Diamond’s resignation 
as an “old-fashioned execution”. The Governor of the Bank of England Sir 
Mervyn King made a call to Barclays’ outgoing chairman Marcus Agius the 
previous night in which he signalled that Mr. Diamond should step down. 
The article used language to establish a personalised narrative, stating Mr. 
Agius “did not need to hand Mr Diamond the revolver” as he realised “the 
game was up”. At 7.30am, Mr. Diamond’s resignation was announced, 
“bringing to a climax one of the most extraordinary weeks in Barclays’ 300-
year history”. The article discussed Mr. Diamond’s “controversial” career, 
and that he had now come to represent “the inability of Britain’s big banks 
to realise that the world had changed since the financial crisis”. For Sir 
Mervyn King, Mr. Diamond represented “much of what is wrong with British 
banking”. Although the “combative” Mr. Diamond was “determined not to 
bow to what he saw as unfair political and media pressure”, he decided that 
he must go “for the good of the organisation” and because if he stayed he 
would remain a “lightning rod for attacks on the bank”.  
 
On 5 July 2012, The Times published two articles that used personalisation 
to address the issues of culpability and culture. The articles, headlined “‘You 
seem to have seen nothing, heard nothing, known nothing’” (Hosking 8,9), 
and “Diamond refuses to take blame for rate fix” (Watson et al 1,9), both 
detailed Bob Diamond’s cross-examination by MPs. These articles indicate a 
link between personalisation and official political sources, as the media 
were able to construct a personalised narrative as a result of UK political 
elites questioning individuals. This indicates an intertwining of watchdog 
and newsworthiness imperatives. Although both articles reported that Mr. 
Diamond “declined to take personal culpability for the scandal”, their use of 
personalisation in fact suggested to, and potentially encouraged, the public 
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to view Mr. Diamond as personally responsible for the rate-rigging. This, 
therefore, encouraged the public to employ the “moral-imaginative 
reflection” (Tomlinson 77) that underpins scandals. The first article 
depicted a powerful sense of blame attributable to Mr. Diamond by 
reporting the strong critical reaction from MPs: “Either you were complicit, 
or grossly negligent, or grossly incompetent” (Hosking 8,9). Likewise, the 
second article reported a letter written by the FSA to the Barclays board in 
2010 that “sought reassurances that [Mr. Diamond] would establish the 
right culture and not encourage staff to take too many risks” (Watson et al 
1,9): aspects that, as the coverage revealed, were not sufficiently 
implemented by Mr. Diamond. 
 
On 4 July 2012, The Financial Times published an article headlined 
“Dramatic rise and fall of former trader who transformed lender” (Goff and 
Jenkins 15). The article used a high level of personalisation by examining the 
life and career of Bob Diamond, which “has never been short of drama”. The 
article explored Mr. Diamond’s career, explaining that he built his reputation 
at Barclays “almost as dramatically as he lost it”. The article pinpointed the 
moment that triggered the “fiercely competitive culture obsessed with 
short-term profits and bonuses” - a deal headed by Mr. Diamond in 2008 
that transformed Barclays into a “truly global and diversified bank”. It 
explained that Mr. Diamond, who was known for his “steadfast 
determination and relentless ambition”, was accused of being the 
“unacceptable face of banking” by Lord Mandelson in 2010: words that 
“came back to haunt the chief executive as he jumped from one controversy 
to the next”. 
 
On the same day, The New York Times published an article headlined “A 
Chief With Flair Falls From a Perch” (Thomas and Scott B1). The article also 
used a high level of personalisation by delving into the life and career of Bob 
Diamond, “a fiercely competitive Wall Street executive who hated to lose, 
[but who] recognised late Monday night that he was losing”. The article 
described Mr. Diamond as “charming, with a gleaming smile”, yet a man who 
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had now become a “lightning rod” and a “public enemy of sorts”. The article 
gave a comprehensive account of his career, detailing both his achievements 
and his pit falls. Interestingly, the article made reference to Mr. Diamond’s 
American ties on three occasions, with statements such as “the American-
born chief executive”, “Mr. Diamond…brought an American flair to the 
stodgy world of British banking”, and “…his embrace of the American-style 
pay and bonus culture became one of his main vulnerabilities”. On the one 
hand, these statements localise the scandal for an American audience by 
drawing direct connections between Mr. Diamond and the US. However, on 
the other hand, it is surprising that The New York Times was, in fact, 
reminding the public that the ‘central villain’ in the scandal has roots in the 
US.  
 
Continuing the personalisation of the scandal through Bob Diamond, The 
Financial Times and The New York Times published articles on 11 July 2012 
that detailed the history leading up to the scandal. The Financial Times 
article, headlined “Barclays tensions with FSA laid bare” (Jenkins and Goff 
14), detailed a “damning selection of letter exchanges” between the FSA and 
Barclays dating back to 2010. The central theme in the letters was the 
“unease” and “scepticism” surrounding the appointment of Bob Diamond as 
Chief Executive, which was ultimately the underlying issue that created “the 
dysfunctional relationship that had grown up between the bank and 
regulators”. The letters discussed the need for Mr. Diamond to develop “a 
close, open and transparent relationship with regulators in the UK and 
around the world [which requires] an increased level of engagement from 
[him].” Furthermore, the letters stressed the need for Mr. Diamond to set 
“the right culture, risk appetite and control framework across the entire 
organisation”.  
 
Similarly, The New York Times article, headlined “Parliament Questions 
Culture at Barclays” (Scott b. B1), also quoted sections of the FSA’s letter. 
The article detailed how lawmakers had primarily focused on the actions of 
Mr. Diamond, “wondering what went wrong inside the bank”. The article 
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detailed the criticism of Mr. Diamond’s leadership and management style, 
which in fact “came months – and in one case, years – before the bank came 
under fire for trying to manipulate [Libor]”. This revelation set up a 
personalised narrative in which Mr. Diamond was depicted as the root cause 
of a socially significant problem within the financial industry, which 
ultimately culminated in the manipulation of Libor. 
 
 
Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England 
 
On 4 July 2012, The Times published an article explaining that Mr. Tucker, 
one of Britain’s “most influential and respected public servants”, had been 
pulled into the scandal. The article was headlined “The waters are muddied 
and the net widens after that nudge-nudge, wink-wink moment” (Fleming 9). 
Although it was featured in the ‘News’ section of the newspaper, it reads 
more like a commentary, using a high level of personalisation by detailing 
Mr. Tucker’s exceptional professional qualities: 
 
He is renowned for his impressive contact book and his understanding of 
the intricate workings of the financial system. [He] is a hands-on player, 
perpetually scrolling through his messages on his BlackBerry when he’s out 
of the office as he keeps up with developments…. Mr Tucker has always 
shown more finesse [than his superior Sir Mervyn King]. 
 
 
The personalisation of Mr. Tucker in this article revealed an interesting 
discrepancy in the interpretation of the infamous telephone conversation 
with Mr. Diamond. Although Mr. Tucker was officially cleared by the FSA of 
any wrongdoing in regards to the conversation, the UK newspapers 
frequently insinuated otherwise. The FSA’s official report concluded that Mr. 
Tucker gave no instruction to put in lower submissions when he informed 
Mr. Diamond that “it did not always need to be the case that we appear as 
high as we have recently”: this statement was apparently “misunderstood” 
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(Fleming 9). However, in their personalisation of the scandal, the UK 
newspapers repeatedly articulated that the conversation could, in fact, be 
interpreted as “Mr. Tucker hinting that Barclays could lower its submissions” 
(Fleming 9; Waller 15). An article published in The Times articulated that Mr. 
Diamond “insist[ed] that he did not believe that he had received any 
instructions from Mr Tucker at all”, and that the FSA reached the same 
conclusion (Fleming 9). However, the article explained that Mr. Tucker’s 
statement “could be interpreted as a “nudge nudge, wink wink” moment” 
(Fleming 9). The article went on to explain that Mr. Tucker could, therefore, 
be called to appear before MPs. Thus, the UK newspapers not only used 
personalisation as a form of newsworthiness, but also used it as a way to 
fulfil watchdog imperatives, challenging the official accounts and remaining 
sceptical and critical. 
 
On 21 July 2012, The Times published an article that used personalisation in 
an interesting manner, portraying Mr. Tucker as both a villain and a hero. 
The article, headlined “Tucker knew that banks could fiddle Libor figure” 
(Hosking 64), firstly attributed blame to the “embattled” Mr. Tucker, who 
“conceded in an internal memo four years ago that it was “plausible” that 
banks were fiddling Libor in order to maximise their profits”. The article 
explained that while Mr. Tucker’s memo did not explicitly pinpoint any 
dishonesty, it strongly indicated that the Bank may have suspected 
wrongdoing by banks during that time – “something that it has denied”. 
However, the article then reported that “several senior people in 
Westminster gave their backing to Mr Tucker”, including Lord Oakeshott, 
the former Liberal Democrat Treasury minister, who defended Mr. Tucker’s 
chances of becoming the next Governor of the Bank of England. Similarly, 
the article quoted Lord Myners, the former Labour Treasury minister, who 
praised Mr. Tucker as being “an absolute hero during [2008] in rescuing the 
banking system from complete collapse”.   
 
At times, the UK coverage used the close link between Paul Tucker and Bob 
Diamond to further their personalisation of Mr. Tucker. On 18 July 2012, The 
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Times and The Financial Times published articles reporting on newly 
disclosed “chummy emails” that revealed “the warm relationship” between 
Mr. Tucker and Mr. Diamond, “adding to evidence that the Bank was part of 
an alleged conspiracy to rig interest rates” (Hosking 13). The articles, 
headlined “Bank on the rack for ‘lowballing Libor’” (Hosking 13), and 
“Tucker faces threat of falling at the last fence in race for top job” (Giles 3), 
personalised the scandal through Mr. Tucker’s relationship with Bob 
Diamond. The Financial Times exploited Mr. Tucker’s particularly vulnerable 
position, explaining that things “do not get much worse” for “someone 
favourite to become the next Bank of England governor” (Giles 3). The 
emails showed Mr. Diamond’s reaction to Mr Tucker being promoted to 
Deputy Governor in 2008, in which he says “Paul, Congratulations. Well 
done, man, I am really, really proud of you. Talk soon. Bob”. Mr. Tucker 
replied, saying, “Thanks so much Bob. You’ve been an absolute brick 
through this, Paul”.  
 
The Financial Times continued to explore the close link between Mr. Tucker 
and Mr. Diamond in an article headlined “Diamond testimony pivotal for 
BoE deputy” (Giles 18). While Mr. Diamond’s questioning by MPs would be 
pivotal for his own career, the article explained, “It is also shaping up to be 
just as important for Paul Tucker”. As the article highlighted, “the stakes 
could hardly be higher” for Mr. Tucker, who was the front-runner to replace 
Sir Mervyn King as Governor of the Bank of England. The article explained 
that Mr. Diamond was considering implicating the Bank of England, and Mr. 
Tucker in particular, by questioning whether he knew of, and even 
condoned, Libor manipulation. Thus, Mr. Tucker’s front-runner status could 
be put in serious jeopardy.  
 
While Mr. Diamond did not, in fact, end up implicating Mr. Tucker, the 
Deputy Governor’s status remained in jeopardy. The Financial Times 
articulated this on 9 July 2012 in the lead-up to Paul Tucker’s own 
questioning by MPs. Their article, headlined “Bank of England deputy 
governor faces tough questions” (Giles and Kuchler 17), again expressed 
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that “the stakes could not be much higher for the deputy governor who 
hopes to be appointed governor in the autumn”. The article asserted that Mr. 
Tucker must “fight to keep alive his ambition”, detailing that the he had a 
low public profile until he became associated with central villain Bob 
Diamond. The article explained that Mr. Tucker would be questioned on 
whether he personally sanctioned Barclays to submit artificially low Libor 
rates, and if he knew it was common practice in other banks to low-ball 
Libor. It went on to state that if he was not, in fact, aware of this, he would 
be questioned as to whether he was therefore “asleep at the wheel”. 
 
The Times continued their relentless personalisation of the scandal through 
Mr. Tucker by detailing the “bruising” cross-examination by MPs of the 
Deputy Governor on 10 July 2012. Again, this article indicates the link 
between personalisation and official political sources, as the context of UK 
political elites questioning individuals enabled a strong personalised 
narrative to emerge. The article, headlined, “Bank was in a mess, deputy 
admits” (Savage and Bremner 4), explained that Mr. Tucker “looked most 
uncomfortable” when questioned about the failure of the Bank to act on 
warning signs of the rigging of Libor in 2007. In addition, MPs accused Mr. 
Tucker of obstructing parliament due to delays in the submission of emails 
requested by them, which arrived too late to be used when questioning Bob 
Diamond. The article quoted Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the Treasury Select 
Committee, who asserted, “It doesn’t look good, Mr Tucker, I have to tell 
you”, and Conservative MP Andrea Leadsom who argued that his evidence 
was “contradictory”. The article explained that one interpretation of the 
telephone conversation with Mr. Diamond was that Mr. Tucker encouraged 
Barclays to low-ball Libor. However, during his questioning by MPs, Mr. 
Tucker dismissed this suggestion by stating that that part of the 
conversation “gives the wrong impression”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England 
 
On 14 July and 16 July 2012, The Times personalised the scandal through 
another culpable individual, Sir Mervyn King. The first article, headlined, 
“Americans warned Bank governor of Libor fixing four years before the 
scandal broke” (Costello 17), explained that Mr. King was “thrust to the 
heart of the rate-rigging scandal” after it was revealed that then-president of 
the New York Fed Timothy Geithner had pressed Mr. King to clean up Libor 
four years prior. The article explained that email exchanges released by the 
Bank of England showed that Mr. King was aware of potential “deliberate 
misreporting” of the Libor rate in June 2008, and was urged by Mr. Geithner 
to introduce six measures to restore Libor’s credibility. The article explained 
that these email revelations had “turned the spotlight on Sir Mervyn”. In a 
follow-up article, headlined, “Bank faces questions over rate rigging” 
(Hosking 13), it was reported that Mr. King would be questioned by MPs 
about the email. This would focus on the “apparent contradiction between 
warning signs received by the Bank in 2008 and its expressed belief that no 
dishonesty was taking place”. The article also explained that the Bank’s 
insistence that it was unaware of dishonesty “appears to conflict with 
evidence from Bob Diamond”. 
 
On 18 July 2012, The Times detailed the “hostile questioning” of Mr. King in 
an article headlined, “Bank on the rack for ‘lowballing Libor’” (Hosking 13). 
The article explained that MPs “expressed scepticism over [Mr. King’s] claim 
that he knew nothing about dishonest Libor submissions until recently”. The 
article transcribed the “testy exchange” between MP Michael Fallon and Mr. 
King, in which Mr. King “snapped back” at the suggestions put forth by Mr. 
Fallon. The article clearly navigated the complex relationships exposed by 
the scandal, with Mr. King explaining that the “regular pattern of behaviour” 
at Barclays led the Bank to question “the navigational skills of the captain on 
the bridge” – aka Mr. Diamond. 
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The Times developed their personalised narrative with an article on 26 July 
2012 that relayed Timothy Geithner’s version of events. The article, 
headlined “Geithner points finger at the Bank” (Robertson 31), explained 
that Mr. Geithner made his “most direct criticism of Sir Mervyn King and the 
Bank of England” by blaming them for “failing to prevent the interest rate-
rigging scandal”. The article gave a detailed account of the communication 
between Mr. King and Mr. Geithner, in which Mr. Geithner stated that if his 
recommendations for reform had been adopted - outlined in the “very 
detailed memo” to Mr. King in 2008 – “it would have severely reduced, or 
eliminated, the risk going forward”. The article explained that Mr. Geithner 
said it was up to the Governor to address the concerns. However, Mr. King 
“denied receiving any evidence of rigging or misconduct”.  
 
 
Timothy Geithner, then-President of the New York Fed 
 
While the UK press featured relentless coverage of Paul Tucker as the face of 
the Bank of England in order to personalise the scandal, the US coverage did 
the complete opposite. The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal only 
featured two articles each that were overtly dedicated to Timothy Geithner, 
then-president of the New York Fed: the remainder of their articles 
preferred to use the term “The New York Fed” as opposed to singling out Mr. 
Geithner. For example, on 14 July 2012, The New York Times published an 
article headlined “New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports on Rates” 
(de la Merced and Protess B1). The article was riddled with statements such 
as; “The New York Fed learned about concerns over the integrity of Libor in 
summer 2007”; “The New York Fed conferred with British and American 
regulators”; “The New York Fed thought the reports amounted to market 
chatter and did not provide definitive proof of widespread manipulation”; 
“The New York Fed started notifying other American regulators”; and “The 
New York Fed defended its actions”.  
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Similarly, on 25 July 2012, The New York Times published an article 
headlined “New York Fed Faces Questions Over Policing Wall St.” (Protess 
and Silver-Greenberg B1). This article included statements such as; “the 
interest-rate investigation [has] raised questions about the New York Fed”; 
“The New York Fed, which knew Barclays had been reporting false rates at 
the time, did not stop the actions”; “The New York Fed has been engulfed in 
controversy since the financial crisis”; “In the case of Libor, the New York 
Fed took a somewhat passive approach. Despite mounting evidence of 
problems, the agency focused on policy solutions rather than the 
wrongdoing”.  
 
The similarities with The Wall Street Journal were striking in terms of their 
lack of personalisation. On 12 July 2012, the newspaper published an article 
headlined, “Fed to document Libor Action – Official Says Reports From Crisis 
Period Will Show Swift Response to Problems” (Paletta C2). This article 
featured statements such as; “The Federal Reserve Bank of New York acted 
swiftly…to identify problems with a key interest rate and suggest changes”; 
“the New York Fed took prompt action four years ago to highlight problems 
with [Libor]”; “Some members of congress…have raised questions over 
whether the New York Fed knew that certain banks were manipulating 
Libor and whether it should have done more to intervene”; and “The New 
York Fed has said it started receiving reports about the problem in 2007”.  
 
Similarly, on 14 July 2012, The Wall Street Journal published an article 
headlined “Libor Talks Go Back to Early ‘08” (Paletta et al B2). This article 
featured statements such as; “Top US and UK officials were aware in early 
2008 that large international banks might have intentionally distorted 
[Libor]”; “the documents are likely to heighten pressure on US and UK 
regulators to explain why they didn’t do more to either investigate or stop 
banks from misreporting [Libor rates]”, and “The latest disclosures raise 
questions about how the Fed handled the situation”. 
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This reporting by The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal places 
their coverage on the highly abstract end of the personalisation scale. 
Although at times their articles featured interesting insights about the 
scandal, their repeated use of the abstract institution ‘The New York Fed’ as 
opposed to singling out Timothy Geithner meant that they failed to 
personalise the scandal to a similar extent as the UK newspapers. This not 
only significantly diminished the newsworthiness of the scandal in the US, 
but also complicated notions of both moral and legal accountability. The lack 
of a clearly defined culpable villain resulted in a weakening of public debate 
about the scandal in the court of public opinion, as well as a difficulty in 
holding key individuals accountable in courts of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
News media’s challenge to balance an idealised socio-political role and a 
commercial responsibility has been analysed through the investigation of 
four newspapers’ coverage of the Libor scandal. The analysis revealed a 
complementary relationship between these potentially conflicting, and often 
mutually exclusive, aspects of news media as the coverage demonstrated an 
equal emphasis – or lack thereof – on both newsworthiness and watchdog 
imperatives. Thus, scandals represent a unique case in which dramatic mass 
interest imperatives combine with critical public interest imperatives. 
However, the unexpectedly large divide in coverage between the UK 
newspapers and the US newspapers signifies that the divide between 
domestic and foreign news is significantly more important than the divide 
between news media’s idealised socio-political role and its commercial 
aspects. Although the US press did cover the scandal, and at times offered 
insightful reporting, their fulfilment of watchdog and newsworthiness 
imperatives did not match that demonstrated by the UK newspapers. The 
results of the analysis suggest that an equal fulfilment of both watchdog and 
newsworthiness imperatives – demonstrated throughout the coverage by 
the UK press – can offer a comprehensive investigation of, and increase 
public concern for, issues within an international scandal. In contrast, a lack 
of fulfilment of both watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives – 
demonstrated throughout the coverage by the US press – can result in a 
weakening of public attention and debate about foreign issues that directly 
affect domestic political and economic policy. In addition, the analysis 
revealed that official sources play a crucial role in fulfilling both watchdog 
and newsworthiness imperatives, which raised questions as to whether the 
coverage was supporting the indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990) or the 
CNN effect. Furthermore, the unexpected similarities between specialist and 
mainstream publications suggest that both publications consider scandals 
newsworthy. 
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The complementary relationship between watchdog and newsworthiness 
imperatives underpinned the divide between domestic and foreign news. 
The UK coverage was substantially more comprehensive than the US 
coverage as they balanced an emphasis on the moral aspects of the scandal – 
as a measure of watchdog imperatives – and construction of a personalised 
narrative – as a measure of newsworthiness imperatives. Their coverage 
clearly articulated the more ambiguous and largely anonymous set of 
targets, such as the financial industry’s ‘culture of systematic greed, 
excessive risk and executive bonuses’, while simultaneously establishing the 
accountability of two key individuals. In addition, these two categories were 
united through the articulation that Bob Diamond was personally 
responsible for the morality and culture of the industry. Although at times 
the nature of the event made personalisation more likely, for example the 
questioning of individuals by MPs, the UK coverage gives credence to the 
argument that personalisation can bridge the gap between newsworthiness 
imperatives and watchdog imperatives: personalisation of this scandal in 
the UK both engaged people and offered “an entry point to everyday 
discussions of morality, boundaries and appropriate behaviour” (Bird 44). 
 
The UK coverage indicated a strong recognition of the commercial 
advantages of watchdog journalism. Their equal emphasis on watchdog and 
newsworthiness imperatives suggested a drive by UK journalists to act as a 
disinterested check on the abuse of power by individuals whilst boosting 
profits through an emphasis on news values to attract and maintain 
audience attention. This relationship indicates an intertwining of McManus’ 
two potentially conflicting theories of news selection. The equal emphasis 
on watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives suggests that socially 
responsible journalism can at times, and in the context of a scandal, work in 
tandem with maximising the return to shareholders. This enabled the 
scandal to remain a valuable resource for UK citizens.  
 
In contrast, the US coverage demonstrated a number of Entman’s “blocked 
scandal traits” (138-147), which underpin watchdog and newsworthiness 
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imperatives. Similarly to Entman’s case study on George W. Bush’s insider 
trading, the US coverage vaguely described the precise nature of the Libor 
manipulation, which stripped it of resonance. The coverage failed to 
aggressively question the individuals involved or demand official 
investigations, failed to emphasise the substantive social impact, and used a 
limited range of sources, which ultimately resulted in the US coverage failing 
to construct a scandal frame.  
 
 
Official Sources 
 
The use of official political sources was a crucial element in the coverage as 
a whole, which raised questions as to whether the coverage was supporting 
the indexing hypothesis as articulated by Bennett (1990) or the CNN effect. 
The use of official sources supported the indexing hypothesis as political 
elites often facilitated discussions on morality, enabled certain news values 
to be emphasised, and enabled the construction of a personalised narrative. 
Indeed, The Times’ strong emphasis on morality was certainly aided by the 
use of official political source Ed Miliband and his negative comments 
regarding the ethics of the individuals involved and the financial sector as a 
whole. Similarly, The Financial Times’ strong emphasis on certain news 
values, including the ‘elite’ and ‘bad/negative’ news values, was aided by the 
use of numerous official political sources. In addition, both The Times and 
The Financial Times were able to construct a personalised narrative to 
establish newsworthiness through the use of official company sources 
including Bob Diamond and Paul Tucker. The analysis also revealed that the 
coverage was supporting the CNN effect, as the media’s highlighting of 
wrongdoing helped to elicit the critical and moral responses from political 
elites. This was particularly evident in news articles and editorials published 
by The Times, headlined “Banks must solve question of ethics” (Ferguson et 
al 34) and “It’s the end of a dangerous moral experiment” (Sacks 22). Thus, 
both political sources and the media themselves introduced the critical and 
moral issues that underpin the scandal. 
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The emphasis on official political sources and their strong negative 
reactions revealed a significantly stronger interest in accountability among 
elites and media in the UK. This complicates Bennett et al’s argument in that 
it reveals a contentiously optimistic view of powerful sources driving the 
news. This focus on official political sources essentially paved the way for an 
“ideal news source” in accordance with Bell’s views on newsworthiness, as 
the official political sources were not only used as a form of political 
authority, but were also news actors, “someone whose own words make the 
news” (194). In addition, this significantly magnified the scandal’s coverage, 
and enabled the UK press to remain critical of the version of events being 
told from official company sources. This ultimately demonstrated a stronger 
willingness to question and challenge official versions of events, in 
accordance with the ideals articulated by Bennett et al and Entman (6; 140).  
 
Furthermore, the two UK newspapers’ heavy use of official political sources 
created the institutional cues that sharpen and sustain a story, as the UK 
media were more easily able to report on official government actions and 
their response to revelations. The Libor scandal did not descend into silence 
in the UK news media because newsworthy remedial action was firmly 
initiated by political elites, which garnered powerful scandal sponsors and 
enabled a consistent stream of coverage. 
 
In contrast, the absence of official political sources in the US coverage 
resulted in a lack of emphasis on news values and personalised narrative, 
which in turn made it difficult to initiate a strong emphasis on the morality 
underpinning the scandal. The coverage did not reveal whether this was a 
result of US political elites not getting as heavily involved in the debate, or 
whether reporters did not approach them for comment. This resulted in the 
US news media treating the scandal with a strong sense of detachment and 
neglecting to offer explicit value judgements, which are in fact considered 
more appropriate in foreign news (Gans 31). The consequences of this were 
significant, as this weakened the potential for strong public debate about an 
issue that affected American political and economic policy. Therefore, the 
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absence of official political sources in the US coverage significantly 
underpinned the divide between domestic and foreign news.  
 
The US news media’s lack of emphasis on news values underscored a 
somewhat overlooked aspect of Galtung and Ruge’s study: their 
investigation was specifically concerned with how foreign events become 
news. The differences in the perceived newsworthiness of the Libor scandal 
by the UK and US newspapers suggest that news values are not universal – 
in addition to Allern’s distinction between ‘traditional’ news values and 
‘commercial’ news values, there is an equal need to distinguish between 
domestic and foreign news values.  
 
 
Specialist vs. Mainstream Publications 
 
The unexpectedly comparable coverage between the specialist and 
mainstream publications indicates that both publications consider scandals 
to be newsworthy. The coverage by specialist publication The Financial 
Times was particularly noteworthy, with the newspaper exceeding 
expectations by demonstrating a strong emphasis on ‘public interest’ 
reporting that often rivalled mainstream newspaper The Times. Thus, their 
coverage demonstrated a convincing embracement of ethical and social 
responsibilities. In addition, The Financial Times exceeded expectations by 
emphasising similar newsworthiness imperatives as mainstream 
newspaper The Times. The newspaper succeeded in making this highly 
complex financial scandal newsworthy “in the immediate sense of 
mainstream news values” (Manning 179), and succeeded in creating “a 
‘personality’ around which to hang information” (Manning 179).  
 
The emphasis on the morality underpinning the scandal and the emphasis 
on news values significantly contributed to the minimal divide between 
specialist and mainstream newspapers. The Financial Times, in particular, 
was equally concerned with emphasising the normative issues of the 
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scandal as it was the political-economic issues. The newspaper’s repeated 
discussions regarding corporate culture and the need for a cultural 
revolution in banking, alongside a policy revolution, exceeded the 
newspaper’s responsibilities to investors and shareholders. This was 
furthered by their examination of Bob Diamond’s “moral defence” (Jenkins 
19), the move by customers to “ethical banks” (Bridge 57; Goff 15), and the 
need for tougher enforcement to change the values held by bankers 
(“Reforming British banking after Libor” 6). The newspaper’s unexpectedly 
strong emotive undertone in their discussions of MPs’ reactions significantly 
heightened their emphasis on news values and in fact exceeded that 
demonstrated by mainstream newspaper The Times. This complicates 
Doyle’s assertions, as business and financial journalists working for 
specialist publications can, at times, have a similar sense of what is 
newsworthy to that of journalists working for mainstream publications.  
 
 
Accountability 
 
The analysis revealed an interesting paradox between the emphasis of 
watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives and the tangible consequences 
of the scandal. Despite the UK’s firm emphasis on the uproar resulting from 
the scandal and the need to hold individuals accountable, the coverage 
revealed an interesting lack of criminal urgency by UK enforcers. This was 
partly as a result of confusion surrounding the UK’s criminal enforcement 
regime, and partly as a result of their apparent hesitance in their co-
ordination with US enforcers. In contrast, despite the evident lack of 
watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives, the US coverage suggested US 
enforcers were progressing well with criminal proceedings. As one article 
articulated, the US Justice Department and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission spent two years building cases together (Protess and Scott B1). 
In addition, US enforcers wield significantly more power, as the Commodity 
Exchange Act directly makes Libor rigging a criminal offence (Masters and 
Binham 18). This indicates that although the fulfilment of watchdog and 
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newsworthiness imperatives by the UK coverage revealed a high degree of 
“moral accountability”, in which the scandal was overtly debated and 
framed in the court of public opinion, this did not guarantee a high degree of 
“legal accountability” in courts of law (Hallahan 221). Although the lack of 
fulfilment of watchdog and newsworthiness imperatives by the US press 
resulted in a low degree of “moral accountability”, this did not categorically 
prevent the potential for “legal accountability”. 
 
 
Future Research 
 
A natural progression from this research would be to conduct a 
comprehensive investigation into the divide between domestic and foreign 
news. A specific examination of news values could investigate the extent to 
which domestic news is governed by a different set of news values to foreign 
news. In addition, a more intensive examination of the media’s use of official 
sources may give some insight into the conditions that determine whether 
official sources are supportive of, or an impediment to, the news media’s 
watchdog role. These elements were highly visible within this analysis and 
thus warrant further investigation. 
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